Sean Kissick

The moving parties brought a motion to reopen their appeal after the Ontario government passed legislation repealing the statutory provisions at issue.

The moving parties argued that the repeal was an attempt to evade constitutional scrutiny and render the remitted rehearing moot.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that it was premature to conclude the remitted issues were moot, as the application judge retains discretion to hear the matter.

The Court emphasized that the application judge has the institutional advantage to make the necessary factual findings on the expanded Charter claims.

The applicant sought judicial review of two interim decisions of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario regarding his allegations of discrimination against the respondent College.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, raising concerns that the application was premature because the Tribunal process was ongoing.

Despite the applicant's submissions alleging bias and procedural flaws, the court held that absent exceptional circumstances, it should not interfere in ongoing administrative proceedings.

The application was dismissed as patently premature.

Following the allowance of the appeal, the Court of Appeal requested submissions on costs for the motion, which had not been addressed at the hearing.

The parties reached an agreement on costs.

The court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the appellant $4,000 all-inclusive, in accordance with the parties' agreement.

The plaintiffs brought a constitutional challenge against provisions of the Insurance Act, alleging the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) lacked adjudicative independence.

They obtained a motion judge's order under Rule 30.10 requiring the LAT to produce hundreds of internal records.

The LAT appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in her application of Rule 30.10.

The records were not relevant to a material issue because adjudicative independence in a specific case does not impact the constitutional validity of the tribunal's jurisdiction under s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867, nor does it engage s. 7 or s. 15 of the Charter.

The Court also clarified that deliberative secrecy applies to administrative tribunals to the same extent as courts.

The appellants, over 400 healthcare workers, appealed an order striking their action against the provincial Crown and various healthcare organizations regarding a COVID-19 vaccination directive.

The motion judge struck the claims as an abuse of process and for disclosing no reasonable cause of action, finding the action was a broad political inquiry rather than a legally cognizable dispute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings that the Charter did not apply to the private healthcare respondents, the tort claims lacked material facts, and the unionized and privileged hospital staff appellants were required to pursue their claims in other statutory forums.

The applicants brought a Charter challenge alleging that the Government of Ontario's cancellation of a joint task force violated their right to freedom of association under section 2(d).

The task force had been proposed during collective bargaining between the union and the college employer council to help resolve a strike, but no collective agreement was reached and the strike was ended by back-to-work legislation.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the task force was not part of any collective agreement and its cancellation did not substantially interfere with the collective bargaining process.

The appellants, a public sector union and its officers, challenged the constitutionality of back-to-work legislation (Bill 178) that ended a five-week faculty strike at Ontario's 24 colleges of applied arts and technology in 2017.

The Court of Appeal found that the legislation limited the appellants' s. 2(d) Charter right to freedom of association by ending a lawful strike, departing from the application judge's finding of no substantial interference.

However, the court held that the limitation was justified under s. 1 of the Charter, finding that Ontario had a pressing and substantial objective of resuming classroom instruction to protect students' academic year, that the means were rationally connected and minimally impairing, and that the substitution of neutral interest arbitration for strike activity rendered the effects proportionate.

The moving parties sought a stay of a new Ontario government policy restricting international medical graduates from participating in the first iteration of the medical residency matching process (CaRMS) unless they attended high school in Ontario for two years.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding it lacked jurisdiction over the underlying application for judicial review.

The court held that the policy was not an exercise of a specific statutory power under the Judicial Review Procedure Act, nor was certiorari available against the Crown in these circumstances.

The inclusion of Charter arguments did not expand the court's statutory jurisdiction.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her application for lack of jurisdiction.

The applicant alleged discrimination based on creed after her employment was terminated for failing to comply with a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review was reasonableness, found no denial of procedural fairness, and concluded that the Tribunal's determination that the applicant's singular belief against the vaccine did not constitute a 'creed' under the Human Rights Code was reasonable.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The plaintiffs, comprising 473 individuals, brought an action against the Ontario government and 54 non-governmental healthcare entities, challenging COVID-19 vaccination policies and public health measures.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim.

The court granted the motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction over unionized employees and physicians whose claims were subject to exclusive statutory regimes.

The court also found the action to be an abuse of process due to its prejudicial scope and frivolous pleadings.

Furthermore, the court held that the statement of claim failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action for conspiracy, intimidation, intentional infliction of mental anguish, and Charter breaches.

The claim was struck in its entirety, with leave to amend.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The parties settled the costs of the appeal, agreeing that the respondent would pay the appellants an all-inclusive amount of $75,000.

The Ontario Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by seven youth challenging the constitutionality of Ontario's greenhouse gas emission reduction target and plan.

The application judge had dismissed their claim, characterizing it as seeking positive rights.

The Court of Appeal found this was an error, clarifying that the case concerned whether Ontario's voluntarily assumed statutory obligation to combat climate change was Charter compliant under ss. 7 (life, liberty, security of the person) and 15 (equality).

The matter was remitted for a new hearing to determine if the Target and Plan violated the Charter.

The Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU) and two individuals applied for a declaration that the Colleges of Applied Arts and Technology Labour Dispute Resolution Act, 2017, which ended a five-week college strike, infringed their freedom of association rights under section 2(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and sought damages.

The Crown in Right of Ontario and the College Employer Council argued the Act did not infringe the Charter or was justified under section 1.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Act did not substantially interfere with meaningful collective bargaining, as the parties were at an impasse.

Alternatively, the court held that even if there was an infringement, it was justified under section 1, given the pressing and substantial objective of resuming college instruction, the rational connection of the legislation, its minimal impairment (by substituting a neutral arbitration process), and its proportionality.

The applicant, Fair Change, brought a constitutional challenge against sections 2, 3, and 5 of the Safe Streets Act, 1999, arguing they violate several Charter rights.

The court granted Fair Change public interest standing.

The court found that the deeming provisions in paragraphs 2(3)2 to 6 of the Act violate the presumption of innocence under s. 11(d) and freedom of expression under s. 2(b), and are not saved by s. 1.

The court also found that the blanket prohibitions on solicitation in certain places under clauses 3(2)(a) to (e) violate freedom of expression and are not minimally impairing, thus not saved by s. 1.

However, the court upheld the prohibition on aggressive solicitation in s. 2(2) and the prohibition on squeegeeing in s. 3(2)(f) as justified limits on freedom of expression.

The court dismissed the challenges under ss. 7, 12, and 15 of the Charter.

The unconstitutional provisions were declared of no force and effect.

The appellant appealed a lower court's dismissal of her application against the Attorneys General of Canada and Ontario under Rule 2.1.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows for dismissal of frivolous, vexatious, or abusive proceedings.

The appellant sought declarations regarding the disrepute of the justice system and breaches of Charter rights.

The motion judge dismissed the application without a hearing, finding it an attempt to relitigate similar allegations, lacking standing, and non-justiciable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, affirming the motion judge's discretion to proceed without submissions under Rule 2.1.01 and her finding that the application was an abuse of process.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

This appeal involved a constitutional challenge to Ontario's COVID-19 public health measures, specifically the proof of vaccination requirement enacted by Ont.

Reg 364/20.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because the provincial government had ceased enforcement and subsequently revoked the Regulation.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal, finding no practical effect for the declaratory relief sought and that the claim for nominal damages did not cure mootness.

Concerns about judicial economy and the utility of deciding fact-specific constitutional issues in the absence of a live controversy also weighed against exercising discretion.

The applicants, who were unsuccessful in their constitutional challenge regarding Ontario's response to climate change, and the respondent, who successfully defended the application, both sought costs.

The respondent sought $45,000 on a partial indemnity basis, while the applicants sought $96,999.79 or, alternatively, no costs.

The court applied the factors for public interest litigation and declined to award costs to the successful respondent, noting the applicants had no pecuniary interest, the issues were of existential public importance, and the respondent had superior capacity to bear costs.

The court also declined to award costs to the unsuccessful applicants, finding this was not one of the rare cases justifying such an award.

The court ordered that each party bear their own costs.

The applicant, a minor represented by her father, brought an application alleging "health abuse" through ultrasound exposure and unauthorized medical interventions, seeking broad and imprecise relief including rights to employment equality and prevention of asset theft.

The court, on its own initiative under Rule 2.1.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, called for submissions on why the application should not be dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The father's submissions did not address the substance of the court's concerns.

The court found the pleaded facts did not link to the relief sought, the relief was imprecise and unsustainable (e.g., seeking restoration of health or prevention of future theft), and dismissed the application.

The applicants, seven young Ontarians, brought an application challenging Ontario's greenhouse gas reduction target (the "Target") set under the Cap and Trade Cancellation Act, 2018.

They argued that the Target, which aims to reduce emissions by 30% below 2005 levels by 2030, is unconstitutional and violates their rights under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The court found that the issues were justiciable, as they involved a challenge to specific state action and legislation.

However, the court dismissed the application, concluding that while climate change poses a severe threat and disproportionately impacts youth, the Target itself does not violate the Charter.

The court held that section 7 does not impose positive obligations on the state to enact more stringent environmental policies, and the Target is not arbitrary or grossly disproportionate.

Furthermore, the court found no section 15 violation, as the disproportionate impacts are caused by climate change itself, not the impugned legislation, and the Charter does not impose a positive obligation to remedy social inequalities.

The appellants, two churches and their members, challenged the constitutionality of Ontario's COVID-19 regulations that imposed capacity restrictions on indoor and outdoor religious gatherings.

The motion judge found that the regulations infringed the appellants' freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter but were justified under s. 1.

On appeal, the appellants argued the motion judge erred in her treatment of expert evidence, her refusal to use hindsight evidence, her decision not to conduct separate analyses for other s. 2 Charter rights, and her s. 1 justification analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's deferential approach to the government's response to an unprecedented public health emergency, her application of the precautionary principle, or her conclusion that the measures were minimally impairing and proportionate.