Superior Court of Justice - Ontario

Court File No.: FC-24-1647 Date: 2026-03-16

RE: Fariaa Ali Zaidi, Applicant

• and -

Safi Danish Zaidi, Respondent

• and -

Ashfaw Zaidi and Narjis Zaidi, proposed added parties

BEFORE: Associate Justice Kamal

COUNSEL:

Joseph A. Di Iorio, for the Applicant Elsie Daoust, for the Respondent Jodi R. Fleishman, for the proposed Respondents

Reasons for Decision

Background

[1] On November 12, 2025, the Respondent brought a procedural motion seeking the Court's assistance to schedule a motion for various relief for a period of 1.5 hours to be scheduled at the soonest available date.

[2] The Respondent sought the Court's assistance with scheduling because the Respondent's counsel was having difficulties getting the Applicant's counsel's availability and cooperation in scheduling the motion.

[3] On that date, I was advised that there are interim issues that remain outstanding and for which the Respondent requested relief from the court prior to trial, including orders addressing a jointly leased apartment, disclosure from Ms. Zaidi, and adding the Respondent's parents as parties to this proceeding due to their interest in a piece of land held in the parties' name.

[4] A draft Notice of Motion was attached to the Respondent's materials.

[5] In an effort to provide earlier dates and streamline the process, I endorsed that the motion for adding parties, disclosure, and any other relief that is within the jurisdiction of an Associate Judge would be heard before me. I made myself available by special appointment to hear this motion because this matter is scheduled for trial on the May 2026 trial sittings. The motion dealing with the parties' interests in the apartment (and any other matters not dealt with at the motion before me) was to be scheduled as a regular motion.

[6] Counsel was encouraged to review Rule 42 of the Family Law Rules to determine what issues an Associate Judge has jurisdiction to hear on a motion.

[7] I ended up receiving three (3) separate Notices of Motion: one from the Applicant, one from the Respondent, and one from the Respondent's parents (who are seeking to be added as parties).

[8] I ended up receiving a total of 37 heads of relief.

[9] The Applicant's Notice of Motion sought 13 substantive heads of relief that were not contemplated at the scheduling of this motion. This motion was improperly brought.

[10] Also, much of the relief outlined in the Applicant's Notice of Motion was not within my jurisdiction. The Applicant also did not file a factum (as directed) and did not provide helpful submissions on the issue of jurisdiction.

[11] The beginning of the motion was spent on submissions about jurisdiction. Then counsel made submissions on the issues I determined I had jurisdiction to hear.

[12] Below are my reasons with respect to the jurisdiction of an Associate Judge, followed by each issue determined in this motion.

Relevant Facts

[13] The relevant facts for this motion are:

a. The Applicant was born on August 3, 1988, and is currently 37 years of age.

b. The Respondent was born on April 24, 1982 and is currently 43 years of age.

c. The parties were married in Lahore, Pakistan, on March 19, 2020. They were introduced through a customary Islamic liaison. Other than a few very brief encounters, they did not know each other prior to marriage.

d. The parties were domiciled in Ontario following marriage. They separated on March 30, 2024.

e. There are no children of the marriage.

f. At the time of separation, they were living in rental accommodation in Ottawa, Ontario.

g. There is a lot in Cornwall registered in the names of the parties. At the case conference on January 24, 2025, the parties agreed it was worth approximately $130,000. The Respondent and his parents assert that his parents have an unregistered interest in the property.

h. The parties also have a joint bank account and a safety deposit box.

i. There is a dispute over jewellery, which includes jewellery that may or may not be in the safety deposit box.

j. The Respondent has a B.Sc. from York University and an M.D. from Ross University in Dominica. He is employed as a clinical researcher and earned $162,477.24 in 2024.

k. The Applicant completed a Bachelor of Business Administration and Marketing from Thompson Rivers University in British Columbia. She did not work during the marriage. She has recently obtained employment driving part-time. There is little evidence of her income and financial circumstances.

l. This matter is scheduled for trial on the May 2026 trial sittings.

Issues on this Motion

[14] This motion raises the following issues:

a. What is the jurisdiction of an Associate Judge on a motion in family law?

b. Should the Respondent's parents be added as parties?

c. Should the Respondent's payments for the Dearborn Apartment, made on behalf of the Applicant in the years 2025 and 2026, be deemed to be spousal support paid and received under the Income Tax Act ("ITA")?

d. Should the Respondent be provided access to the Dearborn Apartment to collect his belongings and inspect the property?

e. Should the parties' joint safety deposit box and associated bank account be closed forthwith, with all remaining contents in the safety deposit box confirmed prior to closing?

f. Should the Applicant be required to provide the requested disclosure?

Law and Analysis

Jurisdiction of an Associate Judge to hear and decide motions in family law

a. General Principles Regarding Jurisdiction of an Associate Judge in Family Law

[15] Associate Judges promote active management, in accordance with subrule 2 (5). See Rule 42(2).

[16] Associate Judges' jurisdiction in family law is derived from the Family Law Rules, specifically Rule 42. See Rule 42(4).

[17] The exercise of those powers and the performance of those duties and functions are subject to the restrictions specified in subrule (5), which states:

The associate judge has no jurisdiction in respect of,

(a) a power, duty or function that is conferred exclusively on a judge of a superior court by law or expressly on a judge by an Act;

(b) a case involving a special party or a child party;

(c) the determination of a right or interest of a party in real property; or

(d) the making of an order or hearing of a motion for an order,

• to change, set aside, stay or confirm an order of a judge,
• to find a person in contempt of court,
• to restrain the liberty of a person, including an order for imprisonment, a warrant for arrest or a warrant of committal,
• to dismiss all or part of a party's case for a failure by the party to follow these rules or obey an order in the case or a related case, if the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, 1996 applies to the party's case,
• to split a divorce from other issues in a case under subrule 12 (6), or
• to grant summary judgment.

[18] In my view, subrule 42(5) is absolute, and all other subrules must be read with consideration of this subrule.

[19] An Associate Judge may hear motions under Rule 14 relating to matters over which we have jurisdiction and, for that purpose, may exercise any power under that rule, other than a power under subrule 14(21) - order a party not to make any other motions in the case without the court's permission. See Subrule 42(7).

[20] Subrule 42(8) lists the orders an Associate Judge is permitted to make on a motion. This list is extensive.

[21] It includes procedural orders on issues such as representation, service, pleadings, disclosure, questioning, and other procedural issues.

[22] It also includes substantive issues including but not limited to, parenting orders or contact orders, child support, spousal support, restraining depletion of property, orders dealing with property other than real property, striking a document, orders for blood and DNA tests, and any order that is necessary and incidental to the power to make a temporary order that is within the jurisdiction of the associate judge.

b. The Applicant's Notice of Motion

[23] The Applicant's Notice of Motion sought 13 heads of relief.

[24] As mentioned above, this motion was not contemplated at the scheduling of this hearing. It was improperly brought. Nonetheless, I allowed the Applicant's counsel to make submissions on the Applicant's motion, bearing in mind the time allotted for each party's submissions.

[25] Much of the relief outlined in the Applicant's Notice of Motion was not within my jurisdiction.

[26] The Applicant's counsel only made submissions on whether I has jurisdiction to make an order directing the Respondent to comply with the marriage law and Islamic religious obligation(s) the Respondent entered into pursuant to religious marriage in the jurisdiction and laws of Pakistan as per the wording of section 58(a) of the Family Law Act, and responded to the Respondent and the Respondent's parents motions.

[27] The Applicant also did not serve and file a factum, as directed in my previous endorsement.

[28] An Associate Judge does not have jurisdiction to hear or decide a request directing a party to comply with the marriage law and Islamic religious obligation(s) the parties entered into pursuant to religious marriage in the jurisdiction and laws of Pakistan, as per the wording of section 58(a) of the Family Law Act. The jurisdiction of an Associate Judge on a motion is outlined in Subrule 42(8) of the Family Law Rules. This relief is not listed in Subrule 42(8).

[29] Accordingly, I find I do not have jurisdiction to decide the first head of relief in the Applicant's Notice of Motion.

[30] The remainder of the Applicant's motion is deemed abandoned because counsel did not make submissions on the rest of the motion, either with respect to jurisdiction or the relief sought. I also note that the Applicant's motion was improperly brought.

[31] The Applicant's request was disproportionate and inappropriate for the time allocated to this motion. There is no way a total of 37 heads of relief could be addressed in a one-hour motion.

c. The Respondent's Notice of Motion

[32] The Respondent's Notice of Motion seeks the following orders:

a. An Order that, within 30 days, the Respondent shall be provided reasonable access to 715-G Dearborn Private, Ottawa (the "Dearborn Apartment"), accompanied by a police escort, to collect his personal belongings and inspect the condition of the unit.

b. An Order that all payments made by the Respondent on behalf of the Applicant in the year 2025 shall be deemed periodic payments of spousal support, paid and received under subsections 56.1(3) and 60.1(3) of the ITA. For the tax year 2025, the Respondent shall deduct these payments from his taxable income, and the Applicant shall include them in her taxable income.

c. An Order that all payments made by the Respondent on behalf of the Applicant in the year 2026 relating to the rent, insurance, hydro, Enercare, Enbridge, and internet expenses for the Dearborn Apartment, shall be deemed periodic payments in lieu of spousal support, paid and received under subsections 56.1(3) and 60.1(3) of the ITA, without prejudice to either party's ability to argue entitlement to spousal support, quantum of spousal support, or any other argument with respect to spousal support at trial.

d. An Order that any remaining contents of a safety deposit box be confirmed in the presence of both parties, and with a witness, and that the TD Bank joint account and safety deposit box be thereafter closed.

e. An order for reimbursement for post-separation payments made by the Respondent for the Applicant's credit card account, half of the fees relating to the joint TD account and safety deposit box, and payments made by the Respondent, on behalf of the Applicant, for her Fido cell phone account.

f. An Order for specific disclosure, detailed in the Notice of Motion.

g. Costs.

[33] At the outset of the Motion, the Respondent's counsel advised that the request for reimbursement for post-separations was not being pursued in this motion due to time constraints.

[34] In my view, I have jurisdiction to hear and decide the Respondent's motion.

[35] First, the Respondent requests access to the Dearborn Apartment for the purpose of collecting his personal belongings and inspecting the condition of the unit.

[36] Pursuant to Subrule 42(8)12 of the Family Law Rules, an Associate Judge has the jurisdiction to make an interim order on a motion dealing with property other than real property.

[37] Subrule 42(5)(c) states that an Associate Judge has no jurisdiction "in respect of the determination of a right or interest of a party in real property". This does not mean that an Associate Judge cannot make any order at all with respect to real property. An Associate Judge can make orders that do not determine or affect the rights or interests of the parties with respect to that real property.

[38] Pursuant to s.18(1) and 19(1) of the Family Law Act, the Dearborn Apartment is a matrimonial home to which both parties have an equal right to possession.

[39] The purpose of the order requested is with respect to allowing the Respondent access to the Dearborn Apartment so that he may collect his personal belongings and inspect the condition of the unit.

[40] In my view, an order permitting access to a property is not determining or affecting the rights or interests of the parties with respect to that real property. The heart of the order sought is to gain access to the apartment to collect personal belongings and inspect the apartment. This is not a determination of a right or interest of a party in real property. Specifically, an order allowing access to collect belongings is an order regarding property other than real property. An order allowing access to inspect the property does not determine rights or interests in the property. Therefore, this request is within the jurisdiction of an Associate Judge.

[41] The next issue is whether payments made by the Respondent on behalf of the Applicant in the years 2025 and 2026 shall be deemed periodic payments of spousal support, paid and received under subsections 56.1(3) and 60.1(3) of the ITA.

[42] Subrules 42(8)(9) and 42(8)(10) provide an Associate Judge with jurisdiction to make temporary orders for support under both the Family Law Act and the Divorce Act (Canada). Such an order would be incidental to an order for periodic spousal support.

[43] Section 34(1)(a) and (e) of the Family Law Act provides that where there is an application for spousal support under s.33, the court may make an interim order under subsection (a) requiring that an amount be paid periodically, whether annually or otherwise and whether for an indefinite or limited period, or until the happening of a specified event; and under subsection (e) requiring that some or all of the money payable under the order be paid into court or to another appropriate person or agency for the dependent's benefit.

[44] Pursuant to Subrule 42(8)9 of the Family Law Rules, an Associate Judge has the jurisdiction to make a temporary order on a motion relating to support under section 33, 34 (1) (a) and (e). The characterization of those payments is an incidental order to a spousal support order. Subrule 42(8)16 permits an Associate Judge to make an order that is necessary and incidental to the power to make a temporary order that is within the jurisdiction of the associate judge. Accordingly, I find that I, as an Associate Judge, have jurisdiction to determine this issue.

[45] The next issue is the contents of a safety deposit box to be confirmed in the presence of both parties, and with a witness, and that the TD Bank joint account and safety deposit box be thereafter closed.

[46] Subrule 42(8)12 states that an Associate Judge may make a temporary order dealing with property other than real property.

[47] Both the safety deposit box and the TD bank account are property other than real property. Therefore, I have jurisdiction to determine this issue.

[48] With respect to the disclosure request, Rule 13 of the Family Law Rules deals with the obligations on parties to provide full and frank financial disclosure on an ongoing basis.

[49] Subrule 42(8)1 specifically permits an Associate Judge to make orders pursuant to Rule 13.

d. The Proposed Added Parties' Notice of Motion

[50] The parents of the Respondent seek to be added as named Respondents to this proceeding pursuant to Rule 7(5) of the Family Law Rules. They also seek procedural orders related to their participation if they are added as parties.

[51] Subrule 42(8)1 specifically permits an Associate Judge to make orders pursuant to Rule 7.

[52] Subrule 42(8)16 permits an Associate Judge to make an order that is necessary and incidental to the power to make a temporary order that is within the jurisdiction of the associate judge.

[53] Accordingly, I have the jurisdiction to decide the motion to add parties.

Adding Parties

[54] Should the proposed Respondents, Ms. Narjis Zaidi and Mr. Ashfaq Zaidi, be added as parties to the family court proceeding pursuant to Rule 7(5) of the Family Law Rules?

[55] Ms. Narjis Zaidi and Mr. Ashfaq Zaidi seek to be added as parties because they purchased a lot located at 1253 Westburke Avenue, Plan 52M49, Lot 35, Cornwall, Ontario, on March 8, 2021, which was placed into the names of the Applicant and the Respondent.

[56] It is undisputed that the proposed Respondents paid a $10,000.00 deposit on March 8, 2021, to the realtor to purchase the lot, with the balance of $107,494.91 paid by the proposed Respondents on July 5, 2021. The evidence demonstrates that the monies were withdrawn from their bank account.

[57] In her Application, the Applicant seeks an Order for the sale of the lot and for the net proceeds of the sale to be divided equally between the Applicant and the Respondent.

[58] Rule 7(5) of the Family Law Rules states:

Party added by court order

(5) The court may order that any person who should be a party shall be added as a party, and may give directions for service on that person.

[59] An order to add a party under Rule 7(5) is discretionary. The rule gives no direction as to how the court should exercise its discretion; however, caselaw directs that discretion ought to be exercised very sparingly unless the proposed parties have a legal interest in the issues joined in the proceeding. See Children's Aid Society of London and Middlesex v. P.(J.), 2000 CanLII 20732 at para. 4; Linett v. Linett, 2012 ONSC 6894 at para. 35.

[60] In Noik v. Noik, 2001 CanLII 27970 and A.C.V.P v. A.M.T. 2017 ONSC 7031, the Court set out the relevant principles for a court to consider in a motion to add a party under Rule 7(5):

a) No party should be added unless an order could be made in favour of, or against, such person;

b) A party should only be added if his/her presence would assist the court in resolving the issues in this case;

c) A party should not be added if the applicant's claims against the current respondent can properly be adjudicated without the proposed party.

[61] As further detailed below, Ms. Narjis Zaidi and Mr. Ashfaq Zaidi meet the test to be added as parties for the following reasons:

a. An Order could be made at trial to sell the Cornwall lot and divide the proceeds equally between the parties, which would be an Order against the proposed Respondents and would have a direct negative impact on them;

b. The presence of the proposed Respondents would assist the court in resolving the issues in this case; and

c. The claims made by the Applicant against the Respondent with respect to the Cornwall lot cannot be properly adjudicated without adding the proposed Respondents as parties.

a. An Order could be made that impacts the proposed parties

[62] A person should not be added as a party under subrule 7(5) unless an order can be made in favour of, or against, that person. See Santilli v. Piselli, 2010 ONSC 2874; London and Middlesex v. P.(J.), 2000 CanLII 20732; Worral v. Worral, 2012 ONSC 438; Niessen v. Niessen, 2023 ONSC 6945.

[63] In Ignjatovic v. Vukojevic, 2017 ONSC 2247, the Court added the husband's cousin as a third party, pursuant to Rule 7(5) of the Family Law Rules. In the context of a divorce proceeding involving an equalization claim, the wife claimed that the husband and his cousin had a joint bank account and that the cousin was hiding money for the husband, which ought to be part of the husband's net family property.

[64] The Court stated that if the respondents are "involved" or if their financial affairs are inextricably intertwined and naming them would not prejudice or disadvantage them in any way, then they may be named as parties. See Ignjatovic v. Vukojevic, 2017 ONSC 2247 at para. 11.

[65] The test is not that the party that seeks to be added as the third party has to establish that there is a cause of action against that party. See Ignjatovic v. Vukojevic, 2017 ONSC 2247 at paras. 13-14.

[66] In the present case, the parties' and the proposed Respondents' financial affairs have become entangled. The proposed Respondents paid the money for the Cornwall land. To determine the equalization payment, the trial judge will likely have to first determine who owns the lot. As the Applicant is now requesting an order to sell the lot so she can keep half of the revenues, an Order could be made that impacts the proposed parties.

b. The participation of the proposed Respondents would assist the court in resolving the issues in this case

[67] The fact that someone may have relevant evidence in a case does not elevate them from a witness to party status. See Noik v. Noik, 2001 CanLII 27970.

[68] In order for the participation of the proposed party to be of assistance to the Court requires them to be able to provide assistance as a party. This must be considered through the lens of the legal claims being adjudicated in the proceeding.

[69] In the present case, the claims include equalization, as well as claims involving a resulting trust and constructive trust.

[70] The Applicant specifically makes claims with respect to the Cornwall lot in the Application.

[71] The Respondent claims that the Cornwall lot is owned by way of a resulting or constructive trust in favour of his parents and, therefore, the lot should not be sold and net sale proceeds divided between the parties, as the Applicant is requesting.

[72] I have considered that the Respondent and his parents have similar positions, and whether it would be sufficient for the Respondent's parents to just provide evidence as part of the Respondent's case.

[73] However, the Respondent's parents' interests in the property would be greatly impacted in this litigation. Their participation would assist the Court with more than just evidence. Their ability to test the parties' evidence, including cross-examining the parties and their witnesses, provide submissions, seek orders, participate in the procedure, engage in settlement discussions, and even appeal the decision if needed, makes their participation helpful to the Court more than juts being witnesses.

[74] Being a party also means they can be represented by legal representation and will not have to rely on the Respondent's legal counsel.

[75] In my view, the participation of the Respondent's parents would benefit the Court because they must be permitted to take a position independent of the Respondent, they must be able to present evidence, test the parties' evidence, and make submissions independent of the Respondent, and they must be able to retain counsel and participate in a way that protects their interests, independent of the Respondent.

c. The claims cannot be properly adjudicated without adding the proposed Respondents

[76] The Applicant's position was that the proposed added parties should initiate a civil claim.

[77] This would serve to delay the family law matter (scheduled for trial in May) unnecessarily and cause increased expense to the Applicant, Respondent and proposed Respondents by having competing proceedings. This would be contrary to Rule 2 of the Family Law Rules.

[78] In my view, it would be a complete waste of time and resources for two separate proceedings.

[79] If the proposed added parties initiated a civil action, the civil and family law claims would have questions of law and fact in common. To permit the claims to run concurrently risks producing inconsistent rulings. See Liu v. Ling, 2025 ONSC 2503 at para. 30

[80] Zhou v. Zhao et al. 2024 ONSC 6663 is an example of a case where the added parties were needed in order to properly adjudicate the trust and equalization claims.

[81] In considering the legal claims, the presumption of a resulting trust arises when title to property is in one party's name, but that party, because he or she "is a fiduciary or gave no value for the property", holds the property in trust for the other party and is under an obligation to return the property to the other party. The effect of a resulting trust is that the title to the property reverts back to the beneficiary. The presumption of resulting trust is a rebuttable presumption of law and of the general rule that applies to gratuitous transfers. See Pecore v. Pecore, 2007 SCC 17 at paras. 20-25.

[82] In Prtenjaca et al. v. Wells-Prtenjaca et al. 2022 ONSC 438, the Court stated that when a parent makes a gratuitous transfer to an adult child, there is a presumption of resulting trust. A party alleging that such a transfer is a gift bears the burden of proving that the transfer was a gift. It is the intention of the transferor at the time of transfer that is determinative of whether or not a transfer is a gift. The intention of the transferee is irrelevant.

[83] In order for the proper adjudication of the family law proceeding, the ownership of the Cornwall lot will need to be determined. It is simply not appropriate to require two separate proceedings or to adjudicate that issue without adding the Respondent's parents, who paid for that lot, as a party.

[84] Accordingly, Ashfaq Zaidi and Narjis Zaidi shall be added as Respondents to this proceeding.

[85] As incidental orders to adding them as parties, the following orders shall apply:

a. Ashfaq Zaidi and Narjis Zaidi shall serve and file their Answer by no later than fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order.

b. Ashfaq Zaidi and Narjis Zaidi may file their Answer with a sworn financial statement completed only with respect to their interest in the Cornwall lot.

[86] In my view, the participation of Ashfaq Zaidi and Narjis Zaidi is limited to their interest in the Cornwall lot. The rest of their financial information is not relevant to this proceeding and would be a waste of resources to include in this proceeding.

Payments as Interim Spousal Support

[87] The Respondent seeks an order that the following payments made in 2025 should be deemed periodic payments of spousal support: Rent, totaling $23,990.39; Hydro, totaling $911.58; Enercare, totaling $647.50; Enbridge, totaling $534.91; Insurance, totalling $253.63; Internet, totalling $651.99; and by the time of the motion, the Respondent anticipated having paid a further $2,206.31 in rent, and ~$270.00 in insurance, utilities, and operating costs for December 2025.

[88] In total, he seeks an order that $29,466.28 for the year 2025 be deemed to be spousal support paid by the Respondent and received by the Applicant under s.56.1(3) and s.60.1(3) of the ITA.

[89] Similarly, the Respondent seeks an order that ongoing payments related to the Dearborn Apartment, made by the Respondent on the Applicant's behalf in the year 2026, including rent of $2,206.31 per month, and all monthly expenses for Hydro, Enercare, Enbridge, Insurance, and Internet should be deemed without prejudice periodic payments of spousal support, pursuant to s.56.1(2) and 60.1(2) of the ITA.

[90] The Respondent submits that he has not received any tax deduction benefit for all expenses paid for the Applicant's benefit. The Respondent seeks to file his 2025 taxes on time and prior to trial, including all appropriate deductions for expenses paid in 2025 on behalf of the Applicant.

[91] By the time the matter proceeds to trial and a decision is rendered, the deadline to file this year's taxes will have passed, and the Respondent will be prejudiced in terms of the tax deductions.

[92] Implicit in this argument is that the Respondent concedes that he is entitled to pay spousal support. However, it is unclear to me whether he concedes that the amount of spousal support he is obligated to pay exceeds the amount of the expenses.

[93] The Applicant submits that the request is only aimed at gaining deductions from the Respondent's salary and that it is improper because it is contrary to the religious values that were fundamental for the wedding to take place between the parties.

[94] Section 34(1)(a) and (e) of the Family Law Act provides that where there is an application for spousal support under s.33, the court may make an interim order under subsection (a) requiring that an amount be paid periodically, whether annually or otherwise and whether for an indefinite or limited period, or until the happening of a specified event; and under subsection (e) requiring that some or all of the money payable under the order be paid into court or to another appropriate person or agency for the dependent's benefit.

[95] Sections 56(1)(b) and 60(b) of the ITA use the term "commencement date" in relation to court orders or written agreements. The commencement date determines the extent to which support amounts are included in the recipient's income and are deductible by the payor.

[96] Sections 56.1(3) and 60.1(3) of the ITA are reciprocal provisions that permits a court to make an order providing that payments made prior to the order by one spouse, and received by the other spouse -- either in that year or the preceding taxation year -- may be deemed to be support paid and received, if the order specifically provides said payments to be so considered. These provisions, therefore, allow for a court to order the prior payments made to be deducted from the payor's income, and in turn, included in the recipient's income. See Splett. v. Pearo, 2011 ONSC 5329, para 80.

[97] Similarly, sections 56.1(2) and 60.1(2) of the ITA are reciprocal provisions that permit a court to make an order in respect of separated spouses for expenses incurred by one spouse, for the maintenance of the other spouse, to be deemed periodic support payments which are tax deductible for the payor and taxable for the recipient.

[98] The Respondent relies on the following cases:

a. In D.P.L. v I.G.L., 2017 BCSC 2443, payments made by the claimant to date were made voluntarily and not pursuant to either an agreement or court order; therefore, he had not received the tax benefit. He sought an order that the support previously paid to present be considered to have been paid under that Order and therefore be tax deductible to him and included as income by the Respondent. The Court made an order for ongoing spousal support. The Court was not persuaded that the order should be made retroactive to the previous year. The Court specifically stated that the claimant could have brought the application sooner. The Court was, however, satisfied that the order sought by the claimant should be made commencing January 1 of that year.

b. In Bahous v. Bahous, 2023 ONSC 1580, where there remained issues of disclosure and income determination, on an interim basis until a final determination of the matter at trial, the court ordered that s.56.1(2) and 60.1(2) of the ITA would apply to payments made by the husband for the benefit of the wife as and for partial spousal support, including the mortgage, lines of credit, utilities, gas, property tax, property insurance, internet and telephone for the property in which she was residing. These payments would be tax-deductible to the husband and included by the wife in reporting their total incomes for tax purposes.

c. In Jordan v. Jordan, 2005 SKQB 129, interim spousal support was ordered, with the respondent making specific third-party payments related to the family home and other assets. The Court ordered that the provisions of s. 56.1(2) and 60.1(2) of the ITA are to apply to these payments, and the support is to be considered tax-deductible to Mr. Jordan and as income by Ms. Jordan.

d. In Wendt v Wendt, 2016 SKQB 227, the husband was ordered to continue paying certain expenses related to the family home, with a portion of these payments considered as interim spousal support for the wife. The husband was also ordered to pay an additional amount for spousal support.

[99] The key piece in the cases relied upon by the Respondent is that there was a determination of spousal support, including a determination regarding entitlement and amount.

[100] In the present case, there is no spousal support order or agreement, and no one has asked for one. I do not have sufficient evidence before me to decide spousal support.

[101] The order requested by the Respondent cannot be made as a standalone order and requires an order or agreement with respect to spousal support.

[102] The Respondent submitted that due to the delay in scheduling this motion, the Respondent is already prevented from seeking an order characterizing as support paid and received, expenses paid on the Applicant's behalf in 2024. Credit for these payments will be addressed at trial.

[103] Credits for payments made in 2025 and 2026 should also be addressed at trial.

[104] I appreciate that the entitlement threshold on an interim motion is low and a temporary order is "not intended to involve a detailed examination of the merits of a case." See Bahous v. Bahous, 2023 ONSC 1580, at para 13 and Knowles v. Lindstrom, 2015 ONSC 1408, at para. 8.

[105] However, based on the materials before me, it is not appropriate to make an interim spousal support order at this time, especially because the trial is scheduled to be heard in two months and credits for these payments will be addressed at the trial.

[106] Therefore, this request is dismissed without prejudice to address this issue at the trial.

Access to the Dearborn Apartment

[107] The Respondent seeks an Order that, within 30 days, the Applicant shall provide the Respondent with access to the Dearborn Apartment, to allow him to collect his personal belongings, prepare an inventory of any disputed belongings or household contents, and inspect the condition of the unit.

[108] Pursuant to s.18(1) and 19(1) of the Family Law Act, the Dearborn Apartment is a matrimonial home to which both parties have an equal right to possession.

[109] There is no order for exclusive possession.

[110] I am not deciding the rights or interests of any party regarding the Dearborn Apartment.

[111] Since May 2024, the Respondent has made an effort to amicably obtain access to the Dearborn Apartment in order to retrieve his personal things, with the help of a police officer to maintain order. The Applicant has not cooperated. The Respondent has not had his belongings for 19 months.

[112] The Respondent also submits that he is entitled to prepare his matter for trial. As such, the Respondent requires a complete evidentiary record to rely upon regarding disputed personal belongings and household contents.

[113] In addition, if there are any damages or corollary relief relating to the Dearborn Apartment that is required to be addressed, evidence will also need to be gathered for such claims at trial.

[114] I rely on Sabry v. Loeff, 2012 ONSC 1728, in which there was no order for exclusive possession, and the father resided in the matrimonial home. He had changed the locks and refused entry to the motion to retrieve her personal belongings. The court held that it was reasonable to permit the mother to have access to the home to see that it is in good condition, and to pick up her personal belongings.

[115] The Applicant submits that allowing the Respondent to enter the Dearborn Apartment is an "invasion into [her] life" and an "obstruction, a forced entry into [her] personal private space."

[116] That position is not supported by the evidence or the caselaw. Numerous cases provide authority for the reasonable access to a matrimonial home for the purpose of collecting belongings. See, for example, Hao v. Wang, 2015 ONSC 6989 and Norman v. Connors, 2010 ONSC 1975, paras 39-40.

[117] I see no reason why the Respondent cannot attend at the Dearborn Apartment to retrieve his personal possessions.

[118] The evidence shows that the Respondent has taken reasonable steps to make arrangements for a civil and reasonable exchange of possessions through counsel, with notice, and with an officer to help keep the peace. There is no evidence that the Respondent has ever tried to force entry into the Dearborn Apartment or act in a manner that can be characterized as an invasion into the Applicant's life or personal private space.

[119] The Applicant also expresses concerns that further contested household contents may be removed. This can be addressed through clearly defined terms in the order. The Respondent has provided suggested terms to address this.

[120] The Respondent's proposal is reasonable.

[121] Although the Respondent is not presently residing in the home, both parties have an interest in the contents located within it, and are in dispute about the contents. Denying access runs the risk of unjustly depriving the Respondent of his personal belongings and could lead to unnecessary disagreements about the household items.

[122] A controlled and time-limited entry into the Dearborn Apartment is reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances.

[123] Therefore, the Respondent should be granted reasonable access to the Dearborn Apartment, within 30 days, accompanied by police, permitting him to collect undisputed personal belongings, and documenting disputed personal items and contents, which can be addressed at trial.

The Safety Deposit Box and Joint Account

[124] The Respondent seeks an Order that any remaining contents of the safety deposit box be confirmed in the presence of both parties, and with a witness from TD Bank, and that the TD Bank joint account and safety deposit box be thereafter.

[125] The Respondent has been paying the fees for the joint account and safety deposit box. The Respondent continues to incur unnecessary fees for the joint account and safety deposit box.

[126] The Respondent simply seeks to address this matter prior to trial to save time, expense, and further court resources on this issue.

[127] The safety deposit has or had some jewellery in it that is in dispute in this proceeding.

[128] The Applicant has not acknowledged whether there are any contents remaining in the safety deposit box or if the safety deposit box is empty.

[129] The TD Bank log confirms that the Applicant was the last person to access the safety deposit box on March 23, 2024.

[130] The Applicant submits that, according to the TD Bank Manager and employees, the account and safety deposit box could be closed by either of the joint account holders. The Applicant provided the Safety Deposit Box Rental Agreement; however, this agreement does not say that either party can unilaterally close the box or terminate the agreement.

[131] The Applicant also submits that the Respondent has had possession of both safety deposit keys since he left the Dearborn Apartment.

[132] The Applicant states that she is not comfortable or willing to meet the Respondent in person to close the safety deposit box or account because she does not want to engage in conflict.

[133] In my view, the Applicant's concerns regarding conflict are appropriate but can be addressed through specific terms of this Order.

[134] The Respondent is also concerned that if he attends the bank on his own to visit the safety deposit box, his name will appear as the last party in attendance, and then it will be unknown who removed items from the safety deposit box.

[135] Furthermore, the Respondent alleges that he cannot close the safety deposit alone because counsel for the Applicant contacted the branch manager, requesting that a hold be placed on the closing of the safety deposit box and the joint account.

[136] As a result, the branch manager (at the direction of TD head office) has requested that both parties attend to close the safety deposit box.

[137] Requiring the parties to attend together will allow each to observe and confirm the contents of the box, thereby reducing the potential for future disputes regarding what items were present or removed. It is important to confirm any contents in the safety deposit box before closing. Documenting the contents will provide a record for any subsequent determination respecting ownership or division of those items. This is necessary evidence required for the disputed jewellery.

[138] Therefore, within 30 days, the parties shall attend together at TD Bank to confirm the contents of and close the joint safety deposit box. The parties shall arrange for a TD Representative to be present as a witness, and the parties shall jointly request a written confirmation from TD Bank confirming the contents of the safety deposit box prior to closing. The parties shall thereafter close said joint safety deposit box and the TD joint account.

[139] If a TD Representative is unable or unwilling to act as a witness, the parties shall choose a mutually agreed-upon third-party to act as a witness, who will also verify the contents of the safety deposit box and provide a written confirmation of the contents.

[140] The Respondent's parents shall not be the third party.

[141] Both parties shall refrain from engaging in any conflict with each other or the witness during this attendance at TD Bank.

[142] The details and logistics of the attendance at TD Bank shall be arranged through counsel.

Disclosure

[143] The most basic obligation in family law is the duty to disclose financial information. This requirement is immediate and ongoing. Failure to abide by this fundamental principle impedes the progress of the action, causes delay, and disadvantages the opposite party. It should not require court orders to obtain production. See Roberts v. Roberts, 2015 ONCA 450, at paras. 11-13.

[144] There is a general duty in all cases to disclose information that is relevant and material to the case, subject to any claims respecting privilege or other exclusionary rules of evidence. The parties in family law proceedings have a positive duty to provide meaningful financial disclosure to ensure the issues in dispute can be effectively addressed. See Spettigue v. Spettigue, 2011 ONSC 6618 at para. 15

[145] Rule 13 of the Family Law Rules deals with the obligations on parties to provide full and frank financial disclosure on an ongoing basis.

[146] Rule 13(6) requires parties who are obliged to serve Financial Statements to make "full and frank disclosure" of their financial situation.

[147] Rule 13(11) provides that if a party believes that the financial disclosure provided by another party does not provide enough information for a full understanding of the other party's financial circumstances, the party shall request the necessary additional information and if any requested information is not given within seven days, the court may, on motion order the other party to give the information.

[148] The Respondent seeks the following disclosure from the Applicant:

a. Copies of her 2024 T1 Income Tax Return, including schedules.

b. Details of her current employment and social assistance; what efforts the Applicant has made, and continues to make, to seek full-time employment between April 2024 to present within her skillset and education; and a copy of Ms. Zaidi's resume or CV used for employment applications.

c. Monthly bank statements for all accounts and credit accounts held by the Applicant, solely or jointly with any other individual, from March 2024 to present.

d. A copy of the Financing Application and Lease for the Applicant's Hyundai Tucson, including particulars of the periodic financing payments.

e. A copy of the Applicant's complete file with the Eastern Ontario Resource Centre since April 2024, and particulars of what services she has participated in; and

f. Details of what assistance she has been provided by her YMCA Employment Case Manager since February 2025.

[149] In determining whether a party is required to produce information not automatically required by the Rules or Guidelines, the test on an interim motion for disclosure is "some semblance of relevance" taking into account that the pleadings define the scope of production. However, the court must also assess fairness and proportionality. See Bintas v. Bintas, 2013 ONSC 3263, para 19. Boyd v. Fields, 2006 CarswellOnt 867, para 12.

[150] All of the disclosure requested by the Respondent has some semblance of relevance to the issues in this case. The claims involve equalization, trusts, and spousal support. Income Tax Returns, employment details including employment efforts, and bank statements are among the most basic and common disclosure exchanged in a family law proceeding involving claims of spousal support and equalization. A copy of a recent Financing Application and Lease provides the other party with relevant and necessary information about a party's financial circumstances. All of this is relevant to the legal issues and shall be disclosed.

[151] The requested disclosure from the Respondent is fair, proportionate, and available to the Applicant. This disclosure will not cause any prejudice to the Applicant to disclose.

[152] The parties are scheduled for trial in May of 2026. If this disclosure is not provided now, when will it be provided?

[153] When it comes to disclosure, counsel and parties should take the approach "sooner rather than later".

[154] And in this case, with a trial in about two months, later is already here. So, the time is now.

[155] Accordingly, the Applicant shall provide all of this disclosure within 14 days.

Conclusion

[156] For the foregoing reasons, I grant the following orders:

a. Ashfaq Zaidi and Narjis Zaidi shall be added as named Respondents to this proceeding pursuant to Rule 7(5) of the Family Law Rules.

b. Ashfaq Zaidi and Narjis Zaidi shall serve and file their Answer by no later than fourteen (14) days from the date of this endorsement.

c. Ashfaq Zaidi and Narjis Zaidi may file their Answer with a sworn financial statement completed only with respect to their interest in the Cornwall lot.

d. Within 30 days, the Applicant shall provide the Respondent with access to the Dearborn Apartment, to allow him to collect his personal belongings, prepare an inventory of any disputed belongings or household contents, and inspect the condition of the unit, in accordance with the following terms:

i. The Respondent shall attend the Dearborn Apartment with a police officer escort to 'keep the peace' at a mutually agreed upon date and timeframe;

ii. The Respondent and the police officer shall enter the Dearborn Apartment for a maximum of 3 hours while the Respondent collects his personal belongings, and surveys the unit for damage;

iii. The Respondent shall not remove or disrupt any of the Applicant's belongings at the Dearborn Apartment;

iv. Any belongings or household contents that the Applicant disputes are the Respondent's belongings shall be photographed and itemized. They shall not be removed from the Dearborn Apartment;

v. No furniture shall be removed from the Dearborn Apartment;

vi. The Respondent shall bring the Applicant's clothing in his possession to be exchanged at the time of his attendance; and

vii. Neither party shall leave the other party's belongings in the hallway of the Dearborn Apartment or otherwise.

e. Within 30 days, the parties shall attend together at TD Bank to confirm the contents of, and close, the joint Safety Deposit Box, linked to the TD joint account, in accordance with the following terms:

i. If possible, the parties shall arrange for a TD Representative to be present as a witness, and the parties shall jointly request a written confirmation from TD Bank confirming the contents of the Safety Deposit Box prior to closing.

ii. If a TD Representative is unable or unwilling to act as a witness, the parties shall choose a mutually agreed-upon third party to act as a witness, who will also verify the contents of the Safety Deposit Box and provide a written confirmation of the contents.

iii. The Respondent's parents shall not be the third party.

iv. Both parties shall refrain from engaging in any conflict with each other or the witness during this attendance at TD Bank.

v. The details and logistics of the attendance at TD Bank shall be arranged through counsel.

vi. The Respondent shall thereafter close the joint Safety Deposit Box and the TD joint account.

f. Pursuant to the Family Law Rules, within 14 days, the Applicant shall provide the disclosure outlined in the Respondent's Notice of Motion. For greater clarity, this includes:

i. Copies of her 2024 T1 Income Tax Return, including schedules.

ii. Details of her current employment and social assistance; what efforts the Applicant has made, and continues to make, to seek full-time employment between April 2024 to present within her skillset and education; and a copy of Ms. Zaidi's resume or CV used for employment applications.

iii. Monthly bank statements for all accounts and credit accounts held by the Applicant, solely or jointly with any other individual, from March 2024 to present.

iv. A copy of the Financing Application and Lease for the Applicant's Hyundai Tucson, including particulars of the periodic financing payments.

v. A copy of the Applicant's complete file with the Eastern Ontario Resource Centre since April 2024, and particulars of what services she has participated in; and

vi. Details of what assistance she has been provided by her YMCA Employment Case Manager since February 2025.

Costs

[157] Costs for this motion and the procedural motion heard on November 12, 2025, shall be reserved to the trial judge.

[158] I note that there is an outstanding costs order from the determination of urgency heard on November 14, 2024, by Associate Justice Fortier. The Applicant shall pay the cost order from the Endorsement of Justice Fortier from November 14, 2024, forthwith, including post-judgment interest.

Associate Justice Kamal

DATE: March 16, 2026