Cynthia L. Spry

The appellant appealed an Associate Justice's decision dismissing a motion for production of two documents (a Statement of Work and final report prepared by Ernst & Young) that were referenced in an affidavit filed by a non-party representative.

The underlying dispute concerned whether Ernst & Young's acquisition-related records should be produced in a broader non-party production motion.

The Associate Justice declined to compel production of the two documents, finding that doing so would be improper and would unduly interfere with the orderly progress of the action by creating a risk of inconsistent findings between the refusals motion and the main motion.

The appeal court upheld this decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Associate Justice's discretionary determination that the requests were improper, and that her consideration of fairness, proportionality, and the risk of inconsistent results was appropriate.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following the granting of summary judgment in favour of the Defendant Ernst & Young LLP, on the basis that the limitation period for the Plaintiffs’ action had elapsed.

The court reviews the relevant factors under the Courts of Justice Act and the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the result achieved, the complexity of the issues, and the offers to settle.

The court awards costs to Ernst & Young LLP on a partial indemnity basis up to the date of its offer to settle, and on a substantial indemnity basis thereafter, ordering the Plaintiffs to pay $125,000.00 in costs.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of Ernst & Young LLP, finding that the limitation period for the plaintiffs’ action had expired.

The decision reviews the contractual and statutory limitation periods, the relevant facts, and the legal standards for summary judgment, ultimately concluding that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The appellant appealed a partial summary judgment order that dismissed some of his claims (spoliation, intentional infliction of mental suffering) but directed a mini-trial for others (defamation, breach of contract).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it lacked jurisdiction over the interlocutory aspects without leave from the Divisional Court, that the appeal was improperly framed, and that it was premature as the summary judgment motion was not yet complete.

The court emphasized judicial economy and the need to avoid fragmented proceedings.

This is an appeal from a motion judge's order dismissing the appellants' motion for summary judgment and declaring that the respondents' action was commenced within the limitation period.

The appellants argued the claim was discovered earlier, based on a 2015 telephone conversation and a 2005 memorandum concerning tax consequences of a trust.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in her application of the relevant statutory provisions and caselaw, particularly Grant Thornton LLP v. New Brunswick.

The court agreed that the information known to the respondents' lawyer was insufficient to ground a plausible inference of liability without expert advice, thus the limitation period began later, making the action not time-barred.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from a dismissed interlocutory injunction motion brought by the Applicants and a granted cross-motion for consolidation brought by the Respondents.

The Respondents, as successful parties, sought substantial indemnity costs, citing egregious conduct and reasonable settlement offers.

The Applicants argued for costs in the cause or partial indemnity, denying bad faith.

The court ordered costs payable forthwith on a partial indemnity basis, finding no reprehensible conduct warranting substantial indemnity and noting the limited compromise in the Respondents' settlement offers.

The quantum of costs claimed by the Respondents was reduced due to excessive hours, particularly for the consolidation motion.

The defendant, Rogers Communications Canada Inc., brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff, Andrew Athanassiades's, claim for damages arising from alleged failure to provide internet service, intentional infliction of mental suffering, defamation, and breach of contract.

The court dismissed the claim for intentional infliction of mental suffering, finding no evidence of flagrant or outrageous conduct calculated to cause harm.

However, the court found a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the defamation claim, necessitating oral evidence from both parties.

Further submissions were also required for the breach of contract claim to determine if a genuine issue for trial existed given the apparent mutual agreement to rescind the contract.

Hospira Healthcare India Private Limited and Hospira Inc. (Applicants) brought an application to enforce Letters Rogatory issued by the Supreme Court of the State of New York.

The Letters Rogatory sought documentary and oral evidence from Jack Rotsztain and 1827216 Ontario Inc. (Respondents), who were non-parties to the underlying U.S. action.

The U.S. action involved allegations that Apotex Corp. breached an exclusivity agreement by secretly contracting with a different supplier, Qilu, through 182 Ontario, with Mr. Rotsztain acting as its nominal president and counsel.

The Respondents opposed the application, arguing the requests were overly broad, not relevant or necessary, otherwise obtainable, unduly burdensome, and contrary to Canadian public policy, particularly regarding solicitor-client privilege.

The court, applying the six discretionary criteria for enforcing letters rogatory, found that the Applicants failed to establish relevance, necessity, or that the evidence was not otherwise obtainable.

Crucially, the court determined that enforcing the broad requests would be unduly burdensome and infringe upon recognized Canadian legal principles, especially the sanctity of solicitor-client privilege, amounting to a "fishing expedition" not permitted under Ontario's rules for non-party discovery.

The application was dismissed.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, arguing that the plaintiffs' former lawyer had sufficient knowledge of the potential claim more than two years before the action was commenced.

The plaintiffs contended that the information available to their lawyer was insufficient to trigger the limitation period, requiring further expert investigation.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that the information known to the plaintiffs' lawyer was merely a suspicion and not enough to establish a plausible inference of liability, especially given the complex technical nature of the tax issue and conflicting professional opinions.

The limitation period was held to have commenced either when further due diligence was decided upon (February 22, 2016) or when a comprehensive expert opinion was provided (February 24, 2017), both dates being within the two-year period.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's breach of contract action for delay under Rules 48.14(7)(a) and 24.01.

The court found that the plaintiff adequately explained the delay, which was largely due to the health issues and subsequent murder of the plaintiff's former counsel, as well as concurrent delays by the defendant.

The court also found no significant prejudice to the defendant.

The motion was dismissed, a new litigation schedule was imposed, and costs of $25,000 were awarded to the plaintiff.

The parties agreed not to seek any costs of the appeal motions or the appeals.

The Court of Appeal issued an endorsement reflecting this agreement, with no costs awarded.

This is an appeal and cross-appeal from a Superior Court judgment concerning an oppression remedy claim.

The appellants (defendants) challenged the trial judge's valuation of shares, award of equitable damages, refusal to admit fresh evidence, and refusal to reconsider a Rule 59 motion.

The cross-appellants (plaintiffs) challenged the trial judge's findings on fiduciary duty, the 2012 share purchase agreement, quantum of equitable damages (interest), punitive damages, and transaction structure for share repurchase.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, upholding the trial judge's decisions on all substantive issues, including the valuation, equitable damages, and the refusal to admit fresh evidence or reconsider motions.

Both parties' requests for leave to appeal costs were also refused.

This addendum to a judgment determined the transaction structure for a court-ordered share purchase as an oppression remedy.

The individual plaintiff, Ms. Murray, a 9.1% shareholder in Pier 21, had been found to be oppressed, and the defendants were ordered to purchase her shares for $39.3 million.

Ms. Murray held her shares through a holding company (2327342 Ontario Inc.) and sought to minimize her tax liability by having the individual defendant, Mr. Star, or his holding company, purchase the shares of her holding company (Option One).

Mr. Star argued for Pier 21 to repurchase its shares from Ms. Murray's holding company for cancellation (Option Two).

The court found that Option One was not in accord with Ms. Murray's reasonable expectations, considering her prior share sales in 2012 where Pier 21 repurchased shares from her holding company for cancellation.

The court also noted that Option One would impose potential unknown liabilities and significant advisory costs on the defendants, risks not present in Option Two.

The court ordered the share purchase to proceed under Option Two, requiring Pier 21 to repurchase its shares from Ms. Murray's holding company for cancellation.

Following a trial where the defendants were ordered to repurchase the plaintiff's shares, the plaintiffs sought directions on the transaction structure to ensure tax efficiency.

The defendants argued the court lacked jurisdiction as the issue was not pleaded and the court was functus officio.

The court held it had jurisdiction under s. 241(3) of the Canada Business Corporations Act, noting the issue was raised during trial and fell within the broad remedial powers for oppression.

The court established a process for filing further evidence to resolve the transaction structure.

Class members who are not representative plaintiffs have no direct right of appeal from an order approving a settlement in a certified class action.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that the decision in Dabbs v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada remains good law and has not been superseded by subsequent decisions.

A settlement approval order is neither a judgment on common issues nor a determination of aggregate damages, and therefore class members cannot seek leave to appeal under section 30(5) of the Class Proceedings Act.

Permitting individual class members to appeal settlement approvals would introduce uncertainty into settlement negotiations, undermine the authority of representative plaintiffs and class counsel, and impede the resolution of class actions.

The Canadian Hearing Society (CHS) brought a motion seeking to dismiss the application of the corporate applicant, The Campaign for the Inclusion of People who are Deaf and Hard of Hearing (the "Campaign"), for lack of standing, and to stay the application of the individual applicants, Ian Silver and Keith Golem, pending arbitration.

The court found that the Campaign was not a "complainant" under the Canada Not-for-Profit Corporations Act as it lacked a private right and reasonable expectation, and its representative authority was questionable.

The court also determined that the individual applicants' oppression claims were subject to arbitration clauses in the CHS by-laws.

Consequently, the Campaign's application was dismissed, and the Individual Applicants' application was stayed pending arbitration.

Costs were awarded to the CHS.

The plaintiff sued ten fuel providers for losses arising from fraudulent fuel card transactions.

The defendants brought motions to sever the proceedings.

The parties agreed to sever the claims against the Imperial defendants and stay the remaining claims pending the outcome of the Imperial action.

Shell brought a separate motion to stay the action against it based on a forum selection clause designating Alberta as the exclusive jurisdiction.

The court dismissed Shell's motion, finding that the policy against a multiplicity of proceedings constituted 'strong cause' to override the forum selection clause.

The plaintiff sued his investment advisors, actuaries, and lawyers for professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, alleging they misled him into commuting his teacher's pension to establish an Individual Pension Plan (IPP) that risked revocation by the Canada Revenue Agency.

The actuaries and lawyers brought motions for summary judgment arguing the claims were statute-barred and the plaintiff suffered no damages, while the plaintiff brought a cross-motion for summary judgment on liability.

After the plaintiff discontinued the action against all defendants except the lawyers, the court dismissed both the plaintiff's summary judgment motion and the damages branch of the lawyers' motion, finding genuine issues for trial that were not appropriate for summary determination.

The defendant moved to vacate Certificates of Pending Litigation obtained by the plaintiff on an ex parte basis over two properties.

The court held that a party seeking ex parte relief must make full and frank disclosure of all material facts.

The plaintiff failed to disclose a prior divorce settlement in which he had disclaimed any trust interest in the properties and misrepresented the contents of a lawyer’s letter regarding potential sale of the land.

These omissions and misrepresentations were material and could have influenced the original ex parte decision.

The court therefore set aside the order permitting the certificates, but required that 50% of the gross sale proceeds of the properties be paid into court as security pending resolution of the ownership dispute.

A private prosecution brought by an environmental advocacy group against the owners and managers of a commercial office complex for regulatory offences related to bird deaths caused by collisions with the building's reflective glass.

The prosecution charged the defendants under three statutes: the Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, the Environmental Protection Act, and the federal Species at Risk Act.

The court found that the defendants committed the actus reus of two offences (EPA and SARA) but acquitted them on all charges after finding they exercised due diligence in addressing the bird strike problem.