Barry Berge Papazian

The court considered whether an insurer could deny a life insurance claim based on a change in insurability between application and policy delivery, even if the change was unknown to both parties, and whether such a denial could occur beyond the two-year incontestability period in the Insurance Act.

The court held that section 180(1)(c) of the Insurance Act does not permit an insurer to void a policy for an undisclosed change in insurability beyond the two-year period set by section 184(2).

The court granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff, finding the insurance was in effect at the time of death.

The insured property owner appealed the dismissal of its claim for coverage following a wall collapse, while the insurer appealed the finding of coverage for a subsequent arson fire at the same vacant building.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

The wall collapse was not proven to be a fortuitous event.

For the fire loss, the insurer was bound by promissory estoppel preventing reliance on a vacancy exclusion, and its unilateral attempt to amend the policy to exclude arson was invalid under s. 124 of the Insurance Act for lack of written consent.

The Ontario Land Tribunal held a Case Management Conference regarding a claim for compensation under the Expropriations Act.

The claimant, a commercial tenant operating a daycare, sought damages for injurious affection arising from the acquisition of an easement and construction at the High Park Subway Station.

The Tribunal issued a Procedural Order setting a seven-day hearing on the merits and establishing pre-hearing timelines.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to amend the statement of claim, seeking to add a new defendant and remove an existing one.

The court identified numerous procedural deficiencies in the motion record, including an improper basis for bringing the motion in writing (expectation of unopposed vs. consent), lack of affidavit of service for the proposed new party, use of antiquated terminology ("style of cause"), and issues with the consent form and document filing.

The motion was not granted at this time and was adjourned with specific directions for the plaintiff to correct the record and ensure proper service on all parties, including the proposed new defendant.

This is an appeal from the dismissal of a claim for negligence and breach of contract against insurance brokers.

The appellant, owner of a commercial property destroyed by fire, alleged the brokers failed to secure adequate reconstruction cost insurance, leading to underinsurance and a co-insurance penalty.

The trial judge found the brokers discharged their duty by advising the appellant to obtain expert appraisal for reconstruction costs and that the appellant was a sophisticated client.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the application of the duty of care or contractual obligations, and no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff's poultry processing plant was destroyed by fire and was significantly underinsured because the original insurance application understated the building's size.

The plaintiff sued her insurance broker and the insurer.

The insurer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claims against it, arguing it owed no duty of care to inform the insured or the broker of the size discrepancy it discovered during a subsequent property inspection.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that conflicting evidence regarding the purpose of the inspection and the parties' reliance required a full trial to determine whether a novel duty of care existed under the Anns/Cooper framework.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action after a two-week trial, the defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis from the date of their offer to settle.

The plaintiff argued for a significantly lower amount and opposed substantial indemnity.

The court determined that Rule 49.10(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for substantial indemnity costs, applies when a plaintiff obtains a judgment less favourable than an offer, not when their action is dismissed.

Furthermore, the court reiterated that substantial indemnity costs, outside of Rule 49.10, are reserved for cases involving egregious misconduct, which was not present here.

Consequently, the court awarded the defendants costs on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $150,000, inclusive of disbursements and HST, after making adjustments for an expert fee.

The plaintiff, owner of a commercial property destroyed by fire, sued its insurance broker and brokerage firm for negligence and breach of contract, alleging underinsurance due to inadequate advice on reconstruction costs.

The court found that the defendants met the standard of care by advising the plaintiff's principal, a sophisticated client, to obtain a professional reconstruction estimate and by providing documents with co-insurance warnings.

The court also found no causation, as the plaintiff was motivated by cost-saving and would likely not have followed advice for a professional estimate.

Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to mitigate damages by not diligently rebuilding a property of like kind and quality, thus not qualifying for replacement cost coverage.

The action was dismissed.

The appellant, a licensed life insurance agent, appealed an order suspending his licence for nine months and imposing conditions for 24 months.

The order was based on a finding of unsuitability stemming from prior disciplinary proceedings by the Mutual Fund Dealers Association (MFDA) for selling unapproved financial products and borrowing money from a client.

The Financial Services Tribunal determined that the applicable standard of review for the appeal was reasonableness.

The Tribunal found that the Director's findings of unsuitability and the imposed penalty were reasonable, subject to striking one unenforceable condition regarding a discharged bankruptcy and modifying an indefinite employment restriction.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing their motion for a mandatory injunction to compel the respondents to provide fleet insurance for their rental vehicles.

Fresh evidence revealed that the moving parties had sold their fleet, rendering the motion moot.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal on the basis of mootness, and alternatively on the merits, finding no conflicting decisions or reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision.

The applicant, a licensed life insurance agent, appealed a decision suspending his licence for nine months and imposing conditions for a further 24 months.

He brought a motion for a stay of the suspension order pending the determination of his appeal.

Applying the RJR MacDonald test, the Financial Services Tribunal found that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the applicant failed to establish that he would suffer irreparable harm if the stay were denied.

The evidence of potential job loss was speculative, and the balance of convenience favoured protecting the public interest.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

Following a serious motor vehicle accident involving a leased tractor trailer, the insured plaintiffs sought a determination that their insurer's umbrella policy did not respond and summary judgment against their insurance broker and broker employee for failing to secure excess coverage.

The court held that the leased vehicle was excluded from the non-owned automobile coverage by the long-term lease exclusion and that the umbrella coverage did not apply because the lessor's primary policy was not listed in the schedule of underlying insurance.

The court excluded the broker's expert report as unnecessary for policy interpretation, applied the summary judgment framework, and found no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The broker defendants were found to have breached their duty of care by failing to identify and address the coverage gap, and contributory negligence was rejected.

Summary judgment was granted against the broker defendants.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its damages claim against insurance broker respondents arising from the absence of business interruption coverage at the time of a fire.

The court held that the trial judge made crucial factual findings that the need for such coverage had been discussed on multiple occasions and that the appellant's representatives knew the coverage was not in place.

The record also supported the finding that worksheets required for a quotation had not been completed before the fire.

The court found no basis to interfere with the conclusion that there was no breach of duty and dismissed the appeal with costs.