Imran E. Kamal

The defendant in a medical malpractice action brought a motion under s. 105 of the Courts of Justice Act for an order compelling the self-represented plaintiff to undergo a capacity assessment.

The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion seeking procedural accommodation for the plaintiff's participation to proceed exclusively in written and asynchronous formats due to severe disabilities.

The court found that the threshold requirements under s. 105(3) were met, as the plaintiff's own pleadings and conduct raised genuine concerns about litigation capacity.

The court further held that the requested accommodation of exclusively written and asynchronous participation would cause undue hardship by undermining procedural fairness, prejudicing the defendant's right to cross-examine, and straining court resources.

The defendant's motion was granted, and the accommodation request was dismissed without prejudice pending completion of the capacity assessment.

The respondent brought multiple motions in a family law proceeding involving equalization, trust claims, and spousal support.

The court addressed the jurisdiction of an Associate Judge, granted an order adding the respondent's parents as parties given their financial interest in a Cornwall property purchased with their funds but registered in the parties' names.

The court denied the respondent's request to deem apartment-related payments as interim spousal support, as no spousal support order or agreement existed.

Access to the matrimonial home for retrieval of personal belongings was granted, as was an order to confirm the contents of and close a joint safety deposit box.

The court also ordered the applicant to provide outstanding financial disclosure within 14 days, with trial scheduled for May 2026.

Costs endorsement following a successful motion by the plaintiff law firm regarding documentary production obligations.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs of $12,694, while the defendant argued $5,000 was reasonable given the novelty of the privilege issues.

The court found the defendant's pre-litigation conduct reprehensible, including depositing client funds into a personal account, soliciting cash payments, and making disparaging remarks about clients.

The defendant's blanket refusal to produce documents under the guise of solicitor-client privilege, despite the plaintiff's practical attempts to resolve the matter, further warranted elevated costs.

Costs were awarded on a substantial indemnity basis in the full amount of $12,694.

The respondent in a family law proceeding brought a motion on a reference for sole signing authority to complete the court-ordered sale of the jointly owned matrimonial home, after the applicant failed to sign necessary closing documents and was unresponsive to the real estate agent and transaction lawyer.

The court granted sole signing authority to the moving party, directed distribution of net sale proceeds in accordance with a prior judicial order allocating 80% to the respondent and 20% to the applicant (less the applicant's share of mortgage payments and insurance premiums paid by the respondent since separation), and awarded costs of $5,610.45 on a substantial indemnity basis against the applicant for unreasonable conduct.

The Licensed Insolvency Trustee sought court approval of a Division I consumer proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The debtor's assets were less than fifty cents on the dollar of his liabilities, engaging s. 173(1)(a) of the BIA.

The court found that the debtor's insolvency arose from his divorce and the failure of his brewing company due to the COVID-19 pandemic, circumstances for which he could not justly be held responsible.

The proposal met all requirements of s. 59(2), was unanimously approved by creditors, and provided better recovery than bankruptcy.

The court approved the proposal, finding no culpability or blameworthiness warranting a s. 173(a) finding.

The respondents brought a motion under Rule 1.08(8) seeking an order that cross-examinations on affidavits proceed in person rather than virtually, citing a history of surreptitious recording by the self-represented applicant.

The court found that the respondents failed to establish sufficient justification to depart from the originally agreed-upon virtual format.

Applying the factors in Rule 1.08(6) and principles from the case law, the court ordered that cross-examinations proceed virtually, with additional protective orders prohibiting any recording or publication of the transcripts by the parties.

The timetable was amended accordingly, while the hearing date remained unchanged.

The moving party, a self-represented defendant in a motor vehicle negligence action, brought a motion seeking an order that the insurer of the vehicle's owner had a duty to defend him and was required to appoint and fund independent defence counsel of his choosing.

The insurer denied coverage on the basis that the moving party operated the vehicle without the owner's consent, while simultaneously funding and directing the defence of the vehicle's owner, whose defence asserted that the moving party lacked consent.

The court held that the duty to defend is triggered by the mere possibility that a claim falls within the policy, and that the consent issue remained live and unresolved on the pleadings; extrinsic interview evidence relied upon by the insurer was inadmissible as premature.

The court further found a reasonable apprehension of conflict of interest arising from the insurer's simultaneous denial of coverage to the moving party and defence of the co-defendant on an adverse theory.

The motion was granted in its entirety; the insurer was ordered to defend the moving party through independent counsel of his choosing at the insurer's expense.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss a wrongful dismissal action on the grounds that it was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff was terminated on January 4, 2022, for non-compliance with vaccination policies.

He initially pursued proceedings in Federal Court, which were unsuccessful.

The plaintiff did not commence the present action until August 26, 2024.

The court found that the plaintiff knew or ought to have known all material facts necessary to discover his claim on the date of termination, and that the two-year limitation period expired on January 4, 2024.

The plaintiff's misunderstanding of the legal significance of the facts and his belief that the federal government was responsible did not suspend the running of the limitation period.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed as statute-barred.

The defendant brought a motion for summary dismissal under Rule 2.1.01, arguing that the plaintiff's claim for dependent's relief was frivolous and an abuse of process.

The plaintiff, a 37-year-old adult, sought support from her late father's estate based on his failure to provide financial assistance since childhood, relying on a 1998 child support order.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the claim was not clearly frivolous on its face and that the plaintiff raised arguable legal issues under the broad dependent's relief provisions of the Succession Law Reform Act worthy of consideration by the court.

The respondent Law Society of Ontario brought a requisition under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the applicant's application as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The applicant sought declarations that the LSO violated his Charter rights under sections 24(1) and 15(1) by denying him access to court and discriminating against him based on race in connection with the revocation of his law licence in 2020.

The court found that the application was the eighth proceeding initiated by the applicant following the revocation and constituted a collateral attack on decisions that had been upheld through multiple levels of court, including the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of Canada.

The application was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The defendant insurance company brought a motion to quash a summons to examine an employee (an insurance adjuster) for a pending motion to compel answers to discovery refusals and to deliver a further and better affidavit of documents.

The plaintiff sought to examine the adjuster to test the relevance and proportionality of the defendant's broad production requests spanning forty years of documents related to historical sexual abuse claims.

The court dismissed the motion to quash, finding that the proposed examination was relevant to the underlying motion, necessary for fair adjudication, and not an abuse of process.

This is a costs decision following an interim parenting order motion.

The court previously granted an interim parenting arrangement providing the applicant father with weekend and mid-week parenting time.

The respondent mother sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, while the applicant sought no costs or alternatively costs in his favour.

The court found that neither party was successful on the motion, as neither proposed parenting schedule was adopted.

The court determined that success was divided due to the respondent's unreasonable and vacillating positions throughout the motion and the applicant's unsuccessful position stemming from family violence concerns involving his parents.

Accordingly, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs.

The plaintiff sought leave to issue an alias writ of seizure and sale and a notice of garnishment against a judgment debtor who had changed his name and used multiple aliases to evade enforcement of a judgment.

The defendant had been convicted of mail and wire fraud in the United States, ordered to pay restitution, and subsequently deported to Canada where he fraudulently obtained a name change.

After locating the defendant in Niagara-on-the-Lake through investigative efforts, the plaintiff brought an ex parte motion for leave to issue enforcement mechanisms in the defendant's legal name and known aliases.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff had satisfied the low evidentiary threshold for leave and that it was in the interests of justice to permit enforcement against the defendant's aliases to prevent further evasion.

A second mortgagee sought leave to issue a Writ of Possession and an order that the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 does not apply to the mortgaged property pursuant to section 5(i) of that Act.

The mortgaged property had multiple occupants sharing kitchen and bathroom facilities.

The court found that the evidence was insufficient to determine whether section 5(i) applied and that notice must be given to the owner and tenants before such a determination could be made, as it would affect their rights under the RTA.

The motion was adjourned pending service on the owner and tenants and further submissions.

The applicant brought a motion under Rule 20(5) of the Family Law Rules seeking an order to question Dr. Brad Booth, a psychiatrist retained by the respondent, for a maximum of five hours prior to trial.

The respondent opposed the motion, arguing the applicant had not met the statutory test.

The court found that all three prongs of the Rule 20(5) test were satisfied: it would be unfair to proceed without questioning; the information was not easily available by other means; and the questioning would not cause unacceptable delay or undue expense.

The court granted the motion, permitting five hours of questioning on August 18, 2025, and awarded costs to the applicant.

The decision addresses an interim parenting motion involving allegations of family violence, including by the applicant’s parents against the respondent.

The court considers the impact of family violence by non-litigants and the best interests of the child, ultimately granting the applicant father parenting time every weekend and Wednesday evening.

The court condemns coercive control and family violence by extended family members and emphasizes the need for a child-focused, fact-specific approach to parenting orders.

The court dismissed the plaintiff’s motion to set aside a registrar’s dismissal order for delay in a motor vehicle accident action.

The plaintiff’s counsel misunderstood the effect of the COVID-19 suspension of administrative dismissals, believing there was additional time to set the matter down for trial.

The court found the explanation for delay unsatisfactory, noting the plaintiff and her counsel failed to move the action forward and did not provide evidence of a plan thwarted by unforeseen obstacles.

The court also found the presumption of prejudice to the defendants was not rebutted, as key evidence and witnesses were no longer available.

The decision emphasizes the responsibility of parties to advance litigation and the court’s intolerance for delay.

The court considered a motion by the plaintiff for substituted service of a Statement of Claim, an extension of time for service, and leave to amend the Statement of Claim.

The court denied substituted service through the defendant’s insurer, TD Insurance, finding that the plaintiff had not demonstrated that all reasonable steps to effect personal service had been taken, nor that the requirements for substituted service on an insurer were met.

The court granted an extension of time for service and leave to amend the Statement of Claim, finding no prejudice to the defendants that could not be compensated by costs or an adjournment.

The plaintiff, Ari Lesser, brought a motion under Rule 30.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking an order requiring third party Cogeco Connexion Inc. to disclose basic subscriber information associated with a specific IP address.

The court distinguished between Norwich orders and Rule 30.10 orders, finding that as an Associate Judge, it could not grant equitable relief but could grant the requested order under Rule 30.10.

The court found the information sought was relevant and necessary, and that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case against the unknown defendants.

The motion was granted.