Arthur Robert Camporese

Following the release of an earlier endorsement, the defendant requested an amendment to clarify that it had advanced an alternative argument that a release constituted a contract between the parties.

The defendant further submitted that the Limitations Act governed actions on contracts and that any such claim should have been commenced within six years of the contract’s formation.

The plaintiff’s counsel could not recall the specific submission and did not oppose or comment on the request.

The court accepted that the earlier endorsement should not be read as acknowledging that the action need not have been commenced within six years and clarified that the defendant had maintained that position.

The plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs following a motion and cross‑motion in civil litigation.

The responding party did not dispute the quantum claimed but argued that no costs should be awarded due to alleged delay in bringing the proceedings and its partial success in obtaining a stay of the action pending return of settlement funds.

The court held that repayment of the settlement funds was not contested and did not significantly factor into the motion argument.

The court further found no meaningful delay that would justify depriving the plaintiff of costs.

Partial indemnity costs were therefore awarded to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment seeking rescission of a settlement and release relating to statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident, arguing the insurer failed to comply with disclosure requirements under s. 9.1(2) of O. Reg. 664 (Settlement Regulation).

The court held that the insurer’s notice did not adequately explain the commuted value calculation of weekly benefits and therefore failed to satisfy the regulatory disclosure requirements intended to permit meaningful comparison between periodic and lump-sum benefits.

As a result, the insured was entitled to rescind the settlement under s. 9.1(4).

The court rejected the insurer’s argument that the action was statute-barred due to lack of evidence of a clear refusal to pay benefits triggering the limitation period.

However, the action was stayed until the insured repaid the settlement funds received.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion to set aside a default judgment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, noting that the motion judge provided no reasons and the respondent's claim relied on a standard mortgage clause that was not in the material before the court.

The default judgment was set aside on terms that a defence be filed within 30 days, with the writ of seizure and sale remaining in place but enforcement stayed.

The respondent used a portion of the appellants' driveway to park his car, relying on a prescriptive easement.

The application judge granted a declaration of a prescriptive easement, finding that a 40-year right had crystallized before the appellants' predecessor in title gave written permission in 1991.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred in calculating the time period under the Real Property Limitations Act, as the 20 or 40-year period must be the period 'next before' the commencement of the action.

The 1991 written permission defeated the statutory claim.

Furthermore, the doctrine of lost modern grant did not apply because the use was always with the oral permission of the predecessors in title.

The appeal was allowed and the application dismissed.

The appellants appealed a decision finding that the defendant no longer had insurance with the respondent for a 1970 GMC truck at the time of a motor vehicle accident.

The defendant and his insurance broker had signed a form to delete the truck from the policy effective December 10, 1993.

The accident occurred on December 27, 1993.

The appellants argued the cancellation was not effective until processed by the insurer in January 1994.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's finding that the broker had authority to accept the cancellation on the insurer's behalf, making it effective on December 10, 1993.

The appeal was dismissed.

The insured permitted an unlicensed driver to operate a vehicle he had control over, resulting in a motor vehicle accident.

The injured party's insurer brought a third-party claim against the insured for negligent entrustment.

The insured sought a declaration that his homeowner's insurance policy covered the claim and obliged the insurer to defend him.

The Court of Appeal held that the insured's act of permitting another to drive constituted 'use' of the vehicle, which fell squarely within the policy's exclusion for claims arising from the ownership, use, or operation of a motorized vehicle.

The insurer had no duty to defend.