Samantha Gordon

The plaintiff brought a motion to certify a national class proceeding alleging that the defendants, major manufacturers of fragrance ingredients, engaged in an unlawful price-fixing conspiracy contrary to the Competition Act.

The proposed class included direct, indirect, and umbrella purchasers of fragrance ingredients and products.

The court dismissed the certification motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to meet the 'some basis in fact' test.

The evidence relied upon consisted merely of unsubstantiated suspicions and investigations by foreign regulators, without any direct or indirect evidence of a conspiracy or its impact in Canada.

Furthermore, the court found the proposed class definition unmanageable, as it would be nearly impossible for individuals to self-identify as class members.

The applicant, a hedge fund shareholder, brought an urgent application under section 248 of the OBCA seeking to adjourn the respondent corporation's annual general and special meeting of shareholders and to reset the record date.

The applicant alleged the notice was non-compliant with the OBCA and that the board acted oppressively by setting a timeline that effectively prevented shareholders from nominating an alternative slate of directors.

The court found that the respondent was not an "offering corporation" and had met all statutory notice requirements under sections 95(4) and 96(1) of the OBCA.

The court held that the notice procedures followed past practice and did not breach the reasonable expectations of shareholders as established in BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders.

The application was dismissed with costs of $75,000 to the respondent.

The plaintiff brought a consent motion for leave to commence a class action under the Securities Act and for certification under the Class Proceedings Act for settlement purposes.

The action alleged misrepresentations in public statements by the defendants.

The parties reached a proposed settlement of $500,000.

The court granted leave and certified the class for settlement, finding all certification criteria met, albeit with less strict application for settlement purposes.

The court approved the representative plaintiff and the administrator but required revisions to the proposed class notices and further submissions regarding the notice dissemination plan to ensure clarity and proper information for class members.

In a complex construction litigation, the third and fourth parties brought a motion for satisfaction of undertakings and refusals, seeking documents prior to the execution of a settlement agreement on December 7, 2021.

They argued the settling parties reached an 'agreement in principle' earlier and failed to immediately disclose it, fundamentally altering the litigation landscape.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the requested documents were protected by settlement privilege, litigation privilege, and solicitor-client privilege, and that the obligation to disclose applies only to concluded agreements, not ongoing negotiations.

The plaintiff, Dr. Darryl Gebien, sought court approval for a Third-Party Funding Agreement with Omni Bridgeway Ltd. for a proposed class action against numerous pharmaceutical companies regarding the opioid crisis.

Several defendants objected to specific provisions of the agreement, including those related to amendments, assignments, attornment, costs enforcement, termination procedures, accrued costs, and confidentiality.

The court found that while the agreement generally met the requirements for approval, several of the defendants' objections, particularly concerning comprehensive attornment by Omni Bridgeway Ltd. and the broad confidentiality provisions, were "genuinely meaningful" and required resolution.

The motion for approval was adjourned to allow the parties to address these issues, with the court emphasizing that it is not its role to draft the agreement.

The appellant, Johnson Controls Canada LP, appealed a summary judgment that awarded the respondent, John Maynard, full entitlement under his employment contract, including the value of Restricted Stock Units (RSUs).

Maynard was terminated without cause, and his compensation included RSUs subject to a forfeiture provision he was unaware of.

The motion judge found the exclusion of RSUs from the termination payment calculation breached the contract.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that Johnson Controls could not force Maynard to sign a release based on an improperly calculated amount and that the RSUs were part of his compensation entitlement.

This appeal addressed the Ontario court's jurisdiction over an action that overlapped with earlier proceedings in Nova Scotia involving the same parties.

The appellant sought to stay the Ontario action, arguing lack of jurisdiction simpliciter and that Nova Scotia was the more convenient forum.

The Court of Appeal, conducting a fresh analysis due to incomplete lower court reasons, affirmed Ontario's jurisdiction simpliciter but found Nova Scotia to be clearly the more appropriate forum.

This decision was based on the significant overlap of issues and the high risk of inconsistent findings between the two actions.

The Ontario action was stayed on an interim basis.

The moving parties sought advice and directions regarding a previous order that set aside a corporate reorganization for breaching a share pledge agreement.

The responding parties argued the previous order did not apply to a specific entity, Hay Bay Solar LP, because it was not explicitly named.

The court interpreted the previous order broadly, finding that the reorganization was a single integrated transaction and the order set it aside in its entirety, including Hay Bay.

The court also found that issue estoppel would prevent relitigating the ownership of Hay Bay.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action for delay under Rule 48.14(7) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The action, alleging historic sexual and physical abuse from 1966-1974, was filed in 2015 but had seen little progress by 2020.

The motion judge found no acceptable explanation for the delay, including an 18-month period where former counsel explored a class action.

The appellants argued the judge failed to contextualize the delay given the absence of limitation periods for their claims and erred in characterizing counsel's decision to suspend the action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the contextual approach to delay but finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the delay was egregious and unexplained, despite the nature of the claims.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

The plaintiff in a proposed price-fixing class action regarding linear resistors brought motions to discontinue the action against six defendants and to certify the action for settlement purposes against the Kamaya defendants.

The court approved the discontinuance, finding no prejudice to the class as tolling agreements were in place and there was no evidence of the discontinued defendants' involvement in the conspiracy.

The court also certified the action for settlement purposes, approving an expanded class definition that included British Columbia purchasers to facilitate a comprehensive settlement with the Kamaya defendants.

This motion concerned the approval of class counsel's retainer agreement, fees, and disbursements following a partial settlement in a price-fixing class action.

The plaintiff class counsel sought approval for 25% of the settlement amount ($2.35 million) as fees, plus disbursements and interest.

The court reviewed the retainer agreements for compliance with the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, and assessed the reasonableness of the fees and disbursements based on established factors.

The court approved the retainer agreements and the requested fees and most disbursements, but declined to approve interest on disbursements at this stage, pending further developments in the ongoing litigation.

The plaintiff sought court approval for a class action settlement agreement with the Panasonic defendants in a price-fixing conspiracy action concerning linear resistors.

The settlement included a monetary payment of $2,350,000 and significant cooperation from the Panasonic defendants to assist in prosecuting the action against non-settling defendants.

The court approved the settlement, finding it fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, considering the arm's length negotiations, the benefits of cooperation, and the risks of continued litigation.

However, the court rejected a proposed term in the draft order that would allow class counsel to use settlement funds for future disbursements, citing concerns about retainer agreements and counsel's financial risks.

Class Counsel brought a motion for approval of a further instalment of fees in an ongoing competition law class action regarding alleged price-fixing in the foreign exchange market.

The plaintiffs had settled with fourteen groups of defendants and the action continued against the remaining non-settling defendants.

The court reviewed the risks undertaken, the results achieved, and the docketed time, finding the requested fees of $6,325,000, plus costs and disbursements, to be fair and reasonable.

The fee request was approved.

The plaintiffs in a class action regarding foreign exchange price fixing brought a motion to amend the Distribution Protocol for the $110 million settlement proceeds.

The proposed amendments included transferring unused funds from the Indirect Claims Fund to the Direct Claims Fund, setting a minimum $1,000 payout for approved Direct Claimants, and removing the requirement to consider compensation received in other jurisdictions.

The court granted the motion, finding the amendments were administrative, imposed no additional burden on the defendants, and fell within the court's broad discretion under section 12 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

This proposed class action, alleging human rights abuses in chocolate manufacturing, was commenced in Ontario.

The plaintiff also initiated a similar lawsuit in British Columbia.

The defendant, Hershey Canada Inc., brought a motion for an anti-suit injunction to stay the B.C. action.

Concurrently, the plaintiff sought the court's permission under section 29 of the Class Proceedings Act to discontinue the Ontario action, citing funding difficulties and B.C.'s no-costs jurisdiction.

The court, acting as case management judge, determined that both the anti-suit injunction motion and the discontinuance motion should be heard on the same day to address the issue of where the class action should proceed.

The decision outlines the scheduling for these motions, with the anti-suit injunction to be heard first.

Two sets of appellants (manufacturers of optical disc drives) appealed the certification of a price-fixing class proceeding in British Columbia.

The majority held that the discoverability rule applies to extend the two-year limitation period in s. 36(4)(a)(i) of the Competition Act, that fraudulent concealment can toll a limitation period without requiring a special relationship between the parties, that umbrella purchasers (persons who bought from non-defendant manufacturers) have a cause of action under s. 36(1)(a), that s. 36(1) does not bar concurrent common law and equitable claims, and that a plaintiff's expert methodology need only establish that overcharges reached the indirect-purchaser level to certify loss as a common issue.

Côté J. dissented in part, finding that the discoverability rule does not apply to s. 36(4)(a)(i) and that umbrella purchasers have no cause of action under s. 36(1).

Both appeals were dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for an order approving a settlement reached with the defendants Morgan Stanley and Morgan Stanley Canada Limited in a class action alleging a conspiracy to fix prices in the foreign exchange market.

The settlement requires the settling defendants to pay USD$2.3 million and provide cooperation in the ongoing prosecution against the remaining defendants.

The court found the settlement to be fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, noting it was in line with previously approved settlements in the proceeding.

The settlement and the previously approved distribution protocol were approved.

The applicants sought declarations regarding the governance and operations of the Mount Pleasant Group of Cemeteries (MPGC), a statutory trust established in 1826.

The court granted the applicants public interest standing and found that MPGC's directors had not been validly appointed since 1987, as they failed to comply with the mandatory election procedures in the 1849 Act.

The court declared that MPGC holds its assets as a charitable trust and that its operation of visitation centres and funeral homes exceeded its statutory objects.

The court declined to order a formal investigation under the Charities Accounting Act but appointed the seven most senior directors as trustees, subject to confirmation at a public meeting.

The plaintiffs in a class action alleging a price-fixing conspiracy in the foreign exchange market moved for approval of six settlements totaling $51.5 million.

The court reviewed the settlements in light of the estimated range of total damages, the litigation risks, and the value of the settling defendants' cooperation.

Finding the settlements to be fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, the court approved the settlements.

The defendants brought a motion for the production of a report prepared by the plaintiff's Barbadian counsel (the CGF Report) and a list of documents reviewed by that counsel.

The plaintiff claimed solicitor-client and litigation privilege over the report and the list of documents.

The court held that the CGF Report was protected by solicitor-client privilege as it contained legal advice, and the plaintiff had not waived this privilege.

However, the court found that the list of documents reviewed by counsel was not privileged, as it merely constituted facts, and ordered its production.

A cross-motion by the plaintiff to strike portions of an affidavit was resolved by the court placing no weight on the hearsay paragraphs.