Scott Douglas McTaggart

The plaintiff brought a motion to consolidate two London actions, order joint examinations for discovery with a related Toronto action, waive the deemed undertaking rule to allow sharing of evidence between the actions, and transfer the London action to Toronto.

The defendants opposed the joint discovery and waiver of the deemed undertaking rule.

The court granted the consolidation on consent and waived the deemed undertaking rule, finding significant overlap in evidence and witnesses, and that joint proceedings would be more efficient and avoid inconsistent findings.

The request to transfer the action to Toronto was deferred to the Regional Senior Justice in Toronto.

The plaintiff, Istvan Hirosik, brought a summary judgment motion seeking long-term disability benefits from Canada Life Assurance Company, along with aggravated, exemplary, and punitive damages.

The central issue was whether Hirosik's current lumbar spine disability qualified as a new claim or a recurrent disability under the policy, given his complex medical history.

The defendant argued the motion was inappropriate due to insufficient medical evidence to assess disability, causation, and credibility.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the medical issues too complex for summary judgment without a complete medical record and expert evidence, and directed the matter to proceed to trial.

The plaintiff's employment was terminated, which immediately ended his long-term disability (LTD) coverage under the employer's group policy.

Two months later, he became totally disabled in a motor vehicle accident.

The employer inadvertently continued paying LTD premiums, and the insurer initially denied the claim based on lack of total disability and late filing, while reserving the right to investigate eligibility.

The plaintiff argued the insurer waived the termination date of the policy.

The court dismissed the action, finding no waiver because the insurer lacked full knowledge of the termination and did not unequivocally intend to relinquish its right to rely on the policy's termination clause.

In an insurance action arising from a denied long-term disability claim, the defendant moved during trial to amend its statement of defence to add express reliance on a termination clause in the group policy.

The court held that Rule 26.01 requires leave to amend at any stage unless the responding party would suffer prejudice not compensable by costs or an adjournment.

Although the timing of the motion was criticized, the court found any prejudice could be addressed through procedural accommodations, including a short adjournment, further discovery, or recalling witnesses.

The amendment was therefore permitted.

Following a written motion by several defendants to transfer the proceeding to another county, which was granted, the court determined the appropriate quantum of costs.

The moving parties sought $3,000 in costs and argued the motion was unnecessary because the action had been commenced in the wrong venue.

The court held that commencing the action in the original venue was permissible under Rule 13.1.01(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and rejected the suggestion that the motion should necessarily have been consented to.

The court found the time claimed for the motion disproportionate and reduced certain disbursements.

Costs were assessed at $1,500 all inclusive payable by the plaintiff.

The applicant sought a declaration that he was entitled to a $1,000,000 critical illness benefit under a policy after being diagnosed with papillary thyroid cancer.

The insurer denied coverage relying on a policy exception excluding benefits where, within 90 days of the policy’s effective date, the insured experienced signs, symptoms, or investigations that led to a cancer diagnosis regardless of when the diagnosis was made.

The court interpreted the exclusion clause according to established principles of insurance contract interpretation and held the language was clear and unambiguous.

The discovery of thyroid nodules during a carotid Doppler test within the 90‑day window constituted a sign that ultimately led to the cancer diagnosis months later.

The insurer therefore properly relied on the exclusion clause to deny the claim.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application for a declaration that a release in a settlement agreement with her former employer did not bar her claim for long-term disability benefits against the insurer.

She argued the release violated the Employment Standards Act by effectively waiving her right to benefit coverage during the statutory notice period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the employer had maintained coverage as required by the Act, and the appellant was free to compromise her claim for benefits.

The Court also upheld the finding that the insurer, as a third-party beneficiary, could enforce the release.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action, which was based on a written settlement agreement reached at mediation.

She argued she did not understand the terms and her counsel lacked authority to settle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding she signed the agreement, accepted benefits, and her counsel had apparent authority.

The respondent cross-appealed the motion judge's refusal to enforce the release term of the agreement.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, varying the order to include an absolute bar to subsequent proceedings.