Michael S.F. Watson

The successful appellant, Mount Pleasant Group of Cemeteries, sought costs of the appeal and the underlying application from the respondents.

The respondents argued they should be shielded from costs as public interest litigants.

The Court of Appeal accepted that the respondents were public interest litigants but held this did not excuse them from all costs consequences.

Considering the factors under Rule 57.01(1) and the respondents' public interest status, the Court ordered the corporate respondent to pay $350,000 in total costs and the individual respondent to pay $10,000.

The appellant cemetery group appealed a decision declaring that its directors were invalidly appointed under 1849 legislation, that its funeral home and visitation centre businesses exceeded its statutory objects, and that it was a charitable purpose trust subject to the Charities Accounting Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that an 1871 Act fundamentally changed the cemetery's governance to a corporate model, displacing the pioneer public election process.

The Court also held that the ancillary funeral operations were within the cemetery's objects and that the cemetery was a statutory trust, not a charitable purpose trust.

The respondents' cross-appeal seeking an investigation by the Public Guardian and Trustee was dismissed.

The applicants sought declarations regarding the governance and operations of the Mount Pleasant Group of Cemeteries (MPGC), a statutory trust established in 1826.

The court granted the applicants public interest standing and found that MPGC's directors had not been validly appointed since 1987, as they failed to comply with the mandatory election procedures in the 1849 Act.

The court declared that MPGC holds its assets as a charitable trust and that its operation of visitation centres and funeral homes exceeded its statutory objects.

The court declined to order a formal investigation under the Charities Accounting Act but appointed the seven most senior directors as trustees, subject to confirmation at a public meeting.

The Canadian National Railway Company (CNR) moved to stay an application brought by the Regional Municipality of Halton and its constituent municipalities (Halton) concerning the applicability of provincial and municipal laws to CNR's proposed intermodal rail hub in Milton.

Halton's application sought declarations on constitutional division of powers issues, arguing that provincial and local laws of general application should apply to the federal undertaking.

CNR contended the application was premature and interfered with an ongoing federal environmental assessment process.

The court granted CNR's motion to stay Halton's application, finding that while the constitutional issues were not hypothetical, the federal environmental review panel was mandated to consider local concerns and impacts, and allowing the application to proceed would be an unwarranted intrusion into the federal process and an inefficient use of judicial resources.

The stay is temporary, pending the completion of the federal environmental assessment and the Minister's decision.

The applicant, the Town of Oakville, brought a motion to compel the respondents, Clublink Corporation ULC and Clublink Holdings Limited, to answer certain questions and produce documents refused during cross-examinations of their expert witnesses.

The motion concerned the interpretation of section 34 of the Ontario Heritage Act in the context of the Glen Abbey golf course redevelopment.

The court dismissed most of the applicant's requests, finding the documents irrelevant to the narrow issues or the expert's independence.

However, it ordered the production of any separate written retainer agreement for a heritage impact assessment, if such an agreement existed, deeming it marginally relevant to the expert's independence.

The court also addressed and admonished counsel for an improper ex parte communication made after the motion hearing concluded.

Bombardier Transportation Canada Inc. (BTC) sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent Metrolinx (MTX) from terminating a $770 million contract for light rail vehicles (LRVs) due to alleged material default, pending the completion of a mandatory dispute resolution process.

BTC also sought to remove the Engineer, Jeffrey Rankin, for alleged partiality.

The court found that the contract's dispute resolution process applied to MTX's right to terminate for material default.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court determined there was a serious issue to be tried, BTC would suffer irreparable harm (loss of reputation, future business, supply chain disruption, and employee expertise), and the balance of convenience favored maintaining the status quo.

The court granted the interlocutory injunction, prohibiting MTX from terminating the contract until the Dispute Review Board (DRB) ruled on the default, and ordered the injunction to be nunc pro tunc to stay cure periods.

The issue of the Engineer's impartiality was referred to the DRB.

The CCAA monitor of Algoma brought an oppression action under the CBCA against Algoma's parent company, Essar Global, regarding a transaction that transferred Algoma's critical port facilities to a related entity.

The court found that the monitor had standing to bring the action on behalf of creditors.

The court held that the port transaction and a change of control clause giving Essar Global a veto over any buyer of Algoma violated the reasonable expectations of creditors and were oppressive.

The court rejected the business judgment rule defence and ordered the deletion of the change of control clause and amended the agreements to allow Algoma to terminate them after a third-party loan is repaid.

The applicant corporation sought orders under the Securities Act and the Business Corporations Act to restrict certain shareholders from voting shares allegedly acquired in breach of early warning reporting requirements, to declare that a shareholder rights plan “flip‑in event” had occurred, and to invalidate a dissident proxy solicitation ahead of an annual general meeting.

The court declined to address the alleged early warning breach because the matter was already the subject of an ongoing Ontario Securities Commission investigation and had previously been withdrawn from related litigation.

Even if a breach had occurred, the court held that the discretionary remedy of prohibiting voting rights would not be appropriate given the circumstances and absence of harm to the market or shareholders.

The court also found no evidence that the respondents acted jointly or in concert in organizing the proxy solicitation or that the circular was misleading under applicable securities and corporate law regulations.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitration award dismissing a grievance for severance pay for employees following a plant closure.

The arbitrator ruled that the employees were not eligible for severance pay under the Employment Standards Act, 2000 because they received pension benefits that fell within the statutory exemption.

The Divisional Court held that the arbitrator's interpretation of the legislation, including her consideration of the Pension Benefits Act and use of commuted values to compare pension benefits, was reasonable.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing its claim that the steam rate under a 1994 Steam Sale Agreement should be based solely on nuclear-generated steam, rather than including oil-fired steam.

The trial judge interpreted the phrase 'full reasonable cost recovery principle' to allow the respondent to recover its actual costs, including those from an oil-fuelled back-up boiler.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the factual matrix or her application of contract interpretation principles.

In a dissenting opinion regarding an application for certification, Board Member Seville disagreed with the majority's finding that a single-store bargaining unit was inappropriate.

The majority had concluded that the employer's 11 fast-food franchise locations were functionally integrated, particularly regarding the production of baked goods, and that a single-store unit would cause serious labour relations problems.

The dissent argued that the Board lacked sufficient evidence regarding the separate corporate structures of each store and the parent franchisor to properly assess functional integration.

The dissent further contended that the production relationship did not preclude a single-store unit and that requiring an 11-store bargaining unit created an unreasonable impediment to the employees' right to organize.

The appellants challenged the valuation of dissenting shareholders' shares in a closed-end investment holding company, arguing that fair value should have been determined by net asset value rather than stock market trading price.

The court held that the appropriate valuation methodology depends on the facts of each case and accepted expert evidence that market price was the better indicator in light of the issuer's nature, the illiquidity of some portfolio assets, and the trading history of the shares.

The court found it was open to the applications judge to prefer that expert evidence and concluded there was no error in adopting the market value approach.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a decision setting aside a stay of proceedings that had been granted on the basis that his Charter right to a fair trial was infringed due to his inability to communicate with the court and understand the charge.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was not the appropriate forum for the application.

The appellant, a young offender charged with first degree murder, appealed a Court of Appeal decision ordering his transfer to ordinary court under section 16 of the Young Offenders Act.

The Youth Court had initially dismissed the Crown's transfer application, which was upheld by the Court of Queen's Bench but reversed by the Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Court of Appeal correctly applied the burden of proof, properly understood its independent review function, and appropriately weighed the statutory factors, including the heinous nature of the offence.

The appellants were convicted of armed robbery, use of a firearm, and break and enter.

The trial judge erred by admitting police officers' opinion evidence on videotape identification without a voir dire and by using the break and enter evidence as similar fact evidence for the robbery charges.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions using the curative proviso in s. 613(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the proviso was properly applied to the break and enter conviction because the trial judge made an independent identification.

However, the proviso could not save the robbery convictions for one appellant, as the remaining circumstantial evidence was not overwhelming.

The other appellant's appeal was dismissed because the admissible circumstantial evidence against him on the robbery charges was overwhelming.