Arthur Robert Camporese

This decision addresses the costs of a dismissed motion brought by the plaintiff, United Mennonite Home for the Aged, to amend its pleadings to name Dan Gordon in his personal capacity.

The defendant, Dan Gordon, was entirely successful in opposing the motion and sought partial indemnity costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the defendant, reducing the claimed amount by $1,000 due to the defendant's conduct unnecessarily lengthening the proceeding.

The court affirmed that success is a presumptive factor in costs awards and that a charitable organization's limited ability to pay is irrelevant when they initiated the motion.

The appellant, Bon-Star Inc., appealed an order declaring its mortgage a closed mortgage with no prepayment privileges and requiring compensation for lost interest upon prepayment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, varying the declarations to clarify that prepayment privileges were absent in favour of the mortgagor and that compensation for lost interest was required for the specific transaction where the "Due on Sale" clause was not invoked.

The court found the application judge erred in making a broad declaration regarding prepayment without compensation, as specific mortgage terms like the "Due on Sale" clause could alter prepayment conditions.

The court also upheld the application judge's discretionary decisions regarding adjournments and counsel appointment.

This appeal concerns the interpretation of "involved in the incident" under section 268(2) of the Insurance Act, which dictates liability for statutory accident benefits.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Superior Court's decision that an arbitrator erred in law by introducing a causation requirement into the test for "involvement" in a priority dispute between an insured snowmobile's insurer (Gore Mutual) and the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

The Court held that temporal, spatial, and participatory factors were sufficient to establish involvement, without requiring a direct causal link to the injuries.

The appellant, a passenger in a vehicle driven by an unlicensed driver without the owner's permission, sustained injuries in a motor vehicle accident.

He sued the driver, vehicle owner, and the owner's liability insurer, claiming entitlement to uninsured motorist coverage under section 265(1) of the Insurance Act.

The motion judge dismissed the claim on summary judgment, finding that section 1.8.2 of the standard Ontario Automobile Policy excluded uninsured motorist coverage where the vehicle was operated without the owner's consent.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, applying the precedent established in Shipman v. Dominion of Canada General Insurance Co. The appellant was limited to Statutory Accident Benefits and could pursue other claims through the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

The plaintiff, William Conners, was injured as a passenger in a car accident.

He initiated two actions: one against the driver, owner, and their insurer, Gore Mutual, and another against Unica Insurance, an insurer of a past employer.

Both Gore Mutual and Unica brought motions for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the actions against them.

Gore Mutual argued lack of coverage due to the driver operating the vehicle without the owner's consent.

Unica contended no coverage as Conners was no longer an employee for whom a vehicle was furnished.

The court dismissed both actions, finding that Conners was not an "insured person" under either policy based on the Insurance Act and relevant policy exclusions.

CUMIS General Insurance Company appealed a trial judgment finding that an unlicensed driver operated the respondent's vehicle without consent, either express or implied.

CUMIS argued the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors in her factual findings and failed to establish the tort of negligent entrustment.

The appellate court rejected all of CUMIS's arguments, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments and factual conclusions.

The court also held that even if negligent entrustment exists in Ontario, it could not be established given the finding of no implied consent.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

In the first phase of a bifurcated trial, the court addressed whether a 16-year-old G1 driver, Nihad Ismail, had his father Sherif's express or implied consent to operate his vehicle, and whether Sherif Ismail negligently entrusted the vehicle to Nihad.

Nihad was involved in a motor vehicle accident while driving his father's car without permission.

The court found no evidence of express or implied consent, noting Nihad's subjective belief that he lacked permission and the absence of prior unauthorized use known to the father.

The court also dismissed the claim of negligent entrustment, finding that the element of "entrustment" was not established as there was no direct giving of the chattel from owner to operator.

Consequently, Sherif Ismail was not held vicariously liable under the Highway Traffic Act.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a registrar’s order dismissing a personal injury action as abandoned under Rule 48.15 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The action arose from a motor vehicle accident but had been dismissed after no statement of defence was delivered and service issues arose due to a misnomer in the defendant’s name.

Applying the contextual approach endorsed in appellate authority, the court considered factors including the explanation for delay, inadvertence, promptness of the motion, and prejudice to the defendant.

The court found the delay was not inordinate, the error was inadvertent, the motion was brought reasonably promptly, and the defendant had not demonstrated prejudice.

The registrar’s dismissal order was set aside, the statement of claim was amended to correct the defendant’s name, and the time for service was extended.

Following the release of an earlier endorsement, the defendant requested an amendment to clarify that it had advanced an alternative argument that a release constituted a contract between the parties.

The defendant further submitted that the Limitations Act governed actions on contracts and that any such claim should have been commenced within six years of the contract’s formation.

The plaintiff’s counsel could not recall the specific submission and did not oppose or comment on the request.

The court accepted that the earlier endorsement should not be read as acknowledging that the action need not have been commenced within six years and clarified that the defendant had maintained that position.

The plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs following a motion and cross‑motion in civil litigation.

The responding party did not dispute the quantum claimed but argued that no costs should be awarded due to alleged delay in bringing the proceedings and its partial success in obtaining a stay of the action pending return of settlement funds.

The court held that repayment of the settlement funds was not contested and did not significantly factor into the motion argument.

The court further found no meaningful delay that would justify depriving the plaintiff of costs.

Partial indemnity costs were therefore awarded to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment seeking rescission of a settlement and release relating to statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident, arguing the insurer failed to comply with disclosure requirements under s. 9.1(2) of O. Reg. 664 (Settlement Regulation).

The court held that the insurer’s notice did not adequately explain the commuted value calculation of weekly benefits and therefore failed to satisfy the regulatory disclosure requirements intended to permit meaningful comparison between periodic and lump-sum benefits.

As a result, the insured was entitled to rescind the settlement under s. 9.1(4).

The court rejected the insurer’s argument that the action was statute-barred due to lack of evidence of a clear refusal to pay benefits triggering the limitation period.

However, the action was stayed until the insured repaid the settlement funds received.