Dr. Empringham

The court considered whether an insurer could deny a life insurance claim based on a change in insurability between application and policy delivery, even if the change was unknown to both parties, and whether such a denial could occur beyond the two-year incontestability period in the Insurance Act.

The court held that section 180(1)(c) of the Insurance Act does not permit an insurer to void a policy for an undisclosed change in insurability beyond the two-year period set by section 184(2).

The court granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff, finding the insurance was in effect at the time of death.

In a medical malpractice action alleging a misdiagnosed spinal cord injury, the defendants moved for an order requiring the plaintiff to undergo a neuropsychological assessment.

The motion was brought eight years after the statement of defence and nine months before trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no evidence to support an allegation of cognitive impairment, and concluding that the elements of fairness, necessity, and prejudice weighed against ordering the examination at such a late stage.

The plaintiffs sought court approval for a $12.5 million settlement arising from a catastrophic brain injury sustained by a 16-year-old during a high school rugby match.

The court reviewed the proposed structured settlement, private investment plan, and legal fees.

Finding the 30% contingency fee unreasonable given the size of the settlement and the exclusion of the OHIP subrogated claim, the court reduced the legal fee to 20% and directed the savings to the plaintiff's future care fund.

The settlement was approved with these modifications.

The applicant sought a declaration that he was entitled to a $1,000,000 critical illness benefit under a policy after being diagnosed with papillary thyroid cancer.

The insurer denied coverage relying on a policy exception excluding benefits where, within 90 days of the policy’s effective date, the insured experienced signs, symptoms, or investigations that led to a cancer diagnosis regardless of when the diagnosis was made.

The court interpreted the exclusion clause according to established principles of insurance contract interpretation and held the language was clear and unambiguous.

The discovery of thyroid nodules during a carotid Doppler test within the 90‑day window constituted a sign that ultimately led to the cancer diagnosis months later.

The insurer therefore properly relied on the exclusion clause to deny the claim.

The wife appealed a trial judgment regarding the equalization of net family property and spousal support.

At trial, the judge intervened after the close of evidence to request additional actuarial calculations based on the husband's reduced life expectancy, which significantly altered the pension valuations in his favour.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge overstepped her role and usurped the function of counsel, causing procedural unfairness.

The Court varied the equalization payment based on the original trial evidence.

The Court upheld the trial judge's use of the pro rata method for valuing the husband's pension, but set aside the lump sum spousal support award as it was based solely on an income differential without evidence of need.