Clyde M. Smith

The Plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 39.03 to examine witnesses for the Defendants' pending motion to strike his pleadings.

The Defendants argued that motions to strike, particularly under Rule 21.01(1)(b), do not permit the admission of evidence.

The court dismissed the Plaintiff's motion, affirming that evidence is inadmissible on motions to strike pleadings and that the Plaintiff's attempt was an improper fishing expedition to convert the motion into a summary judgment hearing.

The court determined costs for four motions previously heard in the proceeding.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay costs to the defendant Jain on a partial indemnity basis for a motion to admit further evidence, and on a substantial indemnity basis for motions regarding a Mareva injunction and Norwich order due to the plaintiff's reprehensible conduct, including making and withdrawing unfounded allegations of fraud.

The plaintiff was also ordered to pay full indemnity costs to the defendant Wang for a mortgage validity motion, pursuant to the standard charge terms of the mortgage.

This action involved allegations of financial improprieties related to mortgage transactions.

Three motions were heard: a defendant's motion to challenge an ex parte Mareva order, the plaintiff's motion for a Norwich order, and a defendant's motion to determine the validity of her mortgage.

The court found the plaintiff's credibility severely compromised due to numerous inconsistencies, contradictions, and deceptive conduct, including altering a diary entry and making false claims about forged signatures and language proficiency.

The Mareva order was vacated because the underlying facts had substantially changed, the defendant was suffering significant harm, and the balance of convenience favored the defendant.

The plaintiff's motion for a Norwich order was dismissed as moot.

The mortgage held by the defendant Wang was declared legal, valid, and binding, as the plaintiff failed to establish the defence of non est factum or unconscionability, and the unfulfilled conditions were for the lender's benefit.

The mortgagee was granted an order for possession and leave to issue a writ of possession.

The Crown brought an application under section 715.1 of the Criminal Code for the admission of a video statement from a child complainant in a sexual assault and sexual interference case.

The defence challenged the admissibility, arguing the statement was not made within a "reasonable time" due to a four-year delay between the alleged incident and disclosure.

The court applied a six-factor test to assess the reasonableness of the delay, considering the child's age, relationship to the accused, nature of the offence, developmental stages, and potential external influences.

The court found the delay reasonable, noting that children often delay reporting such incidents and that the delay did not negatively impact the complainant's ability to recall.

The video statement was deemed admissible.

The plaintiff, a former owner and vice-president of the defendant company, was terminated without cause 11 months into a three-year fixed-term employment agreement.

He brought a motion for summary judgment for wrongful dismissal.

The court found the termination clause in the employment agreement violated the Employment Standards Act, 2000 by providing a lower standard for 'cause' than the statutory standard for willful misconduct, rendering the entire termination provision void.

The court awarded the plaintiff the balance of his fixed-term contract, totaling 23 months' salary plus benefits, and held that he had no duty to mitigate his damages.

This is a costs endorsement following a trial where the defendant successfully dismissed the plaintiff's action regarding a furnace oil leak.

The court assessed the defendant's partial indemnity costs, considering factors under Rule 57.01, including the principle of indemnity, the complexity of the proceeding, and the conduct of the parties.

The court found the defendant's costs reasonable, making adjustments for a previously dismissed motion and a clerk's hourly rate, ultimately ordering the plaintiff to pay $98,696.65.

The defendant, Dr. Yair Karas, moved for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiff's medical malpractice action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act.

The plaintiff, Denise Bosse, alleged claims of uninformed consent and breach of standard of care related to Radial Keratotomy (RK) surgeries performed by the defendant between 1994 and 2005.

The court found that the plaintiff had actual and constructive knowledge of her injury, its cause by the defendant's acts, and that a legal proceeding was an appropriate remedy by July 11, 2011, when she filed a complaint with the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario.

Consequently, the two-year limitation period expired in July 2013, nine months before the Statement of Claim was issued in April 2014.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's argument that the standard of care claim was only discoverable upon receipt of an expert report in November 2013, emphasizing that knowledge of a breach of standard of care is not required for discoverability.

The defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted, and the action was dismissed.

The defendant, Chad Storey, was convicted of possession of child pornography, making sexually explicit material available to a child, sexual interference, and assault, involving two young complainants.

The Crown sought a 6-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought a 90-day concurrent sentence followed by probation, citing the defendant's intellectual challenges and stringent bail conditions.

The court, applying principles from R. v. Friesen, emphasized denunciation and deterrence for child sexual abuse offences.

It found that the defendant's intellectual disability did not reduce his moral blameworthiness to displace the need for a penitentiary sentence, as he demonstrated awareness of the wrongfulness of his actions.

The court also considered the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and lengthy house arrest bail conditions (50 months), granting 12 months credit for pre-trial custody and restrictive bail.

The defendant was sentenced to an aggregate of five years in the penitentiary, with ancillary orders including lifetime Sex Offender Information Registration Act compliance, DNA sample, 10-year firearm prohibition, and communication prohibition with victims.

On consent of both parties, the Superior Court of Justice allowed a summary conviction sentence appeal, imposing a sentence of 179 days.

The plaintiff, D.S., brought a motion for default judgment against the defendant, Louis Omer Quesnelle, for damages arising from intentional torts of assault, sexual assault, and sexual interference committed when the plaintiff was a child.

The defendant had been criminally convicted for these acts.

The court found the defendant liable, ruling that the criminal convictions constituted proof of the intentional torts and that no limitation period applied.

The court awarded the plaintiff $400,000 in general damages and $1,533,416 in economic damages for past and future loss of earning capacity, but declined to award punitive damages given the defendant's prior penitentiary sentence.

The plaintiff sought default judgment for personal injuries sustained from a dog bite.

The defendants were noted in default and did not respond to the action.

The court found both defendants liable as "owners" under the Dog Owner's Liability Act, establishing joint and several liability.

General damages were assessed at $40,000, considering the severity of the physical injuries (including multiple surgeries for Dupuytren's Disease and permanent scarring) and psychological impacts (anxiety, fear of dogs, nightmares).

Special damages of $120.51 and costs of $14,887.11 were also awarded, resulting in a total judgment of $55,007.62 for the plaintiff.

The respondent, Andritz va Tech Hydro Limited, brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the applicant's, Stonequest Management Inc., claim for outstanding utility payments on the grounds that it was statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002, or alternatively, the Real Property Limitations Act.

The court applied the test for summary judgment from Hyrniak v. Mauldin and found that the claim was discovered no later than December 9, 2013, making the action, commenced on December 22, 2015, outside the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act.

The court also determined that the six-year limitation period under the Real Property Limitations Act did not apply, as utility costs, even if designated as "additional rent" in the lease, do not fall within the objective meaning of "rent" for the purposes of that Act, following Pickering Square Inc. v. Trillium College Inc. Consequently, the applicant's claim was statute-barred, and the respondent's motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the action.

The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment seeking damages for breach of contract and punitive damages.

The court found that a binding contract existed between the parties, allowing the plaintiffs to live rent-free on a farm property in exchange for duties, despite the absence of formal signatures and the defendant's later unilateral termination.

The court determined that the defendant breached this contract without grounds.

General damages were awarded to the plaintiffs based on the remaining rent-free period, but the claim for punitive damages was dismissed as the defendant's conduct did not constitute an actionable wrong independent of the breach of contract.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendants for breach of an agreement of purchase and sale of real property.

The defendants failed to close the transaction and did not file responding materials or appear at the motion.

The court found the agreement valid and the defendants in breach, rejecting claims of impairment at signing.

Summary judgment was granted, and the plaintiffs were awarded damages for loss of bargain, legal fees, inspection, and appraisal costs, totaling $111,737.03, plus post-judgment interest and costs.

The applicant sought leave to issue a Writ of Seizure and Sale against the respondent, based on an assigned judgment.

The respondent had previously received a full and final release from the prior assignee after funds were provided by the applicant and her common-law partner.

The court determined that these funds constituted consideration for a 25% ownership interest in the respondent's property, rather than a loan.

Consequently, the original judgment was deemed satisfied, and the applicant's request for a new writ was dismissed to prevent double recovery.