Philip Hugh Horgan

This decision concerns a dispute between Sound Insurance Services Inc. and Chris Hossein, a former insurance producer, and his new employer, Greensides & Breen Insurance Brokers Limited.

The case addresses breach of contract, inducement of breach, breach of confidence, and civil conspiracy arising from the failed transfer of a book of business.

The court found Mr. Hossein liable for breach of contract and breach of confidence, and Greensides liable for inducing the breach.

Damages were assessed at $350,000, plus interest and costs.

The court considered whether an insurer could deny a life insurance claim based on a change in insurability between application and policy delivery, even if the change was unknown to both parties, and whether such a denial could occur beyond the two-year incontestability period in the Insurance Act.

The court held that section 180(1)(c) of the Insurance Act does not permit an insurer to void a policy for an undisclosed change in insurability beyond the two-year period set by section 184(2).

The court granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff, finding the insurance was in effect at the time of death.

The decision addresses a motion by Greensides & Breen Insurance Brokers Limited to compel Sound Insurance Services Inc. and Chris Hossein to answer certain refused questions and to provide further and better answers to undertakings arising from examinations for discovery.

The court found that Greensides did not require leave to bring the motion, refused to compel answers to the disputed questions, but ordered Sound to provide more detailed responses to five undertakings.

This is an appeal from a motion judge's decision denying an anti-SLAPP motion brought by the appellant, Brooke Dietrich, under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondent, 40 Days for Life, an anti-abortion organization, sued Dietrich for defamation, internet harassment, fraud, breach of contract, inducing breach of contract, and civil conspiracy, following her TikTok videos encouraging disruption of their prayer vigils and online operations.

The motion judge found that 40 Days for Life's claims for defamation, internet harassment, and conspiracy had substantial merit and no valid defence, and that the public interest in continuing the action outweighed the public interest in protecting Dietrich's expression.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no reviewable error in her assessment of the merits of the claims (specifically defamation and conspiracy) or in her public interest balancing.

The Court emphasized that Dietrich's expression, which encouraged disruption and interference with 40 Days for Life's operations, was of low value and not the type of counter-speech protected by anti-SLAPP legislation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

This is a motion for leave to intervene brought by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) in an appeal concerning the dismissal of an anti-SLAPP motion.

The underlying dispute involves a defamation and harassment action by 40 Days for Life against Brooke Dietrich for online protest activities.

The CCLA sought to intervene to make submissions on the application of protest jurisprudence to online expressive activity and the development of the tort of internet harassment in light of freedom of expression.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted the CCLA leave to intervene, finding that it could make a useful contribution on public policy issues without causing injustice or undue prejudice to the parties, despite the motion being brought at a late stage.

The applicant, who lost a municipal school trustee election by a single vote, sought a recount under s. 58 of the Municipal Elections Act.

The court distinguished between undervotes and overvotes/adjudicated ballots.

While dismissing the request for a recount of the 258 undervotes due to their common nature and lack of specific evidence of error, the court found objective grounds to doubt the result based on a single overvote and an unknown number of adjudicated mail-in ballots.

Consequently, a narrow recount was ordered for the overvote and adjudicated ballots to ensure fairness and avoid disenfranchising voters, given the extremely close margin.

Five members were expelled from a religious congregation, and brought an action seeking a declaration that their expulsion was null and void for violating natural justice.

The appellant church sought summary judgment on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction, as no underlying legal right existed.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, but the Court of Appeal allowed the respondents' appeal, holding that the church's written constitution and bylaws constituted a binding contract.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, restoring the motion judge's order, holding that membership in a voluntary association is not automatically contractual and that objective intention to create legal relations — which was absent on this record — is required before a court has jurisdiction to intervene.

Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc., as Construction Receiver for Urbancorp entities, sought approval of its fees and its counsels' fees totaling over $3.4 million.

Terra Firma Capital Corporation, a junior secured creditor, objected to the fees of the Construction Receiver and its independent counsel (Blakes), seeking a 30% reduction, citing unreasonable hourly rates, disproportionate time spent, and duplication of services.

The court reviewed the fees based on the Belyea factors, emphasizing value provided over time spent.

The court found the receivership complex and the rates reasonable, but identified some duplication due to the excessive number of timekeepers from Blakes.

The court approved most fees but applied a minor reduction of $35,000 to Blakes' fees.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's order enforcing a settlement agreement between the appellant and the Ontario respondents arising from the appellant's suspension from the Knights of Columbus.

The appellant argued that only an agreement in principle existed and that it was not finalized by the April 22, 2016 deadline.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that a binding settlement agreement had been reached, noting that the essential terms had been agreed upon, settlement funds had been provided, and the release form had been executed by some respondents before the appellant attempted to terminate the agreement.