Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CV-24-00097079-0000

Date: 2026-02-10

Superior Court of Justice - Ontario

Re: ABDALLA NAZAL, Plaintiff (Responding Party)

-and-

NATHAN HIRUY and ALEM SOLOMON, Defendants (Nathan Hiruy Moving Party)

-and-

AVIVA INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA, Responding Interested Non-Party)

Before: Associate Justice Kamal

Counsel: Nathan Hiruy, Self-Represented Jean - Claude Rioux, for Responding Interested Non-Party, Aviva Insurance Company of Canada

Motion Heard: January 15, 2026

Reasons for Decision

Overview

1 . This motion raises the issue of whether the responding non-party, Aviva Insurance Company of Canada ("Aviva"), has a duty to defend Nathan Hiruy against the Plaintiff's claim, and if so, whether Nathan Hiruy should be defended by independent counsel of his choosing, at Aviva's expense.

2 . This action arises from a car accident that occurred on or about October 26, 2023. Nathan Hiruy drove his mother's car into Abdalla Nazal's car while Mr. Nazal was stationary at a traffic light.

3 . The vehicle was owned by Alem Solomon. Aviva insured two motor vehicles owned by Alem Solomon and Araya Hiruy – Nathan Hiruy's parents.

4 . Nathan was 17 years old when the accident occurred.

5 . Aviva retained counsel to defend Alem Solomon. One of the defences Ms. Solomon's counsel asserts is that, at the time of the accident, Nathan Hiruy had the car without the owner's consent.

6 . Aviva sent an email to Nathan Hiruy with an attached letter denying coverage and an email to Alem Solomon and Araya Hiruy attaching a letter stating that Aviva would defend them.

7 . Nathan Hiruy now brings this motion seeking an Order that Aviva appoint and fund independent defence counsel for him.

8 . Simply put, this motion is about whether Aviva has a duty to defend Nathan Hiruy in this action.

9 . For the following reasons, the motion is granted. Nathan Hiruy shall be defended by independent counsel of his choosing, at Aviva's expense.

Law and Analysis

Section 3.2 of the standard Ontario motor vehicle liability policy provides as follows:

3.2 Who is Covered

You are covered when you, or anyone else in possession of a described automobile with your consent, uses or operates it. We will consider these other people insured persons.

10 . Section 3.2 of the standard Ontario motor vehicle liability policy provides as follows:

11 . Section 1.8.2 of the standard Ontario motor vehicle liability policy provides as follows:

1.8.2 Excluded Driver and Driving Without Permission

Except for certain Accident Benefits coverage, there is no coverage (including coverage for occupants) under this policy if the automobile is used or operated by a person in possession of the automobile without the owner's consent …

12 . Herein lies the issue on this motion: does Aviva have a duty to defend Nathan Hiruy if their position is that he did not have the consent or permission of the owner to operate the vehicle?

13 . Nathan Huiry is not a named insurer or a listed driver on the policy with Aviva.

14 . I note that neither party produced the actual insurance policy. Aviva only referred to the standard Ontario motor vehicle liability policy in their factum.

Duty to Defend

Legal Principles

15 . The duty to defend is both a contractual obligation and a contractual right.

15. In 1990, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that an insurer's duty to defend arises only where the pleadings raise claims which would be payable under the agreement to indemnify in the insurance contract. It is not necessary to prove that the obligation to indemnify will in fact arise in order to trigger the duty to defend. See: Nichols v. American Home Assurance Co, [1990] 1 SCR 801. This decision cites a judgment from the British Columbia Superior Court that held, "the pleadings govern the duty to defend". See: Nichols v. American Home Assurance Co [1990] 1 SCR 801, citing Bacon v. McBride (1984), 6 D.L.R. (4th) 96. One of the takeaways from Nichols is that it is not necessary to prove that the defence will succeed in order for the duty to defend to arise. Rather, the "mere possibility that a claim within the policy may succeed" is enough to trigger the duty to defend. See: Nichols v. American Home Assurance Co [1990] 1 SCR 801.

16 . The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that considerations related to insurance law and practice, as well as the authorities, overwhelmingly support the view that the duty to defend should, unless the contract of insurance indicates otherwise, be confined to the defence of claims which may be argued to fall under the policy. That said, the widest latitude should be given to the allegations in the pleadings in determining whether they raise a claim within the policy. See: Nichols v. American Home Assurance Co, [1990] 1 SCR 801.

17 . The duty to defend, unlike the duty to indemnify, is triggered not by actual acts or omissions, but by allegations, applying "even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent." See: Nichols v. American Home Assurance Co, [1990] 1 SCR 801.

18 . In 2000, the Supreme Court in Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd's of London v. Scalera, 2000 SCC 24 clarified the Nichols decision by stating that the connection between the duty to defend and the pleadings is not determined solely with regard to the language of the pleadings. Instead, the determination is based on what the pleadings reveal to be the "true nature of the claim". See: Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd's of London v. Scalera, 2000 SCC 24 at para. 79.

19 . In Scalera, the Supreme Court pointedly stated that "having determined the nature of the claim, an insured need not further prove that the claim would succeed" in order for the duty to defend to be triggered. See: Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd's of London v. Scalera, 2000 SCC 24 at para. 81.

20. An insurer has a duty to defend where there is a "mere possibility" that the true nature of the pleaded claim, if proven at trial, falls within coverage and would trigger the insurer's duty to indemnify. See: Markham (City) v AIG Insurance Company of Canada, 2020 ONCA 239 at para. 46, referencing Progressive Homes Ltd. v. Lombard General Insurance Co. of Canada, 2010 SCC 33, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 245, at para. 19.

21. The Court of Appeal for Ontario in IT Haven Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds 2022 ONCA 71, referred to Progressive Homes Ltd. v. Lombard General Insurance Co. of Canada, 2010 SCC 33, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 245 and Monenco Ltd. v. Commonwealth Insurance Co., 2001 SCC 49, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 699, to summarize the principles applicable to duty to defend cases:

• Insurers owe a duty to defend where there is a mere possibility that a claim falls within the insurance policy.
• In determining a duty to defend, the court should consider the allegations made against the insured and the policy language.
• The onus is on the insured to first establish the possibility that the pleadings fall within the insurance policy, at which point the onus shifts to the insurer to show that an exclusion clearly and unambiguously excludes coverage for a claim against an insured.
• Extrinsic evidence explicitly referred to within the pleadings may be considered for the purposes of ascertaining the substance and true nature of the claims.
• However, courts cannot look at "premature" evidence, or evidence which, if considered, would require findings to be made before trial that would affect the underlying litigation.
• Extrinsic evidence not mentioned in the underlying action, or not needed for the purpose of ascertaining the nature of the claim, should not be considered by the court in the duty to defend application.

Are these motions based on pleadings or evidence?

16. Aviva submitted that this determination needs to be made on actual evidence and that the Court cannot make this determination without actual evidence.

17. If the pleadings allege facts which, if true, would require the insurer to indemnify the insured for the claim, then the insurer is obliged to provide a defence, even though the actual facts may differ from the allegations in the statement of claim. See: Markham (City) v AIG Insurance Company of Canada, 2020 ONCA 239 at para. 47; Monenco Ltd. v. Commonwealth Insurance Co., 2001 SCC 49, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 699 (S.C.C.), at para. 28; Alie v. Bertrand & Frère Construction Co. (2002), , 62 O.R. (3d) 345 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 182, leave to appeal refused, [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 48 (S.C.C.).

18. Courts are permitted to "look behind the literal terms of the pleadings" to evaluate which of the claims could be supported by the factual allegations in order to ascertain the "true nature" of the claim. See: Monenco Ltd. v. Commonwealth Insurance Co. 2001 SCC 49, [2001] 2 SCR 699 a para. 34.

19. However, the Ontario Court of Appeal clarified that extrinsic evidence not mentioned in the underlying action or "premature" evidence should not be considered in a duty to defend application. Courts cannot look at "premature" evidence, or evidence which, if considered, would require findings to be made before trial that would affect the underlying litigation. See: IT Haven Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds 2022 ONCA 71 at paras. 23 and 39.

20 . Pleadings are also to be interpreted broadly, and any doubt is to be resolved in favour of the insured. See: Panasonic Eco Solutions Canada Inc. v. XL Specialty Insurance Company, 2021 ONCA 612 at para. 22.

21 . It should be recalled that the question of whether an insurer is bound to provide defence coverage in an action taken against the insured arises as a preliminary matter. Of course, after trial, it may turn out that there is no liability on the insurer, and thus, no indemnity triggered. But that is not the issue when deciding the duty to defend. See: Monenco Ltd. v. Commonwealth Insurance Co., 2001 SCC 49 at para. 37.

22 . While the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify are intertwined in some regard, they are separate duties. In this motion, the question is with respect to the duty to defend, not the duty to indemnify.

23 . In the present case, the Statement of Claim has a list of a-gg of allegations of negligence against Nathan Hiruy. There are four allegations of negligence again Alem Solomon, including an allegation that she "allowed [Nathan] to use and operate the defendant motor vehicle without a qualified driver."

24 . The issue of whether Nathan Hiruy had consent is within the true nature of the claim based on the Statement of Claim.

25 . Nathan Hiruy, as a self-represented litigant, served and filed a placeholder defence. Within that defence, Nathan Hiruy pleads that "the circumstances of the operation of the vehicle, any consent issues, insurance issues, and all liability matter remain in dispute …" (emphasis added).

26 . However, this is not determinative to my consideration. On a motion to determine the duty to defend, the Statement of Claim has generally been the determining document since it frames the cause of action and by definition must plead the facts that are material and necessary to the cause of action. The Statement of Defence of the party seeking coverage is immaterial and of no assistance in determining the scope of the cause of action. See: Virani v. Intact Insurance Company, 2014 ONSC 7369 at para. 12.

27 . The Statement of Defence of Alem Solomon alleges that Nathan Hiruy was operating her vehicle without her consent. The Statement of Defence goes on to say that she "is not liable for the negligence, if any, of the co-Defendant, as the co-Defendant was operating this Defendant's motor vehicle without her consent." She states that that she cannot be held vicariously liable for the Plaintiff's alleged injuries, which are denied, and pleads and relies upon s.192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O 1990, c.H.8.

28 . In Virani, the Court also stated that it is clear that any pleading, other than a Statement of Claim against the party seeking coverage, is relevant to define the claim or cause of action in order to conclude whether the party is an insured within the language of the policy. For example a cross-claim or third party claim against the party may be relevant. There is no cross-claim or third party claim against either of the applicants. See Virani v. Intact Insurance Company, 2014 ONSC 7369 at para. 13.

29 . In my view, it is appropriate for me to consider the co-defendant's Statement of Defence in considering the true nature of the claim.

30 . Having considered the Statement of Claim and the Statements of Defence, I find that the issue of whether Nathan Hiruy has consent is a live issue in this litigation. I would come to the same conclusion even if I did not consider Nathan Hiruy's placeholder Statement of Defence.

31 . Aviva relies on extrinsic evidence – namely an affidavit from Michael Johnson, an insurance adjuster, who attached transcripts from two interviews: one interview with Araya Hiruy and Alem Solomon and the second interview with Nathan Hiruy.

32 . Notably, Michael Johnson told Araya Hiruy and Alem Solomon, at the beginning of the interview, that the interview was "without prejudice". However, the transcript of that interview was still included in Aviva's motion materials.

33 . The interview with Nathan Hiruy occurred over a year after the accident. Nathan Hiruy was 17 years old at the time of the accident and 18 years old at the time he was interviewed.

34 . Aviva submits that this evidence determines the true nature of the claim and is sufficient to dispose of the issue that Nathan Hiruy operated his parents' vehicle without their consent.

35 . The interviews are not referenced in the pleadings, including Ms. Solomon's Statement of Defence.

36 . The transcript of the interview reveals that the adjuster asked Nathan Hiruy whether he was granted permission to use the vehicle on that date. However, aside from a very pointed question, the adjuster did not explore other facts that may come out in trial to deal with other issues, such as implied consent. Furthermore, Nathan Hiruy did not appear to have the opportunity to speak to counsel before giving this interview.

37 . None of this evidence has been tested by cross-examination.

38 . In my view, the extrinsic evidence is not appropriate for this motion. It is "premature" evidence, and, if considered, would require findings to be made before trial that would affect the underlying litigation. The extrinsic evidence is not needed for the purpose of ascertaining the nature of the claim and should not be considered by the court in the duty to defend application.

39 . However, even if I were to consider the extrinsic evidence and the pleadings, and I am not satisfied that the materials before me are dispositive of deciding that there is no duty to defend.

40 . As any doubt is to be resolved in favour of the insured, see Panasonic Eco Solutions Canada Inc. v. XL Specialty Insurance Company, 2021 ONCA 612 at para. 22, the evidence and the pleadings do not support the request from Aviva that there is no duty to defend.

41 . The test is whether there exists "the mere possibility that a claim falls within the insurance policy. Where it is clear that the claim falls outside the policy, either because it does not come within the initial grant of coverage or is excluded by an exclusion clause, there will be no duty to defend." This is not to be confused with the duty to indemnify, which may arise from proven findings or facts. The duty to defend test being a 'mere possibility' has been held to be broader than the duty to indemnify. See: Virani v. Intact Insurance Company, 2014 ONSC 7369 at para. 9.

42 . I find that the issue of whether Nathan Hiruy has consent is a live issue in this litigation. I further find that there is a "mere possibility" that Nathan Hiruy had consent to operate the vehicle.

This is Not a Summary Judgement Motion or a Trial

43 . A determination of whether an insurance company has a duty to defend a policyholder who is a defendant in an underlying lawsuit may be dealt with by a motion or application. They are intended to be decided expeditiously. See: Halifax Insurance Co. of Canada v. Innopex Ltd. at para. 1.

44 . In this case, the coverage issue is being addressed by way of a motion. However, such motions are not summary judgement motions or mini trials.

45 . It has been observed that a duty to defend application should not become a "trial within a trial": IT Haven Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds 2022 ONCA 71 at para. 39; Monenco, at para. 37; Halifax Insurance Co. of Canada v. Innopex Ltd. (2004), 72 O.R. (3d) 522, at paras. 1, 39, 55; Reeb v. The Guarantee Company of North America, 2019 ONCA 862 at para. 6.

46 . The mere possibility of coverage based on the claim's accusations and the policy's wording creates a responsibility to defend. The position taken by Aviva requires an assessment of credibility and factual findings. Requiring such findings or credibility evaluations would unjustly collapse the duty to defend into the duty to indemnify, which must be addressed later through due process and procedural fairness. At this point, the court's function is restricted to a threshold legal determination, not fact-finding or weighing evidence. It is not appropriate for the Court to look at "premature" evidence, or evidence which, if considered, would require findings to be made before trial that would affect the underlying litigation.

47 . Turning a coverage motion into a mini-trial would undermine judicial economy by duplicating the underlying litigation, delay resolution of both matters, and allow insurers to pre-litigate the insured's liability under the guise of coverage.

48 . In determining a motion for duty to defend, the court must also avoid the risk of this motion becoming a disguised summary judgement motion.

49 . Aviva's position, including the evidence led, amounts to a guised summary judgement by seeking a determination of the issue of consent on this motion.

50 . The issue of consent remains a material issue in this litigation, and it would be inappropriate to prematurely determine the issue on this motion.

51 . Treating a duty to defend motion like a summary judgment motion would improperly impose an evidentiary burden and would prematurely adjudicate issues that must be resolved with procedural fairness, due process, and at trial, if required.

52 . The evidence submitted by Aviva has not been tested. It is not equivalent to trial-worthy evidence. It would not be appropriate to make such a final determination based on this limited evidence.

53 . Aviva relies heavily on McCauley v. Blagdon, [2006] 84 O.R. (3d) 792, at paras. 10 - 16. In fact, this is the only case Aviva relied on in their factum.

54 . In McCauley v. Blagdon, Tara McCauley was injured while a passenger in a vehicle driven by Sean Blagdon, who had possession of the vehicle without the owner's consent at the time of the accident. Ms. McCauley sued Mr. Blagdon, the owner of the car, and the owner's insurer. The insurer brought a motion to strike Ms. McCauley's claim as disclosing no cause of action. The Court granted the insurer's motion.

55 . In my view, McCauley v. Blagdon is not instructive on the issue of whether Aviva owes a duty to defend. McCauley v. Blagdon involved a Rule 21 motion brought by the insurer to strike a claim by an injured passenger against the insurer directly. The crux of the insurer's motion was that a statutory exclusion conclusively barred coverage on the pleadings, and there was no cause of action.

56 . Furthermore, the decision in McCauley v. Blagdon does not appear to suggest that whether the owner provided consent was in dispute. This is fundamentally different. In the present case, the issue of the owner's consent remains in dispute.

57 . The Court in McCauley v. Blagdon was not asked to determine whether an insurer owed a duty to defend while coverage-relevant facts remained disputed.

58 . Aviva, in their factum, submitted that "to require Aviva to defend Mr. Hiruy would be to rewrite the policy." I respectfully disagree. The policy specifically states, "You are covered when you, or anyone else in possession of a described automobile with your consent, uses or operates it. We will consider these other people insured persons" (emphasis added).

59 . This issue will be determined at the trial. If the result is that Nathan Hiruy did not have consent, Aviva has recourse against Nathan Hiruy. If a finding is made that certain costs were paid by Aviva but incurred solely in defence of claims not covered by the Aviva policy, those costs may be reallocated, and Nathan Hiruy may be required to repay those costs to Aviva. See: Live Nation Ontario Concerts GP, Inc v Aviva Insurance Company of Canada, 2024 ONCA 634 at paras. 5, 39 and 44.

60 . Because I was not provided a copy of the insurance policy, I am unsure to what extent Aviva may reserve its rights and seek repayment later. However, that is certainly a possibility in law.

61 . Accordingly, I find that Nathan Hiruy has met his onus to establish the possibility that the pleadings fall within the insurance policy. I further find that Aviva has not met its onus to show that an exclusion clearly and unambiguously excludes coverage for a claim against an insured.

62 . For greater clarity, nothing in this decision is intended to provide an opinion on whether Nathan Hiruy had the consent of his parents to operate the vehicle at the time of the accident. The issue of whether Nathan Hiruy had consent remains a live issue in this litigation and is better to be determined at a trial or a final hearing of this matter.

Conflict of Interest

63 . Having now found that Aviva has a duty to defend, I turn to Nathan Hiruy's request that he be defended by independent counsel of his choosing, at Aviva's expense.

64 . Nathan Hiruy submits that Aviva is in a conflict of interest because they are funding and providing instructions to defend the owner of the vehcile, Alem Solomon – who is also Nathan Hiruy's mother. Aviva's chosen defence for Ms. Solomon includes the assertion that Nathan Hiruy operated the vehicle without consent, and Aviva relies on that same factual assertion to deny Nathan Hiruy any defence.

65 . As a result, I must consider whether there is a reasonable apprehension of a conflict of interest.

66 . The Court of Appeal for Ontario stated that when a lawyer is retained by an insurance company to represent its insured, a conflict of interest may arise where the interests of the insurance company and the insured are not in alignment. See: Reeb v. The Guarantee Company of North America, 2017 ONCA 771 at para. 13.

67 . The Court of Appeal made clear that actual preferential treatment, prejudice or misconduct need not be shown. The guiding consideration is whether there is a reasonable apprehension that the insurer appointed counsel's mandate conflicts with the duty owed to the insured. See: Reeb v. The Guarantee Company of North America, 2017 ONCA 771 at para. 15.

68 . The following principles are relevant in considering whether there is a reasonable apprehension of conflict of interest:

• Where a lawyer is appointed by an insurer to defend its insured, the lawyer's primary duty is to the insured. That is so even though the lawyer is paid by the insurer and the insurer may eventually have to pay the claim against its insured. See: Pembridge Insurance Company v. Parlee, 2005 NBCA 49, 253 D.L.R. (4th) 182, at para. 17; Hoang v. Vicentini, 2015 ONCA 780 at para. 14.
• An insurer may be required to relinquish control of the defence and pay for independent counsel retained by its insured only if there is "in the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable apprehension of conflict of interest on the part of counsel appointed by the insurer": Brockton (Municipality) v. Frank Cowan Co. (2002), 57 O.R. (3d) 447 (C.A.), at para. 43.
• Not every potential conflict between the interests of the insurer and its insured requires the insurer to yield the right to control the defence, a right it contracted for in the policy of insurance. To require the insurer to yield control, the insured must meet the reasonable apprehension of conflict of interest test. See: Hoang v. Vicentini, 2015 ONCA 780 at para. 16
• The balance is between the insured's right to a full and fair defence of the civil action against it and the insurer's right to control that defence because of its potential ultimate obligation to indemnify. In my view, that balance is appropriately struck by requiring that there be, in the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable apprehension of conflict of interest on the part of counsel appointed by the insurer before the insured is entitled to independent counsel at the insurer's expense. The question is whether counsel's mandate from the insurer can reasonably be said to conflict with his mandate to defend the insured in the civil action. Until that point is reached, the insured's right to a defence and the insurer's right to control that defence can satisfactorily co-exist. See Brockton (Municipality) v. Frank Cowan Co. Ltd. at para. 43; Hoang v. Vicentini, 2016 ONCA 723 at para. 74.

69 . The insurer's duty to defend must be consistent with fundamental legal principles, including procedural fairness, access to justice, and the integrity of the legal system.

70 . In my view, there is a reasonable apprehension of a conflict between the interests of Nathan Hiruy and Aviva. Specifically, Aviva has already served a denial letter to Nathan Hiruy and filed a defence on behalf of Ms. Solomon, which includes the assertion that Nathan Hiruy operated the vehicle without consent. While I am not saying that counsel that would be appointed by Aviva would compromise a defence on behalf of Nathan Hiruy, the apprehension of a conflict requires this court to protect Nathan Hiruy's participation in this proceeding.

71 . Aviva's control of the defence creates an inherent risk that litigation strategy, pleadings, and the allocation of fault may be shaped to protect the insurer's broader interests or another insured, rather than to advance Nathan Hiruy's best interests. Counsel selected and instructed by Aviva cannot ethically reconcile competing positions that require one defendant's liability to be established or emphasized to the detriment of another. To permit the insurer to continue controlling the defence would undermine the insured's right to a defence and compromise the integrity of the process. The Court should prevent such distortions of its process.

72 . In light of this reasonable apprehension of conflict of interest, I must consider what the appropriate next steps are.

73 . Nathan Hiruy requests that he be defended by independent counsel of his choosing, at Aviva's expense.

74 . While Aviva resisted the idea that there is a duty to defend, Aviva agreed that if the Court found that there is a duty to defend, then it is appropriate for there to be an order that Aviva pay Mr. Hiruy's costs and Aviva pay for counsel of Mr. Hiruy's choice to defend him.

75 . When a reasonable apprehension of conflict exists between an insurer and its insured, fundamental principles of fairness and the duty of good faith should require the insurer to appoint and pay for independent counsel. An insurer that controls the defence while simultaneously having an interest in shaping the litigation to limit or defeat coverage places the insured at risk that their position and representation will be influenced by coverage considerations rather than the insured's best interests. In such circumstances, counsel selected and directed by the insurer cannot ethically serve two masters, and the insured must be afforded defence free from divided loyalties.

76 . In my view, ordering the insurer to provide independent counsel preserves the insured's right to a meaningful defence, ensures compliance with ethical obligations, and prevents the insurer from leveraging its control of the defence to the insured's detriment. To be clear, this remedy does not expand coverage. It simply enforces the insurer's existing duty to defend in a manner that is undiluted by a conflict of interest, and consistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties. It is also consistent with procedural fairness, access to justice, and the integrity of the legal system

77 . Ordering the insurer to appoint and pay for independent counsel is therefore necessary to eliminate divided loyalties, avoid conflicting instructions, safeguard ethical obligations, and ensure that the insurer fulfills its duty to defend in a manner that is fair, meaningful, and untainted by conflict.

Conclusion

78 . For the foregoing reasons, Nathan Hiruy's motion is granted in its entirety.

79 . Aviva has a duty to defend Nathan Hiruy in this action. Furthermore, due to a reasonable apprehension of a conflict of interest between Aviva and Nathan Hiruy, he shall be defended by independent counsel of his choosing, at Aviva's expense.

Associate Justice Kamal

DATE: February 10, 2026