Parjot Singh Benipal

The appellants, majority shareholders of Golden Ocean Investment Corporation, appealed the dismissal of their challenge to the validity and enforceability of two mortgages on property owned by the corporation.

The mortgages were authorized by the minority shareholder and sole director, Mr. Huang.

The appellants alleged the mortgages were fraudulent conveyances and that they had been defrauded.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the mortgagees were bona fide purchasers for value with no notice of fraud, that Mr. Huang had both ostensible and actual authority to enter into the mortgages, and that there was consideration for the third mortgage.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the second mortgagee respondents on a partial indemnity scale.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment seeking $1,075,000 in fees allegedly owed under a term sheet dated December 9, 2022.

The defendants resisted and brought a counter-motion for "boomerang" summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The court found that the express language of the term sheet did not entitle the plaintiff to the claimed payments.

The origination fee was payable only upon closing of the financing, which never occurred.

The commitment fee was payable only upon issuance of a letter of approval/commitment meeting the term sheet's indicative terms and conditions, which the plaintiff never provided.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion and granted the defendants' counter-motion, dismissing the action entirely.

Costs of $30,000 were awarded to the defendants on a partial indemnity scale.

The applicant, Parvez Peerpasha Huseni Inamdar, sought to rescind an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for a vacant property after discovering a restrictive covenant limiting development to a single detached house.

The court found that the covenant was a registered restrictive covenant excepted by the agreement, and that the applicant, a sophisticated purchaser, had removed due diligence conditions and assumed the risk.

The application for rescission was dismissed.

The court considered whether to dismiss the plaintiffs' action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

After reviewing the statement of claim and written submissions, the court found that the claim pleaded an arguable and discernable cause of action and should not be dismissed at this stage.

The court emphasized the robust gatekeeping function of Rule 2.1, but found that the statement of claim was not so devoid of merit as to warrant summary dismissal.

Costs were reserved to the trial judge.

The court considered a motion by Hansa Mortgage Investment Corporation for a writ of possession and the discharge of a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) registered by the Fuamba family, who had resided in the property for over 15 years.

The court reviewed the legal and equitable factors for discharging a CPL, including the uniqueness of the property, the parties’ intentions, the presence of alternative claims for damages, and the balance of convenience.

The court found that while the property was unique to the Fuambas, the lack of equity and their agreement to vacate after July 15, 2025, rendered the CPL of little practical utility.

The court granted leave to issue a writ of possession (execution delayed until after July 15, 2025) and ordered the CPL discharged upon registration of a transfer under power of sale.

The court considered a motion by the Applicants, estate trustees under a will, seeking to revoke a Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee Without a Will granted to the Respondent, Denise Mayers, and for various injunctive and preservation orders.

The court found that Denise had fraudulently obtained the certificate despite knowing of the existence of a will, and granted most of the relief sought, including a Mareva injunction, a certificate of pending litigation over certain property, and a preservation order.

The court also awarded substantial indemnity costs against Denise due to her conduct.

The plaintiff, Vista Mortgage Capital Corporation, sought partial summary judgment for possession of mortgaged property against the defendants, Rachelle Adelle MacSweeney and her spouse Garrett Patrick MacSweeney.

The defendants argued the matter was not appropriate for summary judgment, that not all necessary parties were named, that the mortgage was invalid, and that the Farm Debt Mediation Act (FDMA) applied and had not been complied with.

The court found that summary judgment was appropriate, the correct parties were before the court, and the mortgage was valid.

However, the court held that the plaintiff failed to comply with the FDMA notice requirements before commencing proceedings, rendering the action a nullity.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed and the claim struck, with no costs awarded.

This costs endorsement follows a decision upholding the validity and enforceability of second and third mortgages registered against a property owned by a company in which the applicants were shareholders.

The court awards substantial indemnity costs to the successful third mortgagee, finding the amount claimed reasonable and declining to include the legal costs of the second mortgagee and the sale solicitor as part of the costs of the application.

The applicants, shareholders in Golden Ocean Investment Corporation, brought a motion challenging the validity of second and third mortgages registered against a property owned by the corporation.

They alleged the sole director executed the mortgages without authority as part of a fraud, and that the mortgagees were willfully blind to badges of fraud.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the mortgagees were bona fide purchasers for value who conducted proper legal due diligence.

The court held that taking a financial or underwriting risk does not constitute willful blindness to fraud, and the mortgagees were entitled to rely on the director's actual and ostensible authority.

The Plaintiffs (Arkland Homes Inc. et al. and Zhen Kang) brought an action seeking declarations regarding mortgage standing and to set aside property sales.

This decision addresses three interlocutory motions: the Plaintiffs' motion for an injunction to restrain the sale of the Bannatyne Property, Defendant Qiong Huang's motion for possession of 177 Rumsey Road, and the Plaintiffs' cross-motion for a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) on 171 Rumsey Road.

The court granted the Plaintiffs' injunction and CPL motions, finding serious issues to be tried regarding the mortgage defaults, the application of a significant payment, and allegations of bad faith and improper conduct by the Defendants Ming Wei Liu and Yizi Feng, including the hasty sale of properties below market value and an alarming "self-help" attempt to evict occupants.

The court denied Ms. Huang's motion for possession, concluding that whether she was a bona fide purchaser for value was a genuine issue requiring trial.

The court also ordered consolidation and case management for all related litigation.

The court determined costs for four motions previously heard in the proceeding.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay costs to the defendant Jain on a partial indemnity basis for a motion to admit further evidence, and on a substantial indemnity basis for motions regarding a Mareva injunction and Norwich order due to the plaintiff's reprehensible conduct, including making and withdrawing unfounded allegations of fraud.

The plaintiff was also ordered to pay full indemnity costs to the defendant Wang for a mortgage validity motion, pursuant to the standard charge terms of the mortgage.

This action involved allegations of financial improprieties related to mortgage transactions.

Three motions were heard: a defendant's motion to challenge an ex parte Mareva order, the plaintiff's motion for a Norwich order, and a defendant's motion to determine the validity of her mortgage.

The court found the plaintiff's credibility severely compromised due to numerous inconsistencies, contradictions, and deceptive conduct, including altering a diary entry and making false claims about forged signatures and language proficiency.

The Mareva order was vacated because the underlying facts had substantially changed, the defendant was suffering significant harm, and the balance of convenience favored the defendant.

The plaintiff's motion for a Norwich order was dismissed as moot.

The mortgage held by the defendant Wang was declared legal, valid, and binding, as the plaintiff failed to establish the defence of non est factum or unconscionability, and the unfulfilled conditions were for the lender's benefit.

The mortgagee was granted an order for possession and leave to issue a writ of possession.

This endorsement addresses two motions: the Trustee in Bankruptcy's motion to transfer and consolidate a foreclosure action (or parts thereof) from Hamilton to the Commercial List in Toronto with a transfer at undervalue (TUV) motion in the bankruptcy proceeding, and a cross-motion by the Cardillo Respondents to transfer the entire bankruptcy proceeding to Hamilton.

The core dispute, the "250 Mortgage Dispute" concerns the validity and priority of a first mortgage assignment and tacking of subsequent mortgages on the bankrupt's primary asset.

The court found compelling reasons for a common determination of the 250 Mortgage Dispute due to interwoven issues and potential for inconsistent findings.

The cross-motion to transfer the bankruptcy to Hamilton was dismissed, as the Toronto proceeding was well advanced and the request was deemed a delay tactic.

Instead of a full transfer or consolidation, the court ordered a trial of the 250 Mortgage Dispute as an issue within the Toronto bankruptcy proceeding under s. 187(8) of the BIA, granting full party participation rights to the Mortgagee Defendants and staying the relevant part of the Foreclosure Action in Hamilton.

Costs were awarded against the Cardillo Respondents.

The moving party, who had defaulted on a mortgage, sought a stay of execution of a writ of possession pending the disposition of his appeal.

The court found that the automatic stay provision under Rule 63.01 does not apply to writs of possession.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court concluded that the moving party failed to establish a serious issue to be tried or irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured the responding parties.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court decision regarding a mortgagee's attempt to take possession of a commercial property after default.

The appellants, mortgagees, attempted self-help possession by changing locks, which was met with resistance from the respondent, mortgagor.

The application judge dismissed the mortgagees' request for an order restraining the mortgagor and declaring them in possession, finding they did not act peaceably.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the application judge's factual findings and her application of the legal principles of peaceable possession, as clarified in Hume v. 11534599 Canada Corp., 2022 ONCA 575.

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the lower court's conclusion that the mortgagees failed to take peaceable possession.

Following a successful appeal that reversed a Small Claims Court decision for lack of monetary jurisdiction, the appellants sought costs of $19,016.45.

The respondent argued the amount was excessive.

The Divisional Court found the issues were of moderate complexity and fixed the appellants' costs at $5,000 inclusive for both the appeal and the Small Claims Court proceeding, noting the amount claimed in the underlying action was less than $70,000.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent $35,000 for unpaid trailer fees under an agency agreement.

The respondent had sued for only three of seven outstanding invoices to stay within the Small Claims Court's monetary jurisdiction, intending to bring a second action for the remainder.

The Divisional Court held that the right to trailer fees flowed from a single contract, meaning the separate invoices did not constitute separate causes of action.

By splitting the claim to fit within the monetary limit without waiving the excess, the respondent engaged in impermissible cause of action splitting.

The Divisional Court quashed the Small Claims Court decision as a nullity for lack of jurisdiction and ordered the matter to proceed as a Simplified Rules action in the Superior Court of Justice.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the tenants' appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order.

The tenants had not paid rent for over a year, causing the landlord severe financial hardship.

The tenants appealed the eviction order to the Divisional Court, triggering an automatic stay, and concurrently sought a review before the LTB.

The Divisional Court quashed the appeal on three grounds: it was premature because the LTB review was ongoing; it was manifestly devoid of merit as it raised no question of law; and it was an abuse of process designed solely to delay eviction and extend a rent-free tenancy.

The automatic stay of the eviction order was vacated.

The appellants' counsel failed to appear for the appeal hearing, and an associate later advised the court that counsel had no instructions to proceed due to an inability to communicate with the appellants.

The respondent requested the appeal be dismissed with fixed costs.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal with costs of $6,000, inclusive of disbursements and HST, as requested by the respondent.