Hayley Danika Crawhall-Duk

The appellants challenged the validity of a clause in the will of Jeanne Dagenais Gravelle that granted her daughter Jocelyne Gravelle an option to purchase the family home for the amount of the remaining mortgage.

The appellants argued the clause was unenforceable because the mortgage had been fully paid at the time of the testator's death.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding the option clause valid and enforceable.

The court determined that the testator's intention was to allow Jocelyne to purchase the home even if the mortgage balance was zero, and that Jocelyne would be responsible for mortgage discharge fees as consideration for the purchase.

The Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of Robert Paul Ireland from a judgment declaring his Facebook posts defamatory of the Ontario Federation of All Terrain Vehicle Clubs, ordering their removal, and enjoining further defamatory posts.

The court found no procedural unfairness or error in the application judge’s decision, holding that Mr. Ireland’s failure to file a notice of appearance precluded him from participating in the application, and that the Federation’s courtesy in providing him with information did not create further obligations.

The court also rejected arguments regarding service and limitations, and found no reviewable error in the application judge’s findings on defamation and available defences.

The court considered a motion by Hansa Mortgage Investment Corporation for a writ of possession and the discharge of a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) registered by the Fuamba family, who had resided in the property for over 15 years.

The court reviewed the legal and equitable factors for discharging a CPL, including the uniqueness of the property, the parties’ intentions, the presence of alternative claims for damages, and the balance of convenience.

The court found that while the property was unique to the Fuambas, the lack of equity and their agreement to vacate after July 15, 2025, rendered the CPL of little practical utility.

The court granted leave to issue a writ of possession (execution delayed until after July 15, 2025) and ordered the CPL discharged upon registration of a transfer under power of sale.

The appellants appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board order that found them liable for rental arrears based on a monthly rent of $5,500.

The appellants had sold their home to the respondents in a complex transaction intended to lower their mortgage payments, with an alleged agreement to rent the property back for $2,000 per month.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Board exceeded its jurisdiction because the essential character of the dispute involved a suspicious transfer of ownership and a failure to agree on essential lease terms.

The Court held that the Board erred in law by relying on an unsigned draft lease to establish the legal rent and failing to ascertain the real substance of the transaction under section 202 of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The matter was directed to be resolved in the Superior Court of Justice.

The applicant, Claude Bachand, sought a declaration of his 25% beneficial interest in a jointly owned property, the sale proceeds of which were held in trust.

The property was originally purchased by the applicant and respondent Danielle Leclair, with both holding 50% in trust for respondent Marc Agostini.

The applicant claimed his 25% interest arose from his role as a grantor on the mortgage, while respondent Leclair argued she held beneficial ownership over his interest, relying on principles of purchase money resulting trust.

The court found that the applicant failed to rebut the presumption of a purchase money resulting trust, as he did not contribute financially to the property's acquisition or ongoing expenses.

The court concluded that the applicant held his interest in trust for Danielle Leclair, entitling her to the remaining net proceeds of sale after Marc Agostini's agreed-upon share.

The respondents (Xus) brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the applicant's (Morven Construction) defamation application.

Morven sought an interim and permanent injunction against the Xus for defaming their quarry operation through signs, social media, and flyers.

The court found that Morven successfully met both the "substantial merit" and "no valid defence" hurdles, and that the public interest in allowing the defamation proceeding to continue outweighed the public interest in protecting the Xus' expression, which was based on minimal investigation and characterized as strongly held personal opinion presented as fact.

The motion to dismiss was denied, allowing Morven's defamation lawsuit to proceed to trial.