Stephen Edgar Sloan

In the first phase of a bifurcated trial, the court addressed whether a 16-year-old G1 driver, Nihad Ismail, had his father Sherif's express or implied consent to operate his vehicle, and whether Sherif Ismail negligently entrusted the vehicle to Nihad.

Nihad was involved in a motor vehicle accident while driving his father's car without permission.

The court found no evidence of express or implied consent, noting Nihad's subjective belief that he lacked permission and the absence of prior unauthorized use known to the father.

The court also dismissed the claim of negligent entrustment, finding that the element of "entrustment" was not established as there was no direct giving of the chattel from owner to operator.

Consequently, Sherif Ismail was not held vicariously liable under the Highway Traffic Act.

The plaintiffs moved to amend their statement of claim following a motor vehicle accident to add a municipality as a defendant and to properly name the existing defendant as a person under disability represented by a litigation guardian.

The municipality opposed the amendment on the basis that the limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002 had expired.

The plaintiffs relied on the discoverability principle, arguing that they did not learn the material facts supporting a claim against the municipality until they obtained police officers’ notes describing hazardous icy road conditions.

The court held that the limitation period began when the plaintiffs ought to have obtained the notes through the exercise of reasonable diligence.

Because the plaintiffs failed to follow up on a request for the notes for several years, the discoverability principle did not extend the limitation period.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Master Dash on the issue of costs only.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal, finding that the Master erred in exercising his discretion with respect to costs against the plaintiffs.

The court noted that a relevant precedent with virtually identical facts had not been brought to the Master's attention.

Costs of $2,500 were awarded to the plaintiffs.

The appellants were injured when a youth, who had left a residential treatment home operated by the respondent without permission, crashed a stolen car into their house.

Over three years later, the appellants moved to add the respondent as a defendant, alleging negligent supervision.

The motions judge dismissed the motion, finding the respondent was protected by the six-month limitation period under the Public Authorities Protection Act and refusing to exercise discretion to add the party due to presumed prejudice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming the respondent was acting as a public authority fulfilling a public duty, and the appellants failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice caused by the delay.

The appellant appealed a judgment of Justice Juriansz.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the lower court's conclusion and reasons.

The court also granted leave to appeal the costs decision but dismissed that cross-appeal, finding no error in principle in fixing costs based on a summary procedure quantum.

Costs of the appeal were fixed at $7,000 on a partial indemnity basis.