Julia Vizzaccaro

The respondents, facing multiple class actions related to the manufacture and distribution of opioids over a 20-year period, sought coverage for defence costs from their successive primary and excess liability insurers.

The application judge allowed the respondents to select a single primary insurer to fund the entire defence, permitted the exhaustion of self-insured retentions (SIRs) using payments from other insurers, granted relief from forfeiture for pre-tender defence costs, and required insurers to sign a Defence Reporting Agreement (DRA) to receive privileged defence information.

The Court of Appeal allowed the insurers' appeals in part, holding that defence costs must be allocated on a pro rata time-on-risk basis, that the insureds must exhaust each applicable SIR before an insurer's duty to defend is triggered, and that relief from forfeiture was unavailable for pre-tender costs.

The Court upheld the DRA requirement for insurers seeking to associate in the defence to mitigate reasonable apprehensions of conflict of interest.

This appeal addressed whether two insurers, AIG and Lloyd's, had a duty to defend a mutual policyholder (the City of Timmins) in a progressive property damage claim.

The key issues were the role of "premature" evidence in duty to defend analysis, the interpretation of an "Expected or Intended Injury" exclusion clause, and whether a "crystallizing event" (an AMEC Report) triggered this exclusion.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding that the AMEC Report was "premature" evidence and not a "crystallizing event" that would negate Lloyd's duty to defend.

The court affirmed that the underlying claim was based on negligence, not intentional conduct, and therefore the exclusion clause did not apply, triggering Lloyd's duty to defend.

AIG Insurance Company of Canada brought an application seeking equitable contribution from Lloyd's Underwriters towards the cost of defending the City of Timmins in an underlying property damage action.

AIG and Lloyd's provided consecutive liability insurance policies to the City.

Lloyd's denied coverage, arguing the damage was not an 'occurrence' or fell under the 'expected or intended' exclusion due to a preliminary engineering report received by the City.

The court found the engineering report was not definitive enough to crystallize the loss or make the ongoing damage expected or intended.

The court held that the underlying claim raised a mere possibility of coverage, triggering Lloyd's duty to defend, and ordered Lloyd's to pay 50% of the defense costs.

The appellant sought leave to amend his statement of claim to correct a misnomer by substituting the proper defendant after the expiry of the limitation period.

The motion judge refused the amendment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appellant satisfied the "litigation finger test" for misnomer established in Lloyd v. Clark.

The appellant knew the proper defendant but failed to sue the proper party, and the intended defendant knew it was the intended defendant before the limitation period expired.

The court granted leave to amend and awarded costs.

Bombardier Transportation Canada Inc. (BTC) sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent Metrolinx (MTX) from terminating a $770 million contract for light rail vehicles (LRVs) due to alleged material default, pending the completion of a mandatory dispute resolution process.

BTC also sought to remove the Engineer, Jeffrey Rankin, for alleged partiality.

The court found that the contract's dispute resolution process applied to MTX's right to terminate for material default.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court determined there was a serious issue to be tried, BTC would suffer irreparable harm (loss of reputation, future business, supply chain disruption, and employee expertise), and the balance of convenience favored maintaining the status quo.

The court granted the interlocutory injunction, prohibiting MTX from terminating the contract until the Dispute Review Board (DRB) ruled on the default, and ordered the injunction to be nunc pro tunc to stay cure periods.

The issue of the Engineer's impartiality was referred to the DRB.

Following a successful motion, the plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis or, alternatively, on a partial indemnity basis.

The self-represented defendant did not provide costs submissions.

The court awarded costs to the plaintiff on a partial indemnity basis, fixing the amount at $2,500.00, payable within 60 days.