Kelli Day

The bankrupt sought a discharge from her second bankruptcy, which was materially contributed to by her struggles with addiction.

The court considered the rehabilitative purpose of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the bankrupt's ongoing recovery efforts.

The court ordered a conditional and suspended discharge, requiring the bankrupt to attend 12-step meetings, engage in counseling, and return to court annually for three years to demonstrate ongoing recovery.

Following trial, the court determined costs in a boundary and related damages dispute involving highly disproportionate litigation expense relative to the nominal value of the land in issue.

Although the plaintiffs succeeded on the principal boundary issue and in resisting the counterclaim, the court found both sides responsible for inefficient and unreasonable conduct, and specifically found delay and cost consequences attributable to the plaintiffs’ litigation choices.

Applying s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 considerations, the court declined to award any counsel fees.

The court awarded only partial disbursements, ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay $25,000.00 plus HST.

The moving party sought to quash an appeal and dismiss a related motion for leave to appeal on jurisdictional grounds.

The Court of Appeal determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, applying principles from *Iris Technologies Inc. v. Rogers Communications Canada Inc.*, which held that under s. 17(9) of the *Arbitration Act, 1991*, there is no further right of appeal from a Superior Court judge's decision reviewing an arbitrator's preliminary jurisdictional ruling.

The Superior Court had overturned an arbitrator's decision regarding the validity of a lease and its arbitration clause.

Consequently, both the appeal and the motion for leave to appeal were quashed.

The plaintiff, CPOS Inc., brought a motion for an injunction to compel the defendant, Brandon Hwon Munn Fong, to return and have confidential information professionally wiped from his electronic devices by a third party.

CPOS abandoned its claim of improper solicitation.

The court ordered Fong to describe and delete the documents himself, rejecting CPOS's request for third-party wiping.

This decision addresses the costs of that motion.

Fong sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing CPOS's motion was heavy-handed and unsuccessful on the key issue.

CPOS argued its conduct was not improper and the relief granted was more robust than Fong's offers.

The court found Fong substantially successful on the main issue of the wiping method.

Considering factors under Rule 57, including success, claims, complexity, and offers to settle, the court ordered CPOS to pay Fong costs on a liberal partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff, CPOS Inc., brought a motion seeking an order to compel the defendant, Brandon Hwon Munn Fong, to return and professionally wipe confidential information from his personal devices and email account.

The defendant agreed to search and delete the information but objected to an independent consultant performing the search.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion, finding no evidence of misuse of information by the defendant and stating that a detailed search of personal devices should not be ordered based on suspicion or speculation.

The court emphasized that such intrusive orders are reserved for exceptional circumstances with convincing evidence of intentional deletion of relevant information.

The court ordered the defendant to provide an affidavit listing documents, produce them upon request, and then delete them.

The applicant successfully challenged an arbitrator's preliminary ruling on jurisdiction, with the court declaring an alleged lease invalid due to a forged signature.

The applicant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis for the court application and the jurisdiction motion before the arbitrator.

The court found that the respondents engaged in reprehensible conduct, including submitting falsified evidence, altering documents, and making bad faith allegations.

Consequently, the court awarded the applicant substantial indemnity costs fixed at $342,230.24.

The applicant challenged an arbitrator's preliminary ruling that an arbitration clause in an alleged lease agreement was valid.

The applicant claimed his signature on the lease was forged.

The court determined that under s. 17(8) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, the application was a hearing de novo.

After assessing lay and expert evidence, including handwriting and ink dating experts, the court found the respondents failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the applicant signed the lease.

The court declared the lease and its arbitration clause invalid and set aside the arbitrator's ruling.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action under Rule 21, the defendants sought their costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff had made sweeping, unproven allegations of fraud, theft, and professional misconduct against the defendants.

The court found that these unfounded allegations warranted elevated costs to sanction the plaintiff's reprehensible conduct.

Additionally, two defendants had made offers to settle that the plaintiff failed to accept, further justifying substantial indemnity costs.

The court ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendants' costs totaling $58,474.91.

The self-represented plaintiff brought an action against her former landlord, a real estate agent, a paralegal, her former spouse, and the Ottawa Police Service, alleging an 'eviction scam' that resulted in the loss of her personal property.

The defendants brought Rule 21 motions to strike the claim and dismiss the action.

The court granted the motions, finding that the Landlord and Tenant Board had exclusive jurisdiction over the core dispute, the claims against the real estate agent were statute-barred, and the pleadings failed to disclose any reasonable cause of action against any defendant.

The action was dismissed as frivolous and vexatious against the paralegal and former spouse, and the claim was struck in its entirety without leave to amend.

The bankrupt applied under s. 187(5) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to vary a conditional discharge order, arguing the Trustee incorrectly calculated surplus income and failed to consider his family and financial situation.

The Trustee opposed, arguing the application was premature and should have been brought under s. 172(3).

The court held that s. 187(5) was the appropriate mechanism because the bankrupt sought to adduce new evidence and arguments overlooked at the initial hearing.

The court found the Trustee's surplus income calculation was incorrect as it failed to account for the bankrupt's actual monthly income and his custody of two children.

Concluding that further payments would hinder the bankrupt's rehabilitation, the court varied the order to grant an absolute discharge.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision revoking her Reliability Status due to concerns about her financial history and failure to disclose past employment.

The Federal Court found that the decision-maker breached procedural fairness by failing to provide the applicant with a Statement of Adverse Information, as contemplated by the Treasury Board Standard, before a negative decision was made.

The application for judicial review was allowed and the matter remitted for reconsideration.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment that dismissed their action against one of the individual defendants, Paolo Messina, following an altercation at a waterpark where two minor appellants were assaulted.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge made several errors of law and fact, including improperly reversing the onus of proof, failing to draw an adverse inference from the respondent's failure to file an affidavit, and relying on inadmissible hearsay evidence.

The court emphasized that the moving party bears the initial evidentiary burden in summary judgment motions and reiterated the caution against granting partial summary judgment due to the risk of inconsistent findings.

The appeal was allowed, the summary judgment set aside, and the motion dismissed.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision dismissing his applications for substantial interference and failure to meet maintenance obligations.

The tenant and his family had moved into the rental unit but left the next day because it was unsafe and unfit for habitation due to ongoing repairs.

The Divisional Court found the Board erred in law by focusing on the tenant's prior knowledge of the unit's condition, ignoring evidence of the severity of the deficiencies, and failing to provide a remedy despite finding the unit unfit for habitation.

The appeal was allowed, and the tenant was awarded the return of his deposit, rent abatement, and out-of-pocket expenses.