Arthur Robert Camporese

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and applied for statutory accident benefits.

The insurer denied a non-earner benefit based on an initial disability certificate indicating the applicant did not suffer a complete inability to carry on a normal life.

More than two years later, the applicant submitted a new disability certificate supporting a complete inability and sought to arbitrate the denial.

The insurer argued the arbitration was statute-barred by the two-year limitation period.

The arbitrator held that the initial denial was not a valid refusal because there was no valid application for a non-earner benefit at that time, as the applicant had accepted his doctor's opinion that he was ineligible.

Therefore, the limitation period did not commence, and the applicant was not precluded from proceeding to arbitration.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion to set aside a default judgment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, noting that the motion judge provided no reasons and the respondent's claim relied on a standard mortgage clause that was not in the material before the court.

The default judgment was set aside on terms that a defence be filed within 30 days, with the writ of seizure and sale remaining in place but enforcement stayed.

The respondent used a portion of the appellants' driveway to park his car, relying on a prescriptive easement.

The application judge granted a declaration of a prescriptive easement, finding that a 40-year right had crystallized before the appellants' predecessor in title gave written permission in 1991.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred in calculating the time period under the Real Property Limitations Act, as the 20 or 40-year period must be the period 'next before' the commencement of the action.

The 1991 written permission defeated the statutory claim.

Furthermore, the doctrine of lost modern grant did not apply because the use was always with the oral permission of the predecessors in title.

The appeal was allowed and the application dismissed.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and applied for statutory accident benefits.

Following an appeal that upheld a 50% special award but remitted the matter to determine exact quantum, the arbitrator determined the outstanding amounts.

The parties agreed on the outstanding caregiver and attendant care benefits.

The arbitrator held that the special award must be calculated on the total of outstanding benefits plus interest.

Furthermore, the arbitrator ruled that post-judgment interest on the award continues at the statutory rate of 2% per month compounded monthly under the Schedule, rather than the lower rate under the Courts of Justice Act.

The insurer was ordered to pay a total of $161,144.87.

The insurer appealed an arbitration decision awarding the insured caregiver and attendant care benefits, as well as a special award.

The insurer argued the insured had not 'incurred' the expenses because she did not pay the family members who provided the care.

The Director's Delegate upheld the arbitrator's finding that the expenses were incurred, noting the insurer failed to advise the insured she could claim for services provided by family members.

However, the appeal was allowed in part because the arbitrator erred by failing to apply the 104-week statutory limit to the benefits.

The Delegate also affirmed the arbitrator's independent jurisdiction to raise the issue of a special award, finding that adequate notice was provided to the insurer.

The appellants appealed a decision finding that the defendant no longer had insurance with the respondent for a 1970 GMC truck at the time of a motor vehicle accident.

The defendant and his insurance broker had signed a form to delete the truck from the policy effective December 10, 1993.

The accident occurred on December 27, 1993.

The appellants argued the cancellation was not effective until processed by the insurer in January 1994.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's finding that the broker had authority to accept the cancellation on the insurer's behalf, making it effective on December 10, 1993.

The appeal was dismissed.

The insured permitted an unlicensed driver to operate a vehicle he had control over, resulting in a motor vehicle accident.

The injured party's insurer brought a third-party claim against the insured for negligent entrustment.

The insured sought a declaration that his homeowner's insurance policy covered the claim and obliged the insurer to defend him.

The Court of Appeal held that the insured's act of permitting another to drive constituted 'use' of the vehicle, which fell squarely within the policy's exclusion for claims arising from the ownership, use, or operation of a motorized vehicle.

The insurer had no duty to defend.