Emily Stock

The proposed intervenor, Keith Bannon, a former lawyer for the City of Windsor, sought leave under Rule 13.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to intervene as an added party in a pending motion.

This pending motion concerned the legal consequences of a prior decision that permanently stayed the City's counterclaim due to abuse of process related to undisclosed settlement agreements.

The court found that while Bannon might be adversely affected by the judgment due to potential professional negligence liability (satisfying Rule 13.01(1)(b)), his intervention would not offer a useful contribution and would cause undue delay and prejudice in what was an essentially private dispute.

The court emphasized that intervention in private lawsuits is granted "sparingly or rarely." Consequently, the motion for intervention was dismissed, and Bannon was ordered to pay costs to Southside Construction.

The plaintiff, a newly formed lacrosse league, sought an interlocutory injunction to suspend the defendant's regulations that penalized players for participating in competing leagues.

The plaintiff argued the regulations constituted intentional interference with economic relations.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no serious issue to be tried as the defendant was merely enforcing long-standing rules and not intentionally targeting the plaintiff.

The court also found the balance of convenience favoured the defendant, as suspending the rules would destabilize its established organization.

The Representative Plaintiff in a certified class action sought court approval for a $4.2 million settlement with the defendant auditor, approval of Class Counsel's contingency fees and disbursements, and an honorarium for the Representative Plaintiff.

The court approved the settlement, finding it fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, considering the litigation risks and protracted nature of the case.

Class Counsel's fees and disbursements, and the Representative Plaintiff's honorarium, were also approved.

The plaintiff, a wedding and convention center, sued its insurer for damages caused by a major rainstorm, claiming under sewer back-up and flood endorsements, and for business interruption, extra-contractual, and punitive damages.

The court found that only the sewer back-up endorsement applied, for which the policy limit of $500,000 had already been paid.

The flood endorsement did not apply as the damage was caused by "Surface Water" (rain pooling on the ground), which was explicitly excluded and not covered by the endorsement's definition of "flood" (overflow of a body of water).

The business interruption claim was dismissed because the business did not cease operations, and any alleged loss of revenue was attributed to the plaintiff's decision to remain open against the insurer's advice to mitigate damages.

Claims for extra-contractual and punitive damages were also dismissed due to the absence of a breach of contract by the insurer and lack of exceptional misconduct.

The plaintiff claimed indemnity under an insurance policy, alleging its apartment building was structurally damaged by the Ladysmith Earthquake.

The defendant insurer denied the claim, arguing the earthquake did not cause the damage.

After a seven-day trial featuring extensive expert testimony on seismology and structural engineering, the court found the earthquake's force was negligible and insufficient to cause the damage.

The court concluded the structural issues were caused by differential soil settlement and dismissed the plaintiff's action.

At a pre-trial hearing, the court struck the pleadings of Superior Fine Papers Inc., Reliance Holdings Limited, and Reliance Developments Corporation ("Superior et. al.") in two related actions due to their repeated failure to comply with court-ordered litigation timetables, deliver documents, make representatives available for examinations for discovery, and pay previously ordered costs.

The court also awarded further costs against Superior et. al. and set conditions for any motion to set aside the striking of pleadings, including the prior payment of all outstanding costs.

The plaintiff condominium corporation sued the developer and vendor for negligence and breach of warranty regarding HVAC system deficiencies.

The defendants and third parties moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was statute-barred by the limitation period.

The court found a genuine issue requiring trial due to insufficient explanatory expert evidence regarding discoverability of the systemic defect versus localized leaks.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action on a motion for summary judgment due to the expiry of the limitation period, the successful defendants sought costs.

One defendant sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the action was ill-conceived, and an additional fee for in-house counsel.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to both defendants, finding the case was not exceptional to warrant elevated costs and lacking documentation for the in-house counsel claim.

The court also declined to order the plaintiff to pay third-party costs.

The plaintiff, Cargojet Airways Ltd., brought an action for breach of contract and negligence against Aveiro Constructors Limited and Hatch Mott MacDonald Ltd. regarding defects in an aircraft hangar's insulation.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was barred by the Limitations Act, 2002, and a contractual limitation period for Hatch.

The court found that Cargojet had sufficient knowledge of the material facts to commence a claim by May 3, 2010, and failed to act with due diligence.

Consequently, the action against Aveiro was statute-barred by the two-year statutory limitation period, and the action against Hatch was barred by its twelve-month contractual limitation period.

Both motions for summary judgment were granted, and the action was dismissed.

Contractors sought declarations compelling three commercial general liability insurers to defend them in an underlying construction action concerning alleged defects in septic systems installed in a residential subdivision.

The court considered whether the pleadings disclosed “property damage” caused by an “occurrence” under the policies and whether exclusions, including the “your work” and “professional services” exclusions, applied.

Although the pleadings raised a mere possibility of property damage caused by an occurrence, the court found that the “your work” exclusion applied and that the subcontractor exception was not established on the pleadings because the alleged supplier of filter sand was merely a supplier and not a subcontractor.

As a result, the insurers had no duty to defend.

The motion for a declaration compelling a defence was dismissed.

The defendant, a California corporation that dissolved after allegedly supplying a defective generator but before the plaintiff commenced its action, brought a motion to dismiss the action against it for lack of legal capacity to be sued in Ontario.

The court applied conflict of laws principles, determining that while capacity to be sued is procedural, the legal status of a foreign entity is a substantive issue governed by the law of its place of incorporation.

Because the California Corporations Code permits dissolved corporations to continue to exist for the purpose of defending actions, the court found the defendant had the legal capacity to be sued in Ontario and dismissed the motion.

Following a summary judgment decision in a dispute arising from a fire and the interpretation of a commercial lease, the successful party sought partial indemnity costs exceeding $180,000 including disbursements.

The responding party argued the claimed costs were excessive, citing duplication of counsel, work unrelated to the summary judgment motion, and inflated disbursements.

The court agreed that the bill of costs was excessive and reduced both legal fees and non‑lawyer fees, and excluded certain disbursements not permitted under Tariff A. The court fixed reasonable legal fees and limited disbursements, substantially reducing the total amount sought.

The applicant sought a declaration that he was entitled to a $1,000,000 critical illness benefit under a policy after being diagnosed with papillary thyroid cancer.

The insurer denied coverage relying on a policy exception excluding benefits where, within 90 days of the policy’s effective date, the insured experienced signs, symptoms, or investigations that led to a cancer diagnosis regardless of when the diagnosis was made.

The court interpreted the exclusion clause according to established principles of insurance contract interpretation and held the language was clear and unambiguous.

The discovery of thyroid nodules during a carotid Doppler test within the 90‑day window constituted a sign that ultimately led to the cancer diagnosis months later.

The insurer therefore properly relied on the exclusion clause to deny the claim.