Naomi Beverly Brown

The respondents purchased a property and subsequently discovered latent construction defects related to building permits issued in 1987.

They commenced an action against the appellant municipality more than 15 years after the permits were issued.

The motion judge held that the ultimate 15-year limitation period under s. 15(2) of the Limitations Act, 2002 was tolled pursuant to s. 15(4)(b) because one of the respondents was a minor during the running of the limitation period, even though she did not own the property or have a claim at that time.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that a purposive and contextual interpretation of s. 15(4)(b) requires that the plaintiff's claim must arise while they are a minor for the tolling provision to apply.

The claims regarding the 1987 building permits were therefore statute-barred.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for damages arising from construction on an adjacent property and a failed retaining wall, or alternatively, to transfer the action to Small Claims Court.

The plaintiffs claimed damages for interference with their home's use and enjoyment, including punitive and aggravated damages.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that genuine issues requiring a trial existed, particularly concerning punitive damages and the complex nature of the crossclaims.

The court emphasized that partial summary judgment is a "rare procedure" and that the motion did not meet the objectives of proportionality, timeliness, and affordability as outlined in *Hryniak* and *Butera*.

The respondents brought a motion for a stay of execution of a prior judgment by Justice Akhtar, which ordered the removal of illegal construction at their properties due to flagrant violations of building codes and zoning bylaws.

The court dismissed the respondents' motion, finding their conduct to be a continuation of prior violations and their arguments specious.

The court applied a higher test for staying a final judgment, requiring proof that enforcement would be oppressive, vexatious, or an abuse of process, and would not cause injustice to the plaintiff.

The court found that the City's enforcement was not oppressive and that the public interest in safety outweighed the respondents' claims.

Costs were awarded to the City.

The City of Toronto and its Chief Building Official applied under s. 38 of the Building Code Act, 1992, for orders compelling Nikolaos Lambrinos and 1187310 Ontario Limited to remove unauthorized construction and comply with building and zoning by-laws at 102 and 104 Ulster Street.

The properties had a long history of unapproved additions and conversion into multiple dwelling units, deemed unsafe.

The respondents' defenses, including claims of non-receipt of orders and alleged permits, were rejected due to lack of credibility and evidence.

The court found flagrant and unjustified violations of the Building Code Act and Ontario Building Code, making retrospective approval impossible.

The appellants appealed an order enforcing Minutes of Settlement signed after mediation.

They argued their solicitor lacked authority to settle, the agreement was signed under duress, the settlement should not have been approved for the minor plaintiffs, and the agreement was not binding because a release was never signed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the solicitor had ostensible authority, there was no evidence of duress, the motion judge did not err in approving the settlement for the minors, and the requirement to sign a release did not prevent the Minutes from being a binding agreement.

The City of Toronto sought judicial review of a decision by the Board of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario denying the City party status in a hearing regarding the revocation and transfer of a liquor licence.

The City argued it was entitled to party status to represent the public interest due to concerns about illegal activities at the licensed premises.

The Divisional Court determined the standard of review was correctness, but found the Board did not err in its decision.

The Court held that the Board reasonably exercised its discretion, noting that the City's evidence and concerns would be adequately presented through the Registrar and the evidentiary weight of the municipal resolution.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing his action for false arrest and false imprisonment against the police and municipality.

He argued the trial judge should have considered negligence and erred in finding the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him without further investigation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that negligence was not pleaded and the trial judge had no duty to advise the unrepresented appellant to amend his claim.

The Court also found no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the police had reasonable and probable grounds based on the complainants' statements.

The appellant hired a contractor to renovate his basement, which required underpinnings.

The contractor convinced the appellant to commence construction before obtaining a building permit.

When the permit was issued, the underpinnings were concealed.

The municipal building inspector relied on the contractor's assurances rather than conducting a thorough inspection.

The underpinnings were defective, causing flooding.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the municipality owed a duty of care to the appellant to conduct a reasonable inspection, despite the appellant's negligence in allowing construction without a permit.

The municipality was held jointly and severally liable with the contractor, with damages reduced by the appellant's contributory negligence.