Philip Hugh Horgan

Appeal from summary judgment in a life insurance coverage dispute arising after the insurer denied a beneficiary's claim based on an alleged change in insurability between the insured's application and delivery of the policy.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 180(1)(c) of the Insurance Act creates a condition precedent to contract formation and is not subject to the two-year contestability limitation in s. 184(2).

The court rejected both the argument that s. 180(1)(c) operates only prospectively and the argument that the policy's incontestability clause ousted the statutory requirement.

The appeal was allowed, the summary judgment set aside, and the parties were left to determine how to litigate the insurability issue.

The appellant, a teacher, appealed a penalty decision of the Discipline Committee of the Ontario College of Teachers that revoked her teaching certificate for professional misconduct related to off-duty social media posts.

The appellant argued the penalty ignored her Charter right to freedom of expression.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Discipline Committee committed a fatal error of law by failing to conduct a proper Doré analysis regarding the Charter implications of disciplining the appellant for her speech.

The matter was remitted back for a fresh hearing before a differently constituted panel.

This decision concerns a dispute between Sound Insurance Services Inc. and Chris Hossein, a former insurance producer, and his new employer, Greensides & Breen Insurance Brokers Limited.

The case addresses breach of contract, inducement of breach, breach of confidence, and civil conspiracy arising from the failed transfer of a book of business.

The court found Mr. Hossein liable for breach of contract and breach of confidence, and Greensides liable for inducing the breach.

Damages were assessed at $350,000, plus interest and costs.

The court considered whether an insurer could deny a life insurance claim based on a change in insurability between application and policy delivery, even if the change was unknown to both parties, and whether such a denial could occur beyond the two-year incontestability period in the Insurance Act.

The court held that section 180(1)(c) of the Insurance Act does not permit an insurer to void a policy for an undisclosed change in insurability beyond the two-year period set by section 184(2).

The court granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff, finding the insurance was in effect at the time of death.

The Member, a teacher, faced disciplinary proceedings for making numerous racist, Islamophobic, and transphobic posts on her public Facebook account.

Prior to the hearing, the Member brought motions for a discretionary publication ban and for the recusal of a panel member due to alleged bias, both of which were dismissed.

The Member pled guilty to professional misconduct, admitting her posts violated her professional duties under the Education Act and constituted disgraceful, dishonourable, and unprofessional conduct.

The Discipline Committee found the Member guilty and ordered the immediate revocation of her Certificate of Qualification and Registration, emphasizing the severity of the misconduct, the harm caused to the school community, and the need for specific and general deterrence.

The decision addresses a motion by Greensides & Breen Insurance Brokers Limited to compel Sound Insurance Services Inc. and Chris Hossein to answer certain refused questions and to provide further and better answers to undertakings arising from examinations for discovery.

The court found that Greensides did not require leave to bring the motion, refused to compel answers to the disputed questions, but ordered Sound to provide more detailed responses to five undertakings.

This is an appeal from a motion judge's decision denying an anti-SLAPP motion brought by the appellant, Brooke Dietrich, under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondent, 40 Days for Life, an anti-abortion organization, sued Dietrich for defamation, internet harassment, fraud, breach of contract, inducing breach of contract, and civil conspiracy, following her TikTok videos encouraging disruption of their prayer vigils and online operations.

The motion judge found that 40 Days for Life's claims for defamation, internet harassment, and conspiracy had substantial merit and no valid defence, and that the public interest in continuing the action outweighed the public interest in protecting Dietrich's expression.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no reviewable error in her assessment of the merits of the claims (specifically defamation and conspiracy) or in her public interest balancing.

The Court emphasized that Dietrich's expression, which encouraged disruption and interference with 40 Days for Life's operations, was of low value and not the type of counter-speech protected by anti-SLAPP legislation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Member appeared before the Discipline Committee of the Ontario College of Teachers on allegations of professional misconduct.

The parties submitted an Amended Agreed Statement of Facts and Guilty Plea.

The panel accepted the plea and found that the Member engaged in professional misconduct contrary to subsections 1(15), 1(18), and 1(19) of Ontario Regulation 437/97.

The penalty phase of the hearing was scheduled to continue at a later date.

The appellant engaged in digital protests against the respondent's anti-abortion vigils by posting videos on social media.

The respondent obtained an interim and then an interlocutory injunction restraining the appellant's online activity, despite the appellant having ceased the activity months prior and having filed an anti-SLAPP motion.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the appeal was not stayed by the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court allowed the appeal and quashed the injunctions, finding the motion judge erred by failing to apply the strict test for quia timet injunctions restraining expressive activity and by failing to consider the pending anti-SLAPP motion.

This is a motion for leave to intervene brought by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) in an appeal concerning the dismissal of an anti-SLAPP motion.

The underlying dispute involves a defamation and harassment action by 40 Days for Life against Brooke Dietrich for online protest activities.

The CCLA sought to intervene to make submissions on the application of protest jurisprudence to online expressive activity and the development of the tort of internet harassment in light of freedom of expression.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted the CCLA leave to intervene, finding that it could make a useful contribution on public policy issues without causing injustice or undue prejudice to the parties, despite the motion being brought at a late stage.

The applicant, who lost a municipal school trustee election by a single vote, sought a recount under s. 58 of the Municipal Elections Act.

The court distinguished between undervotes and overvotes/adjudicated ballots.

While dismissing the request for a recount of the 258 undervotes due to their common nature and lack of specific evidence of error, the court found objective grounds to doubt the result based on a single overvote and an unknown number of adjudicated mail-in ballots.

Consequently, a narrow recount was ordered for the overvote and adjudicated ballots to ensure fairness and avoid disenfranchising voters, given the extremely close margin.

The plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs of $51,185.65 after successfully defending against the defendant's anti-SLAPP motion.

The court considered section 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act, which presumes no costs for a responding party unless the motion was frivolous or unmeritorious.

Given the divided success on the underlying motion, the court found the anti-SLAPP motion was not frivolous and declined to depart from the statutory presumption.

The plaintiff's request for costs was dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss an action brought by the plaintiff, an anti-abortion organization.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant led an online campaign of harassment and defamation against it via TikTok videos, encouraging false sign-ups for prayer vigils and shopping cart abandonment.

The court found that while the expression related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff's claims for defamation, internet harassment, and civil conspiracy had substantial merit.

The court concluded that the harm suffered by the plaintiff outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendant's expression, which was aimed at disrupting the plaintiff's activities rather than engaging in public debate.

The motion to dismiss was denied.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the orders of the motions judge granting and extending interim injunctive relief in favour of the plaintiff.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal on the issues of whether the motions judge erred in granting the initial injunction and extending it despite a pending anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

Costs of the leave motion were awarded to the moving party.

Five members were expelled from a religious congregation, and brought an action seeking a declaration that their expulsion was null and void for violating natural justice.

The appellant church sought summary judgment on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction, as no underlying legal right existed.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, but the Court of Appeal allowed the respondents' appeal, holding that the church's written constitution and bylaws constituted a binding contract.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, restoring the motion judge's order, holding that membership in a voluntary association is not automatically contractual and that objective intention to create legal relations — which was absent on this record — is required before a court has jurisdiction to intervene.

Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc., as Construction Receiver for Urbancorp entities, sought approval of its fees and its counsels' fees totaling over $3.4 million.

Terra Firma Capital Corporation, a junior secured creditor, objected to the fees of the Construction Receiver and its independent counsel (Blakes), seeking a 30% reduction, citing unreasonable hourly rates, disproportionate time spent, and duplication of services.

The court reviewed the fees based on the Belyea factors, emphasizing value provided over time spent.

The court found the receivership complex and the rates reasonable, but identified some duplication due to the excessive number of timekeepers from Blakes.

The court approved most fees but applied a minor reduction of $35,000 to Blakes' fees.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's order enforcing a settlement agreement between the appellant and the Ontario respondents arising from the appellant's suspension from the Knights of Columbus.

The appellant argued that only an agreement in principle existed and that it was not finalized by the April 22, 2016 deadline.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that a binding settlement agreement had been reached, noting that the essential terms had been agreed upon, settlement funds had been provided, and the release form had been executed by some respondents before the appellant attempted to terminate the agreement.

The plaintiff sued a fraternal organization and several of its members.

The parties negotiated a settlement, but the plaintiff unilaterally settled with the US defendants and purported to withdraw from the settlement with the Ontario defendants just before a convention, citing delays in receiving signed documents and funds.

The Ontario defendants brought a motion to enforce the settlement under Rule 49.09.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff had not made a deadline an essential term of the agreement and suffered no prejudice, as he had already achieved his primary goal of reinstatement through the US settlement.

The appellants appealed a trial decision finding they breached a home renovation contract with the respondent contractor.

The dispute arose when the appellants refused to pay a full $20,000 progress invoice, citing concerns over incomplete work and the statutory 10% holdback requirement under the Construction Lien Act.

The contractor subsequently stopped work, registered a lien, and terminated the contract.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors in concluding the appellants had run out of money and acted unreasonably.

The Court held that the contractor breached the contract by terminating it precipitously, and ordered a new trial on damages.

Several proposed intervenors brought motions to vary a motions judge's decision denying them intervenor status in a judicial review application.

They argued the motions judge erred by considering the overlap in their proposed submissions and the burden on the court process.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motions, finding the motions judge applied the correct legal principles and made no error in principle or palpable and overriding error of fact in exercising his discretion.