Kathryn J. Manning

The plaintiff brought a consent motion for leave to commence a class action under the Securities Act and for certification under the Class Proceedings Act for settlement purposes.

The action alleged misrepresentations in public statements by the defendants.

The parties reached a proposed settlement of $500,000.

The court granted leave and certified the class for settlement, finding all certification criteria met, albeit with less strict application for settlement purposes.

The court approved the representative plaintiff and the administrator but required revisions to the proposed class notices and further submissions regarding the notice dissemination plan to ensure clarity and proper information for class members.

The applicant brought a consent motion to transfer a commercial lease application from Brampton to Toronto to be heard with a companion application.

The sole reason for the requested transfer was to secure an earlier hearing date, as the parties were dissatisfied with the dates available in Brampton.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the desire for an earlier hearing date does not justify transferring a proceeding to a jurisdiction with no connection to the matter, as doing so would inappropriately use other regions to arbitrage court schedules.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion for the production of documents prior to a leave motion under the Securities Act, the successful defendants sought their costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the corporate defendant and one individual defendant.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the other individual defendant, finding that the plaintiff's conduct in pursuing the motion against him and making unfounded allegations of deliberate misconduct was unreasonable and warranted sanction.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay a total of $36,603.87 in costs.

The plaintiff in a putative class action for secondary market misrepresentation brought a motion for the production of documents referenced in the defendants' affidavits prior to serving his reply record.

Alternatively, the plaintiff sought to strike the portions of the affidavits referencing those documents.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the plaintiff has no right to documentary discovery at the leave stage under section 138.8 of the Securities Act, and that the proper mechanism for production is through cross-examination after the reply is served.

The court also declined to strike the affidavits, noting that hearsay is permitted on motions.

The parties agreed not to seek any costs of the appeal motions or the appeals.

The Court of Appeal issued an endorsement reflecting this agreement, with no costs awarded.

This is an appeal and cross-appeal from a Superior Court judgment concerning an oppression remedy claim.

The appellants (defendants) challenged the trial judge's valuation of shares, award of equitable damages, refusal to admit fresh evidence, and refusal to reconsider a Rule 59 motion.

The cross-appellants (plaintiffs) challenged the trial judge's findings on fiduciary duty, the 2012 share purchase agreement, quantum of equitable damages (interest), punitive damages, and transaction structure for share repurchase.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, upholding the trial judge's decisions on all substantive issues, including the valuation, equitable damages, and the refusal to admit fresh evidence or reconsider motions.

Both parties' requests for leave to appeal costs were also refused.

This addendum to a judgment determined the transaction structure for a court-ordered share purchase as an oppression remedy.

The individual plaintiff, Ms. Murray, a 9.1% shareholder in Pier 21, had been found to be oppressed, and the defendants were ordered to purchase her shares for $39.3 million.

Ms. Murray held her shares through a holding company (2327342 Ontario Inc.) and sought to minimize her tax liability by having the individual defendant, Mr. Star, or his holding company, purchase the shares of her holding company (Option One).

Mr. Star argued for Pier 21 to repurchase its shares from Ms. Murray's holding company for cancellation (Option Two).

The court found that Option One was not in accord with Ms. Murray's reasonable expectations, considering her prior share sales in 2012 where Pier 21 repurchased shares from her holding company for cancellation.

The court also noted that Option One would impose potential unknown liabilities and significant advisory costs on the defendants, risks not present in Option Two.

The court ordered the share purchase to proceed under Option Two, requiring Pier 21 to repurchase its shares from Ms. Murray's holding company for cancellation.

Following a trial where the defendants were ordered to repurchase the plaintiff's shares, the plaintiffs sought directions on the transaction structure to ensure tax efficiency.

The defendants argued the court lacked jurisdiction as the issue was not pleaded and the court was functus officio.

The court held it had jurisdiction under s. 241(3) of the Canada Business Corporations Act, noting the issue was raised during trial and fell within the broad remedial powers for oppression.

The court established a process for filing further evidence to resolve the transaction structure.

Following a trial under the oppression remedy, both parties brought motions under Rule 59.06(1) to correct alleged errors in the court's reasons.

The court dismissed the defendants' request to remove references to a personal relationship and their claim of an arithmetic error in the fair value calculation.

The court granted the plaintiffs' motions to correct arithmetic errors, increasing the fair value of the corporation by $0.2 million and the equitable compensation awarded to $605,579.

The plaintiffs' request for compound interest was dismissed as it was not pleaded and lacked an evidentiary foundation.

The appellants (plaintiffs) appealed an order from Master Jolley compelling them to provide answers to outstanding undertakings from their examination for discovery and to pay costs.

The grounds of appeal included misapprehension of evidence regarding the undertakings chart, error in not granting an adjournment of the motion, and the order not reflecting the Master's handwritten endorsement.

The court found no palpable or overriding error by Master Jolley, noting the appellants' delay in providing supporting documents for their undertakings and their failure to object to the draft order.

The appeal was dismissed, and the parties were invited to make submissions on costs for the appeal.

Following the offender's guilty pleas to fraud and money laundering, the Crown brought a forfeiture application.

Two third parties, Picard Foods Ltd. and SNC-Lavalin Profac Inc., claimed interests in the proceeds of the sale of a property.

In a previous ruling, the court found Picard was entitled to a portion of the municipal service costs.

In this final ruling, the court fixed the principal amount owing to Picard at $72,690.29, excluding carrying costs, with 10% interest payable from June 21, 2008.

The court dismissed Picard's application for costs against the Crown and ProFac, finding no Crown misconduct or exceptional circumstances to justify a costs award to a bystander in a criminal proceeding.