Arthur Zeilikman

The plaintiff, a former owner and vice-president of the defendant company, was terminated without cause 11 months into a three-year fixed-term employment agreement.

He brought a motion for summary judgment for wrongful dismissal.

The court found the termination clause in the employment agreement violated the Employment Standards Act, 2000 by providing a lower standard for 'cause' than the statutory standard for willful misconduct, rendering the entire termination provision void.

The court awarded the plaintiff the balance of his fixed-term contract, totaling 23 months' salary plus benefits, and held that he had no duty to mitigate his damages.

An employee of nine years with Standard Life Insurance (acquired by Manulife) submitted a resignation letter effective December 31, 2016, prompted by the company's announcement of a new computer system conversion.

The employee's supervisor told her she could rescind the notice if she changed her mind.

When Manulife cancelled the computer conversion three weeks later, the employee withdrew her resignation notice.

The employer refused to recognize the withdrawal and terminated the employee on December 12, 2016.

The motion judge found the resignation was clear and unequivocal and dismissed the wrongful dismissal claim.

The Court of Appeal reversed, finding the resignation was equivocal given the circumstances and the employee was entitled to withdraw it.

The court awarded 12 months' salary in lieu of notice.

The plaintiff sought summary judgment for wrongful dismissal, arguing she could rescind her notice of retirement.

She had submitted a written notice of retirement effective December 31, 2016, but later orally sought to withdraw it after a company conversion project was suspended.

The defendant maintained the retirement was binding.

The court examined whether an employee can rescind a resignation after it has been accepted by the employer, concluding that once a clear and unequivocal resignation is accepted, it forms a binding contract that cannot be unilaterally resiled from.

The plaintiff's claim was dismissed.

The court held a multi-stage pre-trial conference in a defamation action to ensure an efficient and organized trial.

The judge expressed concern about the plaintiffs' ability to prove damages commensurate with the litigation costs and the lengthy delay since publication.

Directions were issued to streamline the trial process, including requiring evidence in chief by affidavit (except for one plaintiff), exchanging expert reports, facilitating expert meetings, and mandating the use of video conferencing for most foreign witnesses to reduce costs and delays.

The defendant sought leave to appeal a decision allowing an examination in aid of execution of a corporate representative following default on settlement payments.

The court considered the strict test for leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

It held there was no reason to doubt the correctness of the lower court’s decision that the Master had erred by treating examinations of a judgment debtor as discretionary and by applying principles relevant to examinations of non-parties.

The court also found no conflicting authority warranting leave and concluded that further delay would not serve the interests of justice.

Leave to appeal was refused and costs were awarded to the responding parties.

The judgment creditors appealed a master's order dismissing their motion to compel a corporate officer to attend an examination in aid of execution.

The master held that because the creditors had commenced a related action against the officer and others alleging fraudulent asset transfers, the right to conduct an examination in aid of execution had merged into the new action.

The court held that this principle applied only to examinations of third parties and not to examinations of a corporate judgment debtor through its officers under Rule 60.18(2) and (3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The master therefore erred in law by concluding the creditors lost their entitlement to examine the corporate representative.

The appeal was allowed and an order was made requiring the officer to attend for examination in aid of execution.