Michael Seth Blinick

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) decision and a subsequent reconsideration decision that denied his claim for income replacement benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The appellant argued he was denied procedural fairness due to poor interpretation services at the hearing and because the same tribunal member conducted the reconsideration.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no denial of procedural fairness, as the tribunal adequately addressed the interpreter concerns and established jurisprudence permits the same adjudicator to conduct a reconsideration.

The court also found the tribunal's factual findings regarding the appellant's ability to work were reasonable.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking payment of an accidental death benefit and other expenses under an insurance policy following the death of an international student in the downing of Ukraine International Airlines Flight PS752 by Iranian missiles.

The defendant insurers argued the claim was excluded under a clause denying coverage for losses related to an act of declared or undeclared war, or military or usurped power.

The court excluded the defendants' expert evidence on the ultimate issue of policy interpretation.

Relying on the Canadian Forensic Examination and Assessment Team report, the court found the missile strike was not premeditated and did not constitute an act of war or an act of a usurped power.

The court granted partial summary judgment for the $100,000 accidental death benefit but dismissed the claim for repatriation and travel expenses without prejudice due to a lack of evidence.

The plaintiff sought damages for injuries sustained in a rear-end motor vehicle accident.

Two years after the accident, the plaintiff suffered a severe stroke that left him totally disabled.

The central issue was whether the accident caused the stroke due to the plaintiff's alleged increased smoking and sedentary lifestyle following the collision.

The court found the stroke was an unrelated intervening event, relying on expert evidence that the plaintiff's heavy smoking predated the accident and his lifestyle was not sufficiently sedentary to cause a deep vein thrombosis.

The court awarded $100,000 in general damages for the accident-related chronic pain and mechanical back issues, but denied future income loss and most future care costs, as the plaintiff's total disability was caused by the non-compensable stroke.

The plaintiffs brought an action against their insurer, TD Insurance, for various claims including bad faith, breach of contract, and mental distress, stemming from an accident in 2003 and subsequent denial of benefits.

Both parties brought motions for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs also sought to strike the defendant's claim.

The defendant's motion for summary judgment was based on the expiry of the applicable limitation periods under the Limitations Act and the Insurance Act.

The court found that all of the plaintiffs' claims were statute-barred, having been commenced some 12 years after the accident and discovery of the claims.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' allegations of bad faith and lack of production due to insufficient evidence.

Consequently, the defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted, and the plaintiffs' motions were dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for damages arising from construction on an adjacent property and a failed retaining wall, or alternatively, to transfer the action to Small Claims Court.

The plaintiffs claimed damages for interference with their home's use and enjoyment, including punitive and aggravated damages.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that genuine issues requiring a trial existed, particularly concerning punitive damages and the complex nature of the crossclaims.

The court emphasized that partial summary judgment is a "rare procedure" and that the motion did not meet the objectives of proportionality, timeliness, and affordability as outlined in *Hryniak* and *Butera*.

The Ministry of Transportation (MTO) and Brennan Paving & Construction Ltd. (Brennan) brought joint motions for summary judgment to dismiss a Third Party Claim and Fourth Party Claim.

The defendant in the main action had initiated a Third Party Claim against MTO, alleging negligence due to dust and debris on Highway 401 contributing to a motor vehicle accident.

MTO, in turn, issued a Fourth Party Claim against Brennan.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no credible evidence to support the defendant's allegations of dust or debris on the highway.

The defendant's testimony was deemed self-serving and uncorroborated by independent witnesses or official reports.

The court emphasized the proportionality principle in summary judgment and the respondent's obligation to present all available evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial.

The moving party, a commercial tenant, sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing its summary judgment motion.

The underlying motion sought an order requiring the respondent landlord to indemnify the tenant for a personal injury claim arising from a slip and fall on ice in a common area, pursuant to a commercial lease.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's interpretation of the lease's indemnity and insurance provisions.

The defendant, a California corporation that dissolved after allegedly supplying a defective generator but before the plaintiff commenced its action, brought a motion to dismiss the action against it for lack of legal capacity to be sued in Ontario.

The court applied conflict of laws principles, determining that while capacity to be sued is procedural, the legal status of a foreign entity is a substantive issue governed by the law of its place of incorporation.

Because the California Corporations Code permits dissolved corporations to continue to exist for the purpose of defending actions, the court found the defendant had the legal capacity to be sued in Ontario and dismissed the motion.

The appellant applied for a registration certificate for his Armi Jager AP80 firearm, which was refused by the Registrar of Firearms on the basis that it is a prohibited firearm.

The Ontario Court of Justice reversed the Registrar's decision, finding that the AP80 was not a variant of the AK-47.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the Attorney General's appeal and restored the Registrar's refusal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal, holding that the Ontario Court of Justice failed to properly apply the reasonableness standard of review to the Registrar's decision.

The Court of Appeal further held that the AP80 is the same weapon as the AK-22, which is expressly declared by regulation to be a variant of the AK-47, and is therefore a prohibited firearm.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding his employment termination.

On appeal, he raised a new issue claiming entitlement to stock options promised in his employment letter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the options were not granted until the end of his probationary period and did not start to vest until a year later, which was well after his employment had terminated.