Daniel Rosenkrantz

The moving party, who was found vicariously liable for 40% of the plaintiffs' damages in a motor vehicle accident, brought a motion for judgment on its cross-claim against the responding parties, who were found 60% liable.

The responding parties had previously settled with the plaintiffs for their policy limits but were not released from cross-claims.

The moving party paid the balance of the plaintiffs' damages and costs, exceeding its 40% share, and sought contribution and indemnity under s. 1 of the Negligence Act.

The responding parties argued that s. 1 did not apply because the moving party was only vicariously liable and not at fault.

The court rejected this argument, holding that s. 1 applies to vicariously liable parties to ensure fair allocation of financial responsibility.

The moving party was granted judgment for the excess damages and a portion of the costs it paid.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following an alleged motor vehicle collision.

The insurer denied the claim, alleging the applicant misrepresented the occurrence of the collision.

At arbitration, the arbitrator found significant inconsistencies in the testimony of the applicant and his witnesses regarding the events leading up to the alleged collision.

Furthermore, the arbitrator preferred the evidence of the insurer's accident reconstruction expert, who examined the vehicles firsthand and concluded the physical damage was inconsistent with the reported collision.

The arbitrator concluded the applicant was not involved in an 'accident' as defined in the Schedule and dismissed the application.

The plaintiff moved to restore a long-delayed solicitor's negligence action to the trial process and to have three related actions arising from the same motor vehicle accident tried together.

Applying the restoration-to-trial-list framework, the court held that the responding defendants had participated in parts of the delay and that the blame did not rest solely with the plaintiff.

The court rejected claims of prejudice based on a clerk's fading memory, missing damages documentation, and the absence of a final expert opinion, finding the alleged prejudice hypothetical or remediable under the Rules.

The motion was granted and all three matters were directed back to assignment court for possible placement on the long trial list.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident in 2008 and sought ongoing income replacement benefits, housekeeping benefits, and medical benefits for psychological treatment.

The insurer terminated benefits, relying on surveillance evidence and medical assessments indicating the applicant's condition had improved and he was exaggerating symptoms.

The arbitrator found the applicant's evidence lacked credibility, noting he failed to disclose a subsequent 2010 accident to assessors and attributed impairments from the second accident to the first.

The application for arbitration was dismissed, as the applicant failed to prove a complete inability to engage in suitable employment or a substantial inability to perform housekeeping tasks.

The plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs following a motion and cross‑motion in civil litigation.

The responding party did not dispute the quantum claimed but argued that no costs should be awarded due to alleged delay in bringing the proceedings and its partial success in obtaining a stay of the action pending return of settlement funds.

The court held that repayment of the settlement funds was not contested and did not significantly factor into the motion argument.

The court further found no meaningful delay that would justify depriving the plaintiff of costs.

Partial indemnity costs were therefore awarded to the plaintiff.

Following the release of an earlier endorsement, the defendant requested an amendment to clarify that it had advanced an alternative argument that a release constituted a contract between the parties.

The defendant further submitted that the Limitations Act governed actions on contracts and that any such claim should have been commenced within six years of the contract’s formation.

The plaintiff’s counsel could not recall the specific submission and did not oppose or comment on the request.

The court accepted that the earlier endorsement should not be read as acknowledging that the action need not have been commenced within six years and clarified that the defendant had maintained that position.

The plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment seeking rescission of a settlement and release relating to statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident, arguing the insurer failed to comply with disclosure requirements under s. 9.1(2) of O. Reg. 664 (Settlement Regulation).

The court held that the insurer’s notice did not adequately explain the commuted value calculation of weekly benefits and therefore failed to satisfy the regulatory disclosure requirements intended to permit meaningful comparison between periodic and lump-sum benefits.

As a result, the insured was entitled to rescind the settlement under s. 9.1(4).

The court rejected the insurer’s argument that the action was statute-barred due to lack of evidence of a clear refusal to pay benefits triggering the limitation period.

However, the action was stayed until the insured repaid the settlement funds received.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and applied for statutory accident benefits.

A dispute arose regarding the calculation of his prior earning capacity (PEC).

The applicant argued that income from his family's business should be included, which would raise his PEC.

The arbitrator found that the applicant was not meaningfully employed by the family business at the time of the accident and that the funds he received were dividend income rather than employment income.

The applicant's PEC was quantified at $247.98 per week based solely on a pre-accident offer of employment from another business.

The plaintiffs appealed a Divisional Court order compelling the plaintiff to attend two defence medical examinations.

The defendant had previously brought a motion to adjourn the trial to conduct defence medicals, which was dismissed.

The defendant subsequently brought a second motion to compel attendance at rescheduled medicals prior to trial, which was also dismissed by the motion judge but allowed on appeal to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiffs' appeal, holding that the second motion was substantially the same as the first, and the defendant was precluded by issue estoppel from relitigating the matter.

The appellant appealed an order finding that the underlying action had not been settled.

The Court of Appeal first determined it had jurisdiction, as the order finally disposed of the fundamental issue of whether a settlement existed and the action continued.

On the merits, the Court upheld the motions judge's finding that there was no agreement to settle, noting that the original exchange of emails was ambiguous and subsequent conduct did not resolve the ambiguity.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.