CITATION: A.B. v. C.D., 2026 ONSC 2583

Court File No.: FC-24-1517

MOTION HEARD: 2026-04-16

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: A.B., Applicant

v.

C.D., Respondent

BEFORE: Associate Justice Kamal

COUNSEL: Peter Stieda, for the Applicant

Respondent, self-represented

REASONS FOR DECISION

Introduction

1. Kids always come first, especially over curiosity and conflict. Legal proceedings are not to be used as a weapon for character assassination.

2. This decision highlights two important points:

a. When dealing with matters involving children, including a request for DNA paternity testing, the best interests of the child are always the primary consideration; and

b. The family court system cannot be used to humiliate or denigrate another parent.

3. Note: Because of sensitive information that may embarrass or cause harm to the children, on the consent of the parents, I have decided to use random initials for the parties and the children in this endorsement. For the most part, I will refer to the parents as the mother and the father, or the Applicant and Respondent.

4. The Respondent brought a motion for DNA paternity testing pursuant to s. 17.2 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12 (CLRA).

5. The Applicant brought a cross-motion seeking the following orders:

a. The Respondent’s motion shall be dismissed;

b. The Respondent shall pay ongoing child support in the amount of $1,501.64 per month for the three children based on an imputed income of $75,029, as based on line 15000 of his 2024 Notice of Assessment.

6. A Brazilian Portuguese interpreter was present for both parties.

7. For the reasons that follow, I make the following orders:

a. The father’s motion for DNA paternity testing is dismissed;

b. The father shall not speak negatively about the mother in the presence of the children, including the father shall not imply or discuss his concerns that the children may have been conceived through alleged sex work;

c. Associate Justice Kamal shall be the case management judge for this matter; and

d. The father shall pay child support in the amount of $1,501.64 per month for the three children based on an income of $75,029.

Background

8. The parties were in a common-law relationship for approximately 17 years. They have four children together – one child is over the age of 18 and the other three children are between 9 and 16 years old.

9. The mother left the home with the children on June 1, 2023. The children have remained in her care ever since.

10. The mother alleges that she left following years of physical and mental abuse committed against her by the father.

The Father’s Version of Events and Position[^1]

11. As mentioned, the Respondent seeks an order for DNA paternity testing pursuant to s. 17.2 of the CLRA.

12. The father says that throughout the relationship, he had a strong suspicion that the mother was having relationships with other men. He also says that he believes the mother was a sex worker and the children may have been conceived as a result of commercial sex work. Aside from this general sentiment, the father only outlines one event in his affidavits.

13. In 2011, the parties were on a trip to Dubai. The father says that the mother asked him to accompany her to a Western Union branch where she withdrew $1000 USD, and the father later discovered that the money was sent to her by a male friend.

14. The father says that four years later, he intercepted a call and found out that the mother had a sexual relationship with that man.

15. The father says he has suspicions that the mother had involvement with many men, but provides no further evidence.

16. The father deposes that the parties were going to do a DNA test previously (before separation), but he decided not to. However, he now wants the DNA test because separation has occurred.

17. The father says that the purpose of the DNA test is to know his story and his history with the mother.

18. He says he wants to know the truth about paternity for “proof that many statements given by the applicant they are false.”

19. The father also says that his relationship with the children will never change in any way.

20. In his Answer, he seeks an order for shared parenting.

21. The father’s evidence is clear and unequivocal that the results of the DNA test will not alter his obligations towards the children, and that is not his intention. He says that regardless of the test results, he will continue to fulfill his obligations as a father.

22. The father confirmed this in oral submissions.

23. With respect to child support, the father submits that his child support obligation should only be $700 per month.

The Mother’s Version of Events and Position

24. The mother says there is a long history of the father accusing her of infidelity and sleeping with multiple men for money.

25. The mother also alleges that the father has committed ongoing acts of violence and other abuse against her. The mother alleges that the father beat her in the presence of the children. He often screamed at her for being ‘lixo’ (‘trash’). She has been seeing a therapist since leaving the father in order to recover from the years of abuse that she suffered when living with the father.

26. The mother submits that the father’s motion materials have reopened the trauma that she experienced during the relationship.

27. The mother states that the Respondent is indeed the biological father of all four children. She provides each child’s birth certificate, each of which confirms the Respondent is their father.

28. The mother submits that it is not in the best interest of the children to indulge the father’s request for DNA testing. She also submits that the children’s best interests will not be served by suddenly questioning whether or not their father is their father. To do so would be harmful to the children. It would not be in the best interests of the children to suggest that their father is perhaps not their father because their mother is supposedly promiscuous and lied to them their entire lives.

29. She seeks an order for child support pursuant to the tables in the Child Support Guidelines, O. Reg. 391/97 (Guidelines), in accordance with the father’s 2024 income.

Everyone Agrees

30. Both parties agree that the children have known the Respondent, and only the Respondent, as their father since the birth of each child. The Respondent has always acted as the children’s father since the birth of each child. There has never been any other person who has acted as their father, or been presented to any of them as their father.

Issues

31. This motion and cross-motion raise two issues:

a. Should the court order a paternity test?

b. What amount of child support should the father be ordered to pay?

Law and Analysis

ISSUE 1: DNA TEST

The Law on DNA Testing

32. Section 17.2 of the CLRA provides:

17.2 (1) On the application of a party in a proceeding in which the court is called on to determine a child’s parentage, the court may give the party leave to obtain a blood test, DNA test or any other test the court considers appropriate of a person named in the order granting leave, and to submit the results in evidence.

(2) The court may impose conditions, as it thinks proper, on an order under

subsection (1).

(3) The Health Care Consent Act, 1996 applies to the test as if it were treatment under that Act.

(4) If a person named in an order under subsection (1) refuses to submit to the test, the court may draw such inferences as it thinks appropriate.

(5) Subsection (4) does not apply if the refusal is the decision of the substitute decision-maker as defined in s. 9 of the Health Care Consent Act.

33. In Mask v. Cuillerer (2003), 2003 64337 (ON SC), 47 R.F.L. (5th) 110 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 21, Kozak J. held that s. 10 (which is the former equivalent section to section 17.2) “was not intended to be an unfettered discretion in granting leave to obtain blood tests. Instead, it was considered to be a discretion bounded by the facts of the case and the principles of law.” There must be “an evidentiary basis before exercising the discretion to grant leave for the obtaining of blood tests”.

34. Section 17.2 is clear that DNA testing is not automatic or presumptive.

35. Section 17.2 does not articulate any test or criteria that I should apply in deciding the issue of paternity testing. Section 17.2 states “may”, and the caselaw supports that this decision is discretionary.

36. In Children’s Aid Society of Brant v. H. (H.), 2007 ONCJ 477, 45 R.F.L. (6th) 457, at paras. 26-27, Thibideau J. reviewed various cases and set out the following criteria for the granting of leave for paternity testing:

a) The testing process must not adversely affect the child’s health physically or emotionally.

b) An ulterior motive for the request is not made out.

c) A request must be timely, even if made in good faith. However, all things being equal, laches does not apply to the consideration of timeliness.

d) However, prejudice to a party or the child as a result of delay may prevent the making of the order.

e) Necessary admissible evidence to support a prima facie case must be the foundation of the request.

37. All of this is overlaid by the overriding consideration of the best interest of the child.

38. This list of criteria elaborated by Justice Thibideau was applied in the following recent cases: Saunders v. Vargas, 2018 ONSC 1892; Kholod v. Coscarelli, [2019] O.J. No. 7052; and Children’s Aid Society of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo v. A.J. and M.M., 2020 ONSC 7639, 50 R.F.L. (8th) 330.

39. I was unable to find a private family law case in Ontario in which DNA paternity testing was denied under s. 17.2 of the CLRA, nor was I pointed to any authorities.

40. In Children’s Aid Society of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo v. A.J. and M.M., the court found that DNA testing would not be in the best interests of the child. The court stated that a parent’s curiosity as to the paternity of the child should not be allowed to put the child’s emotional and psychological stability at risk.

41. There are also helpful decisions from other jurisdictions within Canada. While not binding on me, they provide valuable guidance on the approach to follow when faced with a request for paternity testing. I will briefly discuss some of them, recognizing, of course, that decisions from other jurisdictions also involve different legislation. Particularly, it is helpful to look at the caselaw across the country to consider decisions in which DNA paternity testing was ordered and where the request was denied.

42. The common threads through the caselaw are that all circumstances must be considered and weighed, each case is different and that the best interests of a child are an important factor in determining the issue of paternity testing. See A.M. v. S.B. and T.D., 2021 NBQB 105 and J.(C.) v. H.(R.), [1995] N.B.J. No. 273 (NBQB).

43. In C.(S.) v. T.(C.), 2007 NSFC 32, Judge Levy denied a mother’s application for paternity testing where the possible father believed for many years he was the child’s biological father and had acted as such. In dismissing the mother’s application, Judge Levy provided the following summary of principles to consider when the court is faced with a request for paternity testing:

4 …I derive the following principles:

1. It will generally be in the best interests of children that any genuine doubt as to their paternity be resolved (B. (J. S.) v. V. (W. L.), 1995 1799).

2. As important as the best interest of the child may be, as Justice Charron wrote at para. 12, “…it is not the only factor to be considered".

3. DNA testing should not be ordered where to do so is unlikely to resolve the substantive claim (B. (J. S.) v. V. (W. L.), 1995 1799, para. 25).

4. “The strength of the applicant's case is one relevant factor to be considered” (H. (D.) v. W. (D.), [1992] O.J. No. 1737 (Ont. Gen. Div., Charron, J.), para. 10).

5. That generally any real issue of paternity should be resolved using the best possible evidence…DNA evidence (B. (J. S.) v. V. (W. L.), 1995 1799).

6. In T. (A.L.J.) v J. (K.J.), 2011 MBQB 91, the court was faced with a request by the biological mother for paternity testing where, after several years of custody proceedings, she had treated the possible father as the child’s biological father. The child was also living with the possible father pursuant to an order of the court. In rejecting the mother’s request for paternity testing, Justice MacPhail stated in paragraph 34:

The mother's request for DNA testing on the basis of less than convincing evidence that anyone other than K.J.J. is the father of the child, if granted, would do nothing, in my view, but cause stress and potential heartache to the child and would definitely not be in his best interests. The order she seeks would only serve to satisfy her own curiosity, and put her own demons to rest, at the cost of potentially turning her little boy's world upside down.

45. In D.F. v. K.G., 2018 NSSC 65, the Honourable Justice Lester Jesudason (as he then was, now Associate Chief Justice), concluded that the following principles arise when faced with a request to order paternity testing:

• Whether to order paternity testing is discretionary;

• It will generally be in the best interest of children that any genuine doubt as to their paternity be resolved using the best possible evidence;

• While the best interests of the child is an important consideration, it is not necessarily the only factor which can be considered. The cases seem to suggest that the court can consider the overall interests of justice particularly when child support is at issue given that possible fathers have a statutory right to apply for paternity testing to contest their legal obligation to pay child support; and

• While paternity testing should generally be ordered, examples of situations where it should not be ordered are where doing so is unlikely to resolve the substantive claim, the applicant’s case is weak, an application is made in bad faith or it can be shown that ordering testing could be prejudicial or harmful to the child [Emphasis in original].

46. In that case, a possible father sought to confirm whether he was the biological father of a 13-year-old boy. The mother opposed testing, citing the child’s medical history and mental health vulnerability after brain tumour surgery. The request arose after the possible father and his family saw photographs suggesting a resemblance and pursued contact and testing.

47. Justice Jesudason declined the request for paternity testing at that time. His Honour emphasized that the best interests of the child govern parenting issues, and potential harm to the child can justify refusing or delaying testing. The court also noted there was little evidence addressing what concrete benefits testing now would bring the child. The evidence established a risk of upheaval and instability for a medically and emotionally vulnerable child who was only recently improving. Some weight was given to the mother’s and husband’s evidence as the child’s only parents, and the interests of justice did not require testing at that time, where child support was not in issue.

The Best Interests of the Child

48. Section 24 of the CLRA sets out the primacy of the best interests of the child:

Best interests of the child

24 (1) In making a parenting order or contact order with respect to a child, the court shall only take into account the best interests of the child in accordance with this section.

Primary consideration

(2) In determining the best interests of a child, the court shall consider all factors

related to the circumstances of the child, and, in doing so, shall give primary

consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security

and well-being.

Factors

(3) Factors related to the circumstances of a child include,

(a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as

the child’s need for stability;

(b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each parent, each

of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an

important role in the child’s life;

(c) each parent’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of

the child’s relationship with the other parent;

(d) the history of care of the child;

(e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;

(f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and

heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;

(g) any plans for the child’s care;

(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order

would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;

(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order

would apply to communicate and co-operate, in particular with one another,

on matters affecting the child;

(j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things,

(i) the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family

violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and

(ii) the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in

respect of whom the order would apply to co-operate on issues affecting

the child; and

(k) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition or measure that is

relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.

Factors relating to family violence

(4) In considering the impact of any family violence under clause (3) (j), the court

shall take into account,

(a) the nature, seriousness and frequency of the family violence and when it

occurred;

(b) whether there is a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour in relation

to a family member;

(c) whether the family violence is directed toward the child or whether the

child is directly or indirectly exposed to the family violence;

(d) the physical, emotional and psychological harm or risk of harm to the

child;

(e) any compromise to the safety of the child or other family member;

(f) whether the family violence causes the child or other family member to

fear for their own safety or for that of another person;

(g) any steps taken by the person engaging in the family violence to prevent

further family violence from occurring and improve the person’s ability to

care for and meet the needs of the child; and

(h) any other relevant factor.

Past conduct

(5) In determining what is in the best interests of the child, the court shall not take

into consideration the past conduct of any person, unless the conduct is relevant to the exercise of the person’s decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact with respect to the child

49. Many cases have considered when a paternity test should be ordered pursuant to the former s. 10 of the CLRA.

50. In Mask v. Cuillerier, at para. 32, Kozak J. stated the language of the provision is wide enough to permit an order for blood tests even though a court has already made a determination of parentage… ascertaining the truth about one's parentage was very important, as significant medical or genetic information might then become available, as could financial support. In that case, the court's access to the best evidence available via blood tests was in the child’s best interests.

51. In this regard, Kozak J. was following the similar views expressed by Charron J. (as she then was) in H. (D.) v. W. (D.), [1992] O.J. No. 1737 (Ont. Gen. Div.), where she stated, “I would rather favour the proposition that it is in the best interest of the child that where a real issue as to parentage is raised the truth be ascertained on the best evidence possible.”

52. As mentioned above, there are other cases in which the court found that an order for DNA paternity testing was not in the best interests of the child.

Applying the Legal Principles for DNA Testing to the Present Case

53. In this section, I will apply the factors set out in Children’s Aid Society of Brant v. H. (H.) as well as the other considerations commonly considered across the caselaw.

a) The testing process must not adversely affect the child’s health, physically or emotionally

54. There is no concrete evidence one way or another that the test would or would not adversely affect the child’s health physically or emotionally.

55. The mother submits that an order for a paternity test would cause the children pain and confusion. They would have to provide their DNA samples, and as such, would learn, through their father, the reason for the test. A court order would give credibility to the father’s claim that he is not really their father, and that the children are products of the commercial exchange of sex. The mother submits that the claims are categorically false.

56. I agree with the mother. While I do not have evidence that the DNA testing would cause specific harm to the children, it is reasonable to appreciate that the request for a DNA test would cause upset to the children.

57. Furthermore, and more pointedly, I do not have evidence addressing what concrete benefits testing now would bring to the children.

b) An ulterior motive for the request is not made out

58. The father says that he wants to know the truth about paternity for “proof that many statements given by the applicant they are false.”

59. I have concerns that the father is pursuing this request in an effort to publicly humiliate the mother, or to denigrate her in the eyes of the children and in the public setting of this court proceeding.

60. This is particularly concerning because he candidly acknowledges that the children have always treated him as their father.

61. The father has been clear and unequivocal that the results of the DNA test will not alter his obligations towards the children and that, regardless of the test results, he will continue to fulfill his obligations as a father.

62. Therefore, one of the father's motives appears to be to harm the mother’s reputation. This is concerning and not in the best interests of the children.

63. During oral submissions, the father stated that the purpose of the request for the DNA paternity test is to know his story and his history with the mother.

64. In my view, this is to benefit the father’s interests. This is not a child-focused reason.

65. The father’s motives appear to be self-centred and focus on his own gain rather than any child-focused reason.

c) A request must be timely, even if made in good faith. However, all things being equal, laches does not apply to the consideration of timeliness

66. The father’s request is not timely.

67. According to the father’s own evidence, he has had these suspicions throughout the relationship. Specifically, he refers to a trip to Dubai in 2011 and a telephone call four years later. He has had these concerns for over 10 years, at least, and has not pursued this request.

68. I appreciate that, all things being equal, laches does not apply to the consideration of timeliness. However, as outlined throughout this decision, all things are not equal, and therefore, it is appropriate to consider the timeliness of the request.

69. The parties separated in 2023. The mother commenced this Application in 2024. The issues in this case are decision-making responsibility, primary residence, parenting time, and child support (retroactive and ongoing).

70. It is only in a defence to the mother’s application that the father has sought a DNA test.

71. In my view, the timeliness (or lack thereof) is concerning. The father cannot and should not be permitted to use the litigation process as a method of attempting to harm the mother’s reputation under the guise of a disingenuous request for DNA paternity testing.

d) Prejudice to a party or the child as a result of delay may prevent the making of the order

72. The prejudice to the mother and the children is that, regardless of the results of the DNA test, the children will be exposed to conflict between the parents and a discussion about why their paternity is being questioned.

73. This is a significant prejudice in my view.

74. This prejudice is heightened because it would not change the outcome of the legal issues in this case – the father has already committed to fulfilling his obligations as a father, regardless of whether he is the biological parent or not.

e) Necessary admissible evidence to support a prima facie case must be the foundation of the request

75. There is no admissible evidence to support a prima facie case to order the DNA testing.

76. The evidence presented by the father does not support the suggestion that the children were conceived as a result of commercial sexual exchanges between the Applicant and men who solicited such services from her.

77. The father’s vague and disputed recount of one incident in 2011 does not meet the consideration of a prima facie case that the children’s paternity should be in question.

f) Other considerations: No Useful Purpose and Unlikely to Resolve the Substantive Claim

78. In addition to the considerations set out in Children’s Aid Society of Brant v. H. (H.), it is appropriate to consider other relevant factors. In light of the caselaw from across the country, it is appropriate to consider whether the paternity testing would serve a useful purpose and whether it would assist in resolving the substantive issues in the case. This is consistent with C.(S.) v. T.(C.), 2007 NSFC 32; D.F v. K.G., 2018 NSSC 65; and B. (J. S.) v. V. (W. L.), 1995 1799 (B.C.C.A).

79. In B. (J. S.) v. V. (W. L.), the British Columbia Court of Appeal stated:

[W]hile a child's paternity may be put in issue by the pleadings, it is pointless to expose a child to the possible disadvantages of such testing if the applicant is unlikely to succeed in the relief claimed in the action. Expressed another way, if the relief claimed in the action is unlikely to be granted, regardless of whether paternity is established, there is no justification for exposing the child to the potential disadvantages of the results of such testing. Putting the matter in the context of Rule 30(1), if establishing paternity would not make any difference to the result in the action, the composition of a person's blood could not be regarded as relevant to what is "in issue in the proceeding".

80. Regardless of whether the Respondent is the biological father or the in loco parentis father, the facts remain the same: he has an obligation to pay child support. He also seeks equal parenting time. He has acted as their father their entire lives. He is on their birth certificates.

81. As stated in B. (J. S.) v. V. (W. L.), “there is no justification for exposing the child(ren) to the potential disadvantages of the results of such testing. … if establishing paternity would not make any difference to the result in the action, the composition of a person's blood could not be regarded as relevant to what is ‘in issue in the proceeding’”.

82. In Chartier v. Chartier, 1999 707 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 242, the Supreme Court of Canada set out some of the factors the court must consider to determine whether a person stands in place of a parent. The court rejected the proposition that settled intention must be based on actual knowledge that someone else is the biological father. The court stated, at para. 39:

Whether a person stands in the place of a parent must take into account all factors relevant to that determination, viewed objectively. What must be determined is the nature of the relationship… The court must determine the nature of the relationship by looking at a number of factors, among which is intention. Intention will not only be expressed formally. The court must also infer intention from actions, and take into consideration that even expressed intentions may sometimes change…

83. The court adopted a “best interests of the child” approach and concluded, at para. 32, that once an adult is found to have a settled intention to be a parent, “that relationship cannot be unilaterally withdrawn by the adult”.

84. In B.E.P. v. S.D.P., 1993 7263 (Ont. S.C.), the court stated:

[25] In my opinion, the court must consider the following when determining whether or not to exercise the discretion to order blood tests,

(1) The context within which and the purpose for which the tests are sought.

(2) The effect of any presumptions that may apply.

(3) The strength of evidence casting paternity into doubt or alleging paternity.

(4) Delay on the part of the applicant together with any associated prejudice to the respondent or estoppel.

(5) The best interests of the child.

(6) The societal value in the determination of paternity by blood tests.

(7) The bona fides of the moving party.

[26] Clearly, the applicant in these proceedings seeks a declaration that he is not the father in the hope of reducing his support obligations, and there is no real evidence of any other purpose in seeking the amendment to the application and leave for blood tests. As he is acknowledged to stand in the role of parent to the child in any event, exclusion of the applicant as biological father may be of no assistance to him unless the biological father is identified and found to have the means to pay support, even assuming that this would provide grounds for variation of the applicant’s support obligations.

[27] The applicant has already adopted a parental role towards the child and is in fact presumed to be the father. His evidence offered to raise the possibility that someone else is the father is weak.

[28] There is no question that the applicant could have voiced his concerns in previous proceedings with the exercise of reasonable diligence. The existence of another as biological father would not be a material change in circumstances occurring after the judgment of divorce and may not on that ground provide a basis for variation. Having failed for nearly six years to pursue an allegation that there existed another person also responsible for the financial support of J.P., the applicant may expect that courts will now be cautious in extending assistance to him now for that purpose. There is an interest in obtaining some degree of finality to litigation of issues between spouses.

85. In Saunders v. Vargas, the court stated:

If he is not the biological father, there is a prima facie case that Mr. Vargas is not otherwise the child’s parent within the meaning of the Family Law Act. He lived with Ms. Saunders for only a few months after the child was born, he has not seen the child since she was less than a year old, and he remains subject to a restraining order preventing him from having any contact with the child. In this case, therefore, it is possible that a determination that he is not the biological father of the child will result in a termination of his child support obligations. This is a bona fide basis for Mr. Vargas to request a paternity test.

86. In the present case, everyone agrees that the Respondent stood in the place of a parent. And he wishes to continue to do so. In fact, the father repeatedly stated that the results of the DNA test will not alter his obligations towards the children and that is not his intention. He says that regardless of the test results, he will continue to fulfill his obligations as a father.

87. Therefore, it is clear that an order for DNA testing (regardless of the results) would not have any impact on the legal issues in this case and would serve no useful purpose.

g) The Best Interests of the Child

88. The consideration for ordering a DNA test is overlaid by the consideration of the best interests of the children.

89. In determining the best interests of a child, the court shall consider all factors related to the circumstances of the child, and, in doing so, shall give primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being.

90. In my view, the majority of the factors to be considered in the best interest of the children weigh against ordering the DNA test, most notably:

a. the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability: in the absence of admissible evidence to support a prima facie case to support the request, the children’s stability should not be disrupted or compromised;

b. the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each parent: the children have a relationship with both parents. The Respondent is the only father the children have known;

c. each parent’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other parent: I have concerns that this request is an attempt for the father to undermine the mother’s relationship with the children and to denigrate her;

d. the child’s views and preferences: These cannot be ascertained. It is impractical to obtain the children’s views and preferences without informing them about the subject matter or the reason for the father’s request for DNA testing. Interestingly, the father stated that he does not think the consent of children is required;

e. the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage: the children have been raised by both parents. The cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage have been received from both parents. This weighs against the need for a DNA test; and

f. any plans for the child’s care: the Respondent’s plan of care for the children would not be changed by the DNA test. This weighs against the need for a DNA test.

91. I also have concerns regarding family violence, which forms part of the consideration for the best interests of the child, and will be discussed below.

Concerns Regarding Family Violence and Litigation Abuse

92. The Supreme Court of Canada in Barendregt v. Grebliunis, 2022 SCC 22, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 517, stated that findings of family violence are a critical consideration in the best interests analysis: at para. 146.

93. I also note the following principles:

a. Family violence is not limited to physical assault. It embraces a range of behavior which includes mental and emotional abuse, with implications that spill over to children. See CCAS v. I.B. et al., 2020 ONSC 5498.

b. Family violence can be insidious. It can take many forms and frequently involves coercive and controlling behaviors which are usually very difficult to prove because they often take place in private. Abusers, especially those of the coercive and controlling kind, are often skilled manipulators; they can be charming, they can be convincing liars, and they can be very persuasive. Victims of family violence are often the only witnesses who can attest to their abuser’s behaviour, and unfortunately, they are sometimes not believed because of their inability to support their allegations with objective third-party evidence. See Volgemut v. Decristoforo, 2021 ONSC 7382.

94. In Malamas v. Wey, 2026 ONCA 133, the Court of Appeal for Ontario recently stated:

[26] Where allegations of intimate partner violence are raised on the record, courts must consider them where they are relevant to the issues before the court. This includes assessing whether they bear on the factual context in which claims arose or on the application of doctrines such as limitations, res judicata, or abuse of process. A failure to engage with relevant evidence may constitute an error warranting appellate intervention: Dunmore v. Mehralian, 2025 SCC 20, 503 D.L.R. (4th) 686, at para. 73; Shipton v. Shipton, 2024 ONCA 624, 5 R.F.L. (9th) 17, at paras. 35-41.

[27] The jurisprudence further recognizes that intimate partner violence may involve patterns of conduct and may have consequences beyond individual incidents, including psychological and economic effects. These considerations may form part of the broader factual matrix relevant to the issues in dispute: see R. v. Bates (2000), 2000 5759 (ON CA), 146 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 30; Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia, 2023 ONCA 476, 167 O.R. (3d) 561, at paras. 91-92, leave to appeal granted and appeal heard and reserved February 11-12, 2025, [2023] S.C.C.A. No. 529.

95. In the present case, the mother alleges a lengthy history of family violence. However, few details were provided.

96. Notably, the father did not deny any of the allegations of family violence.

97. It is particularly difficult to deal with allegations of family violence based only on conflicting affidavit evidence on a motion. See S. v. M. 2023 ONSC 1811, 92 R.F.L. (8th) 468.

98. I am unable to make findings of family violence based on the incomplete record before me.

99. However, it is not appropriate to completely ignore the allegations of family violence made by the mother.

100. In light of the allegations and the information before me, I have some concern that the father is using the litigation process to denigrate the mother, humiliate her in this public forum, and inflict harm on the mother. This behaviour has an appearance of litigation abuse and/or coercive control.

101. In Levely v. Levely, 2013 ONSC 1026, Justice Chappel stated that family Court proceedings, unfortunately, all too often become a destructive tool which one party wields and manipulates in order to create further financial and emotional hardship for the other party. The frequency with which Family Law litigation degenerates into an abusive game of delay tactics, stonewalling, and dodging of judicial authority is a concern which must remain at the forefront of the judge’s mind in considering remedies for a party’s failure to participate as required in court proceedings or to comply with court orders. The court has a critical responsibility and role to play in ensuring that proceedings which are intended to protect families and lead to the resolution of pressing and emotionally divisive issues are not hijacked by a party and transformed into a process for further victimizing the other party and the children in their care.

102. As Justice Chappel recognizes, litigation abuse imposes costs not only on the victims of abuse, and far too often on their children as well, but on the justice system itself.

103. More recently, in Reeve v. Larson, 2025 ONSC 6030, at para. 40, and Anyanwu v. Anyanwu, 2026 ONSC 980, at para. 67, the court accepted the following definition of litigation abuse from Professor Nicholas Bala, in his paper, “Litigation Abuse in Ontario Family Law Cases” (Paper delivered at the LSO Family Law Summit, 27 March 2025), 2025 Docs 1843:

[C]onduct that misuses the Family Court process in a way that could reasonably be expected to cause emotional or financial harm to the other party or their children which is greater than would occur with the proper use of the family justice process.

104. In Robidoux v. Amiti, 2025 ONSC 6819, the court stated that litigation abuse is a form of family violence that the court takes very seriously. Where a parent takes steps to manipulate the other parent or the court, that parent is engaging in litigation abuse.

105. Parties to family law proceedings and their children are severely harmed by litigation abuse. If parties exploit the court system to maintain abusive behaviour, victims of IPV are more vulnerable to emotional abuse due to the financial and emotional strain of a family court proceeding.

106. At this time, I am not making a finding of litigation abuse or family violence. This proceeding is in its early stages, this is the first motion, and the evidence before me is untested and incomplete. However, in an effort to curtail any potential efforts to use the court process to inflict emotional or financial harm on the other party or their children, I am raising the issue early in this case. It is important to flag this issue for any other judge who may have involvement with this case moving forward.

107. Furthermore, in an effort to prevent any potential abuse of the court process, I will be case managing this matter. In this regard, all future conferences shall be scheduled before me, and any motions that are within my jurisdiction and appropriate for me to hear as a case-management judge shall be brought before me.

108. During the hearing, I also raised concerns regarding the father speaking negatively about the mother to the children, including implying that they were conceived through alleged sex work and discussing the events that occurred during the trip in Dubai. Both parties consented to me making an order that the father shall not speak negatively about the mother to the children and shall not imply or discuss his concerns that the children may have been conceived through alleged sex work. Section 17.2(2) allows me to impose conditions, as I think proper, on an order under subsection (1).

109. For the reasons outlined above, the request for DNA paternity testing is dismissed, and an order shall be made that I will be the case management judge, and the father shall not speak negatively about the mother in the presence of the children, including that the father shall not imply or discuss his concerns that the children may have been conceived through alleged sex work.

ISSUE 2: Child Support

General Principles of Child Support

110. The obligation to pay child support is set out in section 31 of the Family Law Act:

Obligation of parent to support child

31 (1) Every parent has an obligation to provide support, to the extent that the

parent is capable of doing so, for his or her unmarried child who,

(a) is a minor;

(b) is enrolled in a full-time program of education; or

(c) is unable by reason of illness, disability or other cause to withdraw from the charge of his or her parents.

111. The purpose of a child support order should recognize that each parent has an obligation to provide support for the child and apportion the obligation according to the child support guidelines.

112. The Child Support Guidelines set out the presumptive rule of child support as set out in the applicable Child Support Table.

113. (1) Unless otherwise provided under these guidelines, the amount of an order for the support of a child for children under the age of majority is,

(a) the amount set out in the applicable table, according to the number of children under the age of majority to whom the order relates and the income of the parent or spouse against whom the order is sought; and

(b) the amount, if any, determined under section 7.

The Appropriate Amount of Child Support

113. The mother seeks an order that the father pay $1,501.64 per month for the three children. The mother seeks to use the father’s income of $75,029, as based on line 15000 of his 2024 Notice of Assessment. The mother referred to this as imputing income on the father.

114. The court is required to determine a fair and reasonable amount of income based on the best evidence before the court.

115. The father says that he was laid off in January 2025 and was reinstated in January 2026. He provided approximate numbers regarding his monthly income after deductions. He says he earns about $3,560 each month after deductions.

116. The father’s affidavit provided an outline of his expenses.

117. He sought an order for child support payable in the amount of $700 per month.

118. Section 16 sets out the starting point that income is determined by using the sources of income set out under the heading “Total income” in the T1 General form issued by the Canada Revenue Agency.

119. Section 17 provides that the court may consider the past three years of income to determine a fair and reasonable amount of income.

120. Section 19 provides that the court may impute “such amount of income … as it considers appropriate” and provides a non-exhaustive list of such circumstances. The relevant portions of s. 19 read as follows:

19(1) Imputing Income – The court may impute such amount of income to a parent or spouse as it considers appropriate in the circumstances, which circumstances include,

(a) the parent or spouse is intentionally under-employed or unemployed, other than where the under-employment or unemployment is required by the needs of any child or by the reasonable educational or health needs of the parent or spouse;

(b) the parent or spouse is exempt from paying federal or provincial income tax;

(c) the parent or spouse lives in a country that has effective rates of income tax that are significantly lower than those in Canada;

(d) it appears that income has been diverted which would affect the level of child support to be determined under these guidelines;

(e) the parent’s or spouse’s property is not reasonably utilized to generate income;

(f) the parent or spouse has failed to provide income information when under a legal obligation to do so;

(g) the parent or spouse unreasonably deducts expenses from income;

(h) the parent or spouse derives a significant portion of income from dividends, capital gains or other sources that are taxed at a lower rate than employment or business income or that are exempt from tax; and

(i) the parent or spouse is a beneficiary under a trust and is or will be in receipt of income or other benefits from the trust.

121. Imputing income is one method by which the court gives effect to the joint and ongoing obligation of parents to support their children. In order to meet this obligation, the parties must earn what they are capable of earning. If they fail to do so, they will be found to be intentionally under-employed. Clause 19(1)(a) of the guidelines is perceived as being a test of reasonableness. See Drygala v. Pauli 2002 41868 (ON CA), [2002] O.J. No. 3731(Ont. C.A.).

122. The court is required to act with caution when asked to impute income based on conflicting affidavits on an interim motion. See Lowe v. Lowe, 2020 ONSC 5224; Hohmeier v. Caputo, 2022 ONSC 4925; Elmgreen v. Elmgreen, 2016 ONCA 849; and M.K. v. K.M., 2022 ONCJ 424.

123. While the Respondent did not use the term undue hardship, he asks that his support obligation be reduced because he cannot afford to pay the table guideline amount.

124. Undue hardship claims are governed by section 10 of the guidelines, which reads as follows:

Undue hardship

10. (1) On the application of either spouse under section 33 of the Act, a court may award an amount of child support that is different from the amount determined under any of sections 3 to 5, 8 or 9 if the court finds that the parent or spouse making the request, or a child in respect of whom the request is made, would otherwise suffer undue hardship.

Circumstances that may cause undue hardship

(2) Circumstances that may cause a parent, spouse or child to suffer undue hardship include,

(a) the parent or spouse has responsibility for an unusually high level of debts reasonably incurred to support the parents or spouses and their children during cohabitation or to earn a living;

(b) the parent or spouse has unusually high expenses in relation to exercising access to a child;

(c) the parent or spouse has a legal duty under a judgment, order or written separation agreement to support any person;

(d) the spouse has a legal duty to support a child, other than a child of the marriage, who is,

(i) under the age of majority, or

(ii) the age of majority or over but is unable, by reason of illness, disability or other cause, to obtain the necessaries of life;

(e) the parent has a legal duty to support a child, other than the child who is the subject of this application, who is under the age of majority or who is enrolled in a full time course of education;

(f) the parent or spouse has a legal duty to support any person who is unable to obtain the necessaries of life due to an illness or disability.

Standards of living must be considered

(3) Despite a determination of undue hardship under subsection (1), an application under that subsection must be denied by the court if it is of the opinion that the household of the parent or spouse who claims undue hardship would, after determining the amount of child support under any of sections 3 to 5, 8 or 9, have a higher standard of living than the household of the other parent or spouse.

Standards of living test

(4) In comparing standards of living for the purpose of subsection (3), the court may use the comparison of household standards of living test set out in Schedule II.

Reasonable time

(5) Where the court awards a different amount of child support under subsection (1), it may specify, in the order for child support, a reasonable time for the satisfaction of any obligation arising from circumstances that cause undue hardship and the amount payable at the end of that time.

Reasons

(6) Where the court makes an order for the support of a child in a different amount under this section, it must record its reasons for doing so.

125. It is very difficult to make out a successful undue hardship claim under section 10 of the guidelines. There are three parts to the test:

1. The person making this claim must show that there are circumstances that could create undue hardship.

2. If this is the case, the person making the claim must show that his or her standard of living is lower than that of the responding party.

3. If the first two parts of the test are made out, the court has the discretion to make a support order different than the table amount, based on the means, needs and circumstances of the parties.

See Matthews v. Matthews 2001 28118 (ON SC), [2001] O.J. No. 876 (Ont. S.C.).

126. The father must prove more than hardship. He must show that the hardship is exceptional, excessive or disproportionate, not merely awkward or inconvenient. See Hanmore v. Hanmore, 2000 ABCA 57.

127. The father has the onus of providing adequate supporting documentation to prove his undue hardship claim. See Van Gool v. Van Gool, (1998) 1998 5650 (BC CA), 166 D.L.R. (4th) 528(B.C.C.A.); Al-Hadad v. Al-Harash, 2023 ONCJ 463, 98 R.F.L. (8th) 213.

128. I am not satisfied that the father has met his onus for establishing undue hardship. While I appreciate that he was off work for one year, he is working again. The evidence does not demonstrate that the alleged hardship is exceptional, excessive or disproportionate.

129. The father may need to reconsider his expenses. But nothing in the evidence convinces me that the father’s child support obligation should be reduced.

130. It is appropriate for the father to pay $1,501.64 per month for the three children based on an income of $75,029, as based on line 15000 of his 2024 Notice of Assessment. Whether you call it imputing income or simply based on the best evidence before me, I arrive at the same amount.

131. It is not appropriate to deviate from the Child Support Guideline amounts.

Conclusion

132. Based on the foregoing, this court makes the following orders:

a. The father’s motion for DNA paternity testing is dismissed.

b. The father shall not speak negatively about the mother in the presence of the children, including the father shall not imply or discuss his concerns that the children may have been conceived through alleged sex work.

c. Associate Justice Kamal shall be the case management judge for this matter. Subject to the court’s availability, all future conferences shall be scheduled before Associate Justice Kamal, and any motions that are within the jurisdiction of an Associate Judge and appropriate for Associate Justice Kamal to hear as a case-management judge shall be brought before his Honour.

d. The Respondent shall pay child support to the Applicant for the children, in the amount of $1,501.64 per month, in accordance with the Tables under the child support guidelines based on the Applicant’s annual income of $75,029commencing May 1, 2026 and continuing on the 1st day of each month that follows.[^2]

Associate Justice Kamal

DATE: April 30, 2026

[^1]: The father is self-represented. In accordance with the Court of Appeal’s guidance in Grand River Conservation Authority v. Vidhya Ramdas, 2021 ONCA 815, at paras. 18-21 and Morwald-Benevides v. Benevides, 2019 ONCA 1023, at paras. 34-36, and acknowledging the court’s duties to self-represented litigants, I provided the father extra time to make his submissions. I also engaged in active adjudication to ensure the court received submissions on the relevant issues.

[^2]: The names, dates of birth, and personal information of the children and parties was intentionally omitted from the wording of this child support order in this endorsement. When the order is drafted for issuing, counsel shall ensure that the requirements of s. 13 of the Child Support Guidelines are adhered to.