Cynthia L. Spry

The defendants brought motions for leave to appeal a decision and a subsequent reconsideration decision of the motion judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed both motions for leave to appeal without costs.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order transferring a matter from the Family Law Team to the Civil Law Team in Toronto.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that while there was good reason to doubt the motion judge's finding on jurisdiction, the decision to have the matter addressed by the Civil Law Team was an exercise of administrative discretion that did not raise a matter of such importance to warrant leave to appeal.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal a prior decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving parties to pay costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The appellant appealed an Associate Justice's decision dismissing a motion for production of two documents (a Statement of Work and final report prepared by Ernst & Young) that were referenced in an affidavit filed by a non-party representative.

The underlying dispute concerned whether Ernst & Young's acquisition-related records should be produced in a broader non-party production motion.

The Associate Justice declined to compel production of the two documents, finding that doing so would be improper and would unduly interfere with the orderly progress of the action by creating a risk of inconsistent findings between the refusals motion and the main motion.

The appeal court upheld this decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Associate Justice's discretionary determination that the requests were improper, and that her consideration of fairness, proportionality, and the risk of inconsistent results was appropriate.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following the granting of summary judgment in favour of the Defendant Ernst & Young LLP, on the basis that the limitation period for the Plaintiffs’ action had elapsed.

The court reviews the relevant factors under the Courts of Justice Act and the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the result achieved, the complexity of the issues, and the offers to settle.

The court awards costs to Ernst & Young LLP on a partial indemnity basis up to the date of its offer to settle, and on a substantial indemnity basis thereafter, ordering the Plaintiffs to pay $125,000.00 in costs.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of Ernst & Young LLP, finding that the limitation period for the plaintiffs’ action had expired.

The decision reviews the contractual and statutory limitation periods, the relevant facts, and the legal standards for summary judgment, ultimately concluding that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The appellant appealed a partial summary judgment order that dismissed some of his claims (spoliation, intentional infliction of mental suffering) but directed a mini-trial for others (defamation, breach of contract).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it lacked jurisdiction over the interlocutory aspects without leave from the Divisional Court, that the appeal was improperly framed, and that it was premature as the summary judgment motion was not yet complete.

The court emphasized judicial economy and the need to avoid fragmented proceedings.

This is an appeal from a motion judge's order dismissing the appellants' motion for summary judgment and declaring that the respondents' action was commenced within the limitation period.

The appellants argued the claim was discovered earlier, based on a 2015 telephone conversation and a 2005 memorandum concerning tax consequences of a trust.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in her application of the relevant statutory provisions and caselaw, particularly Grant Thornton LLP v. New Brunswick.

The court agreed that the information known to the respondents' lawyer was insufficient to ground a plausible inference of liability without expert advice, thus the limitation period began later, making the action not time-barred.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Vermette J. dated December 15, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion.

As no costs outline was submitted, the court made no order as to costs.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from a dismissed interlocutory injunction motion brought by the Applicants and a granted cross-motion for consolidation brought by the Respondents.

The Respondents, as successful parties, sought substantial indemnity costs, citing egregious conduct and reasonable settlement offers.

The Applicants argued for costs in the cause or partial indemnity, denying bad faith.

The court ordered costs payable forthwith on a partial indemnity basis, finding no reprehensible conduct warranting substantial indemnity and noting the limited compromise in the Respondents' settlement offers.

The quantum of costs claimed by the Respondents was reduced due to excessive hours, particularly for the consolidation motion.

The applicants brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction in an oppression application to preserve their alleged shareholdings in a startup company and restrict the respondents' use of corporate assets.

The respondents brought a cross-motion to convert the application into an action and consolidate it with their own action against the applicants.

The court dismissed the applicants' motion, finding they failed to establish a strong prima facie case for specific performance regarding the issuance of shares and failed to show irreparable harm.

The court granted the respondents' cross-motion, ordering the application to proceed as an action and be consolidated or heard together with the respondents' action, given the overlapping issues, disputed material facts, and need for discoveries.

The defendant, Rogers Communications Canada Inc., brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff, Andrew Athanassiades's, claim for damages arising from alleged failure to provide internet service, intentional infliction of mental suffering, defamation, and breach of contract.

The court dismissed the claim for intentional infliction of mental suffering, finding no evidence of flagrant or outrageous conduct calculated to cause harm.

However, the court found a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the defamation claim, necessitating oral evidence from both parties.

Further submissions were also required for the breach of contract claim to determine if a genuine issue for trial existed given the apparent mutual agreement to rescind the contract.

Hospira Healthcare India Private Limited and Hospira Inc. (Applicants) brought an application to enforce Letters Rogatory issued by the Supreme Court of the State of New York.

The Letters Rogatory sought documentary and oral evidence from Jack Rotsztain and 1827216 Ontario Inc. (Respondents), who were non-parties to the underlying U.S. action.

The U.S. action involved allegations that Apotex Corp. breached an exclusivity agreement by secretly contracting with a different supplier, Qilu, through 182 Ontario, with Mr. Rotsztain acting as its nominal president and counsel.

The Respondents opposed the application, arguing the requests were overly broad, not relevant or necessary, otherwise obtainable, unduly burdensome, and contrary to Canadian public policy, particularly regarding solicitor-client privilege.

The court, applying the six discretionary criteria for enforcing letters rogatory, found that the Applicants failed to establish relevance, necessity, or that the evidence was not otherwise obtainable.

Crucially, the court determined that enforcing the broad requests would be unduly burdensome and infringe upon recognized Canadian legal principles, especially the sanctity of solicitor-client privilege, amounting to a "fishing expedition" not permitted under Ontario's rules for non-party discovery.

The application was dismissed.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, arguing that the plaintiffs' former lawyer had sufficient knowledge of the potential claim more than two years before the action was commenced.

The plaintiffs contended that the information available to their lawyer was insufficient to trigger the limitation period, requiring further expert investigation.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that the information known to the plaintiffs' lawyer was merely a suspicion and not enough to establish a plausible inference of liability, especially given the complex technical nature of the tax issue and conflicting professional opinions.

The limitation period was held to have commenced either when further due diligence was decided upon (February 22, 2016) or when a comprehensive expert opinion was provided (February 24, 2017), both dates being within the two-year period.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's breach of contract action for delay under Rules 48.14(7)(a) and 24.01.

The court found that the plaintiff adequately explained the delay, which was largely due to the health issues and subsequent murder of the plaintiff's former counsel, as well as concurrent delays by the defendant.

The court also found no significant prejudice to the defendant.

The motion was dismissed, a new litigation schedule was imposed, and costs of $25,000 were awarded to the plaintiff.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal where the appellants successfully set aside a finding that a revenue misrepresentation claim was encompassed within the original statement of claim, thereby preserving a Limitations Act defence.

Both parties claimed to be the successful party and sought costs of $20,000.

The court found that success was divided, as the appellants did not get the claim dismissed but did preserve a significant defence.

The court awarded the appellants $10,000 for the appeal and $1,500 for costs submissions, and ordered each party to bear their own costs for the motion below.

The appellants appealed an Associate Judge's decision granting the respondent leave to amend its Statement of Claim to add a revenue misrepresentation claim arising from a share purchase agreement.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal in part, finding the Associate Judge erred in law by relying on discovery evidence to conclude the amendment was not a new cause of action.

However, the court upheld the Associate Judge's alternative finding that the discoverability of the claim under the Limitations Act involved factual disputes that must be resolved at trial.

The respondent was permitted to amend its claim, but the appellants were granted leave to plead a limitations defence.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to amend its statement of claim to add allegations of revenue misrepresentation related to a share purchase agreement.

The defendants opposed, arguing the amendments asserted a new cause of action after the expiry of the limitation period and were barred by a survival clause in the agreement.

The court granted the motion, finding that while the original pleading lacked the factual matrix for the new claim, the defendants had elicited the necessary material facts during discovery, meaning it was not a new cause of action.

The court also held that the survival clause did not bar the claim as it only required the claim to arise within two years, not that notice be given.

The plaintiffs sought approval of a settlement agreement with the remaining bank defendants in a national class action alleging a conspiracy to fix credit card merchant discount fees.

A joint virtual hearing was held with judges from British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Ontario, and Quebec.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice approved the settlement, adopting the reasons of the British Columbia Supreme Court.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of the lower court judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the fixed amount of $1,249.78.