Charles R. Daoust

The appellant challenged the appointment of a unilingual Lieutenant Governor of New Brunswick as inconsistent with the province’s constitutional language guarantees.

The majority held that s. 16(2) of the Charter, interpreted purposively and in light of New Brunswick’s unique constitutional commitment to substantive linguistic equality, requires the holder of that unipersonal and highly symbolic office to be able to understand and communicate in both official languages when performing their functions.

The Court concluded that this requirement limits the exercise of the appointment power under s. 58 of the Constitution Act, 1867, but does not invalidate the office itself or amount to a constitutional amendment.

The appeal was allowed and a declaration issued, while the appointment and prior acts of the office holder were left undisturbed.

A three-judge dissent would have held that the Charter guarantees institutional rather than personal bilingualism and does not constitutionally mandate a bilingual appointee.

The plaintiff, former Chief Commissioner of the Canadian Human Rights Commission, brought defamation actions against the defendants over allegations of antisemitism.

The defendants brought anti-SLAPP motions to dismiss the actions.

Two organizations, Independent Jewish Voices Canada and the National Council of Canadian Muslims, brought motions to intervene in the anti-SLAPP motions to provide perspective on the meaning of antisemitism.

The court dismissed the motions to intervene, finding that anti-SLAPP motions are intended to be expeditious, preliminary screening mechanisms, and that adding interveners would unnecessarily expand the evidentiary record and scope of the private dispute.

The court also ordered that the defendants, as moving parties, would present their arguments first at the anti-SLAPP hearing.

The appellants challenged the validity of a clause in the will of Jeanne Dagenais Gravelle that granted her daughter Jocelyne Gravelle an option to purchase the family home for the amount of the remaining mortgage.

The appellants argued the clause was unenforceable because the mortgage had been fully paid at the time of the testator's death.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding the option clause valid and enforceable.

The court determined that the testator's intention was to allow Jocelyne to purchase the home even if the mortgage balance was zero, and that Jocelyne would be responsible for mortgage discharge fees as consideration for the purchase.

The plaintiff brought an action for defamation arising from a Facebook post made by his ex-wife, the defendant, approximately two years after the end of their roughly ten-year marriage.

The defendant counterclaimed for defamation and sexual battery.

The parties had lived in Los Angeles and were involved in the online gaming and pornography industries.

Their marriage was polyamorous in nature.

The defendant's Facebook post alleged that the plaintiff had sexually, physically, and emotionally abused her and other women during their marriage.

The court found that while many of the defendant's statements were truthful or constituted fair comment, certain statements regarding sexual assault, physical violence, and lack of consent were defamatory and not supported by the evidence.

The court dismissed the defendant's counterclaim for sexual battery, finding insufficient evidence of non-consensual sexual activity.

The plaintiff was awarded general damages for defamation.

The Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of Robert Paul Ireland from a judgment declaring his Facebook posts defamatory of the Ontario Federation of All Terrain Vehicle Clubs, ordering their removal, and enjoining further defamatory posts.

The court found no procedural unfairness or error in the application judge’s decision, holding that Mr. Ireland’s failure to file a notice of appearance precluded him from participating in the application, and that the Federation’s courtesy in providing him with information did not create further obligations.

The court also rejected arguments regarding service and limitations, and found no reviewable error in the application judge’s findings on defamation and available defences.

The court considered a motion by the respondent, Robert Paul Ireland, to set aside a default judgment granted in favour of the Ontario Federation of All Terrain Vehicle Clubs.

The judgment, issued after Ireland failed to attend the hearing, declared certain statements made by him on Facebook to be defamatory and ordered their removal.

Ireland argued he did not attend due to accident, mistake, or insufficient notice.

The court found that he was properly served, aware of the proceedings, and intentionally chose not to participate.

The motion to set aside the judgment was dismissed.

The defendant, Samantha Robinson (carrying on business as Postering Ottawa), brought an anti-SLAPP motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss a defamation action brought by Diffusart International and Marc Agostini.

The court found that while Robinson’s expressions related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiffs’ claim had substantial merit and Robinson did not have valid defences.

The court concluded that the harm to the plaintiffs outweighed the public interest in protecting Robinson’s expression, and dismissed the anti-SLAPP motion without costs.

The applicants brought a motion challenging the validity of their mother's will and the interpretation of a clause granting one of the respondents the option to purchase the family home for the remaining mortgage amount.

The court found the will valid, as the testator had acknowledged her signature in the presence of two witnesses, satisfying the strict compliance requirements of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The court also applied the armchair rule to interpret the purchase option, concluding the testator intended for the respondent to have the option to acquire the home even though the mortgage balance was zero at the time of death.

The estate trustee was ordered to pass accounts.

The Ontario Federation of All Terrain Vehicle Clubs (the "Federation") brought an application seeking declarations of defamation and a permanent injunction against Paul Ireland (also known as Robert Paul Ireland) for an online campaign of defamatory posts.

Mr. Ireland failed to respond to the application.

The court applied the three-part test for defamation from Grant v. Torstar, finding that Mr. Ireland's posts, which alleged corruption, fraud, and criminal conduct, were defamatory and would lower the Federation's reputation.

As Mr. Ireland presented no evidence, the court found no valid defence (justification, fair comment, or qualified privilege).

Consequently, the court granted the Federation's requested declaratory and equitable relief, ordering Mr. Ireland to remove the defamatory posts and permanently enjoining him from publishing similar statements.

The court also awarded costs to the Federation.

The appellant investors, who participated in a Ponzi scheme operated by a one-person corporation, sought to have the trustee in bankruptcy's unjust enrichment claims statute-barred under Ontario's Limitations Act, 2002 by attributing the directing mind's knowledge of illegal interest and commission payments to the corporation.

The majority held that the corporate attribution doctrine applies to one-person corporations on the same purposive, contextual, and pragmatic basis as to other corporations, and that courts retain discretion to decline attribution when it would undermine the purposes of the laws engaged — here, the limitations and bankruptcy regimes.

In concurrence, a separate judge held that resort to the common law corporate attribution doctrine was unnecessary because the codified agency rules in s. 12 of the Limitations Act, 2002 provided a complete answer, and that the claims were not discoverable until the trustee was authorized by the court to bring them.

All judges agreed that the investors were disentitled from equitable set-off for lack of clean hands, that the referral agreements were illegal contracts at common law, and that one appellant was not dealing at arm's length with the corporation.

The applicant brought a motion seeking extensive financial disclosure from the respondent and third-party corporate entities, alleging the respondent had significant control over family-related corporations.

The respondent contended he was merely an employee or minority shareholder with no control.

The court found that the respondent exercised direct or indirect influence or control in fact over the family corporations, largely due to the respondent's and third parties' failure to provide sufficient evidence clarifying his role and the corporate restructuring.

The court granted the applicant's disclosure order, requiring the respondent and several corporate entities to provide comprehensive financial and corporate records to enable a full assessment of the respondent's financial interests for equalization and income for child and spousal support.

The respondent's cross-motion for the applicant's travel information was adjourned, and one specific third-party disclosure request was denied as speculative.

The applicant, Claude Bachand, sought a declaration of his 25% beneficial interest in a jointly owned property, the sale proceeds of which were held in trust.

The property was originally purchased by the applicant and respondent Danielle Leclair, with both holding 50% in trust for respondent Marc Agostini.

The applicant claimed his 25% interest arose from his role as a grantor on the mortgage, while respondent Leclair argued she held beneficial ownership over his interest, relying on principles of purchase money resulting trust.

The court found that the applicant failed to rebut the presumption of a purchase money resulting trust, as he did not contribute financially to the property's acquisition or ongoing expenses.

The court concluded that the applicant held his interest in trust for Danielle Leclair, entitling her to the remaining net proceeds of sale after Marc Agostini's agreed-upon share.

The Carp Agricultural Society (CAS) revoked Laurie Dillon's membership, alleging conflict of interest and breach of fiduciary duty related to her family's involvement in the sale of an estate property where CAS was a beneficiary.

Dillon sought an order to nullify the decision and reinstate her membership.

CAS brought a cross-application to declare breaches of duty.

The court found that the CAS Board breached natural justice rules in its investigation and decision-making process, including procedural flaws and lack of proper reasons.

The court also determined that Dillon was not in a conflict of interest as defined by the Not-for-Profit Corporations Act, 2010, nor did she breach her fiduciary duties, as the transactions did not involve the CAS directly but rather the Estate Trustee.

The court set aside the revocation of membership and dismissed the CAS's cross-application.

This anti-SLAPP motion sought to dismiss a defamation counterclaim by Iron Horse Corporation and Robin St. Martin in the "Yates Action" and a separate action (the "St. Martin Action") for malicious prosecution and defamation against Robin Yates and Larry Yates.

The court found that the Yates' expressions related to matters of public interest, including gendered harassment by a powerful individual and the functioning of the justice system.

While the defamation counterclaim in the Yates Action was found to have substantial merit and was not dismissed due to the ongoing litigation, the St. Martin Action was dismissed.

The court concluded that the St. Martin Action lacked substantial merit, particularly the malicious prosecution claims, and was primarily strategic, with the public interest favoring its dismissal.

The respondents (Xus) brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the applicant's (Morven Construction) defamation application.

Morven sought an interim and permanent injunction against the Xus for defaming their quarry operation through signs, social media, and flyers.

The court found that Morven successfully met both the "substantial merit" and "no valid defence" hurdles, and that the public interest in allowing the defamation proceeding to continue outweighed the public interest in protecting the Xus' expression, which was based on minimal investigation and characterized as strongly held personal opinion presented as fact.

The motion to dismiss was denied, allowing Morven's defamation lawsuit to proceed to trial.

The appellant, an Imam, appealed the dismissal of his defamation action against the respondent under an anti-SLAPP motion.

The defamation claim arose from a petition shared by the respondent alleging the appellant's lack of transparency and accountability regarding a property sale.

The motion judge found the claim lacked substantial merit and that the public interest in protecting the expression outweighed the harm.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, deferring to the assessment of the claim's merit and the balancing of public interests, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant law society brought disciplinary proceedings against a member lawyer in 2012, resulting in a finding of guilt on four charges and disbarment in 2019.

The respondent applied for a stay of proceedings on the basis of inordinate delay amounting to an abuse of process; the Hearing Committee dismissed the application but the Court of Appeal granted the stay, setting aside the penalty.

The Supreme Court clarified the three-step test from Blencoe for determining whether administrative delay constitutes an abuse of process: the delay must be inordinate, it must have directly caused significant prejudice, and a final assessment must find the delay manifestly unfair or otherwise bringing the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Court also held that in statutory appeals, questions of procedural fairness and abuse of process are subject to appellate standards of review, not the correctness standard applicable on judicial review.

Applying these principles, the majority found no palpable and overriding error in the Hearing Committee's conclusions that the delay was not inordinate and that no significant prejudice was established, and accordingly allowed the appeal.

The moving parties, Shania and Justine Lavallee, sought an order for security for costs against the responding party, Solit Isak, for their successful defamation action and estimated appeal costs.

Isak, the appellant, conceded impecuniosity but argued her appeal was meritorious.

The Court of Appeal found good reason to believe the appeal was frivolous and vexatious due to its lack of merit and Isak's dilatory conduct.

Alternatively, the court found "other good reason" to order security, balancing the parties' interests.

The motion was granted, ordering Isak to post $15,000 in security for costs, staying the appeal until payment, and awarding costs of the motion to the Lavallees.

Following a successful summary judgment motion in a defamation action, the plaintiffs sought partial indemnity costs of $26,547.56.

The defendant did not file responding materials.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01(1), noting the importance of the issues, the success achieved, and the reasonable rates claimed.

However, applying the principle of proportionality and noting potential duplication of work among multiple timekeepers, as well as the defendant's likely limited financial resources, the court fixed costs at $20,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

Following the successful dismissal of the plaintiff's defamation claim under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the defendant sought full indemnity costs of approximately $29,500.

The plaintiff argued that full indemnity costs were inappropriate because the claim had some merit and the defendant's statements were demonstrably false and reckless.

The court agreed with the plaintiff, finding that the lawsuit was not a traditional SLAPP and was driven by the defendant's recklessness.

The court rebutted the presumption of full indemnity costs and awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs fixed at $20,000.