Stephen Ellis

This costs endorsement followed a defamation judgment where the plaintiff was awarded $85,000.

The plaintiff sought $37,589.77 in costs.

The defendants failed to submit their costs response on time, citing illness, but had previously indicated acceptance of a $35,000 offer to settle costs.

The court awarded the plaintiff the full amount claimed, emphasizing the defendants' failure to seek an extension and the plaintiff's thorough submissions.

The plaintiff, Shai DeLuca, an interior designer and public figure, sued the defendants, Foodbenders and its proprietor Kimberly Hawkins, for defamation.

The defendants had posted and reposted statements on Instagram, including calling DeLuca a "terrorist" and implying he aimed a sniper rifle at Palestinian children, and later calling him a "racist" and "killer." The court found the statements defamatory and rejected the defence of fair comment, primarily due to factual inaccuracies and the defendants' malice.

The court awarded $75,000 in general and aggravated damages and $10,000 in punitive damages, and granted a permanent injunction.

The appellant, an Imam, appealed the dismissal of his defamation action against the respondent under an anti-SLAPP motion.

The defamation claim arose from a petition shared by the respondent alleging the appellant's lack of transparency and accountability regarding a property sale.

The motion judge found the claim lacked substantial merit and that the public interest in protecting the expression outweighed the harm.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, deferring to the assessment of the claim's merit and the balancing of public interests, and dismissed the appeal.

Following the successful dismissal of the plaintiff's defamation claim under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the defendant sought full indemnity costs of approximately $29,500.

The plaintiff argued that full indemnity costs were inappropriate because the claim had some merit and the defendant's statements were demonstrably false and reckless.

The court agreed with the plaintiff, finding that the lawsuit was not a traditional SLAPP and was driven by the defendant's recklessness.

The court rebutted the presumption of full indemnity costs and awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs fixed at $20,000.

The moving party brought an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss a defamation claim arising from his distribution of a petition criticizing the responding party's leadership of a religious society.

The petition included a false allegation that the responding party's family sold society lands without accounting for the proceeds.

The court granted the motion and dismissed the action, finding that the expression related to a matter of public interest, the responding party failed to show the claim had substantial merit or that there were no valid defences, and the public interest in protecting the expression outweighed the harm to the responding party.

The applicant filed a human rights application against the disability claims administrator for his former employer, a federally regulated bank, alleging discrimination based on disability after his short-term disability benefits were denied.

The Tribunal directed the parties to provide submissions on jurisdiction.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, finding it lacked jurisdiction because the applicant merely challenged the application of the benefits policy and did not allege that the respondent took discriminatory criteria into account when assessing his claim.

The respondent requested that the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario defer consideration of the applicant's human rights application pending the determination of his Employment Standards Act (ESA) claim for termination pay.

The applicant opposed the deferral, arguing the ESA proceeding would only deal with termination pay.

The Tribunal denied the deferral request, finding a lack of significant overlap between the issues raised in the human rights application and the ESA claim, and concluding that the risk of inconsistent results was minimal.

The respondent requested that the human rights application be dismissed under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, arguing the matter was dealt with in a WSIB proceeding, or alternatively deferred pending a WSIAT appeal.

The Tribunal found that the WSIB decision only addressed whether a work-related accident occurred, which did not overlap sufficiently with the Code issues.

The Tribunal denied the request to dismiss or defer, ordered the matter to proceed to mediation, and directed the applicant to provide an update on the WSIAT appeal.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability.

The respondent requested dismissal on the preliminary basis that it is a federally regulated telecommunications undertaking outside provincial jurisdiction.

Finding that the jurisdictional facts were in dispute, the Tribunal ordered an in-person preliminary hearing to receive viva voce evidence and argument on the constitutional issue.

The respondent employer requested the dismissal or deferral of a human rights application alleging age discrimination, arguing that the applicant had commenced a parallel civil action for wrongful dismissal.

The Tribunal found that section 34(11) of the Human Rights Code did not bar the application because the civil action did not seek remedies for discrimination.

However, given the substantial factual overlap and the potential for inconsistent findings, the Tribunal exercised its discretion to defer the human rights application pending the conclusion of the civil proceeding.

The respondent requested early dismissal of a human rights application under section 34(11) of the Human Rights Code, arguing that the applicant had filed a parallel civil claim for wrongful dismissal based on the same facts.

The Tribunal found that the civil claim did not raise the Code or seek remedies for discrimination.

As duplication of facts alone does not trigger section 34(11), the request for early dismissal was refused and the matter was directed to mediation.