Mark Bourrie

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiffs' $4 million defamation action.

The plaintiffs, senior public servants, alleged the defendants defamed them by accusing them of corruption and fraud in relation to a federal procurement contract.

The court found that while the expressions related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiffs demonstrated substantial merit to their defamation claim and grounds to believe the defendants had no valid defence.

The court concluded that the reputational harm suffered by the plaintiffs outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendants' unverified expressions.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiff brought an action for defamation arising from a Facebook post made by his ex-wife, the defendant, approximately two years after the end of their roughly ten-year marriage.

The defendant counterclaimed for defamation and sexual battery.

The parties had lived in Los Angeles and were involved in the online gaming and pornography industries.

Their marriage was polyamorous in nature.

The defendant's Facebook post alleged that the plaintiff had sexually, physically, and emotionally abused her and other women during their marriage.

The court found that while many of the defendant's statements were truthful or constituted fair comment, certain statements regarding sexual assault, physical violence, and lack of consent were defamatory and not supported by the evidence.

The court dismissed the defendant's counterclaim for sexual battery, finding insufficient evidence of non-consensual sexual activity.

The plaintiff was awarded general damages for defamation.

The moving parties, Wrestling Canada Lutte, Tamara Medwidsky, and Lee Mackay, brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of K. A. Jensen J. dated May 2, 2023.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal, with costs reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

Karen Bell appealed the dismissal of her defamation action against Garden River First Nation and two councillors.

The action arose from a Censure Motion passed by the Council, which stated Bell had shared "false information" in a Facebook post.

The motion judge found the statement prima facie defamatory but upheld the defence of justification, concluding the information was indeed false.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Bell's motion to adduce fresh evidence, finding it irrelevant, and affirmed the motion judge's interpretation of the Censure Motion.

The Court agreed that the specific quoted information in Bell's Facebook post was false and misleading, thereby upholding the defence of justification.

The appeal was dismissed.

This decision addresses a motion for summary judgment and to strike portions of a Statement of Claim.

The Plaintiffs, a corporation and its principal, sued for breach of contract after their independent contractor agreement was terminated.

The Defendants sought to strike the claim for wrongful termination and other allegations, arguing compliance with the contract's notice provision and irrelevance of other pleaded facts.

The court found that the termination claim had no reasonable prospect of success as proper notice was given.

It also struck claims against individual defendants due to privity of contract and ordered the removal of scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious allegations, including those related to defamation, the organization's history, and a Ministry of Labour investigation.

However, the court allowed the claim for breach of the contract's dispute resolution clause to proceed, granting leave for the Plaintiffs to amend their pleading to properly articulate this claim and associated aggravated and punitive damages, and to establish the principal's standing as a party.

The plaintiff, a federal political party leader, brought a defamation action against the defendants for publishing statements characterizing him as a racist, misogynist, and anti-Semite.

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action.

The court granted the motion, finding that while the statements were prima facie defamatory, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the defendants had no valid defence of justification or fair comment.

Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to show that the harm suffered outweighed the public interest in protecting free expression on matters of public interest.