Anna Matas

The defendant brought a motion for an order requiring the plaintiff to provide greater particulars in response to his demand for particulars in a sexual assault claim.

The plaintiff alleged that she was sexually abused by the defendant between 1993 and 1997/8 when both were minors.

The defendant sought specific dates, locations, and details of each incident.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff had provided sufficient particulars in her statement of claim to enable the defendant to understand the case he had to meet, that the defendant had already pleaded a defence, and that further details were appropriately left for examination for discovery.

This is a costs decision following a successful motion for summary judgment by the defendant in a malicious prosecution claim.

The court reviews the parties’ submissions on costs, the applicable legal framework, and the principle of proportionality.

Ultimately, the court fixes costs payable by the plaintiff to the defendant at $75,000 inclusive of HST, considering fairness, the nature of the offer to settle, and the context of the litigation.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing Adam Bullock’s claim for malicious prosecution against Jane Doe, arising from criminal charges of sexual assault that were later withdrawn.

The decision reviews the high threshold for establishing malicious prosecution, especially against private individuals, and finds that Doe’s conduct—while misleading in some respects—did not compromise the independence of the police investigation or the decision to lay charges.

The court concludes that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial on the first element of the test for malicious prosecution, and that the remaining elements would also not support Bullock’s claim.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(a) to strike the plaintiff's defamation claim, arguing that the allegedly defamatory statements were protected by absolute privilege as they were made in preparation for contemplated litigation.

The plaintiff opposed and also had a separate motion for particulars.

The court first addressed the defendants' motion, admitting an affidavit from one of the defendants.

Applying the five factors for absolute privilege in pre-litigation communications, the court found that the communication was protected by absolute privilege, as it was directly concerned with actual or contemplated judicial proceedings and made for the purpose of obtaining evidence from a limited audience.

Consequently, the court granted the defendants' motion, striking the Statement of Claim without leave to amend.

This is an appeal from a motion judge's decision denying an anti-SLAPP motion brought by the appellant, Brooke Dietrich, under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondent, 40 Days for Life, an anti-abortion organization, sued Dietrich for defamation, internet harassment, fraud, breach of contract, inducing breach of contract, and civil conspiracy, following her TikTok videos encouraging disruption of their prayer vigils and online operations.

The motion judge found that 40 Days for Life's claims for defamation, internet harassment, and conspiracy had substantial merit and no valid defence, and that the public interest in continuing the action outweighed the public interest in protecting Dietrich's expression.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no reviewable error in her assessment of the merits of the claims (specifically defamation and conspiracy) or in her public interest balancing.

The Court emphasized that Dietrich's expression, which encouraged disruption and interference with 40 Days for Life's operations, was of low value and not the type of counter-speech protected by anti-SLAPP legislation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiff moved for judgment to enforce Minutes of Settlement purportedly executed following a pre-trial conference regarding a dispute over beneficial ownership of two condominium properties.

The defendants opposed, arguing they did not agree to transfer the property as a trustee to a beneficial owner and felt pressured to sign.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the evidentiary record deficient and conflicting, with three different versions of the Minutes of Settlement presented and no direct evidence from the plaintiff confirming his signature.

A trial was directed to determine whether a binding settlement agreement was actually reached.

The defendants brought a motion to strike a paragraph from the plaintiff's Reply and Defence to Counterclaim under Rule 25.11.

The plaintiff, a dentist, sued her former employer for wrongful dismissal and discrimination, alleging a pattern of discriminatory conduct against female employees.

In her Reply, she alleged a broader pattern of spurious allegations against any employee who left the practice.

The court found the impugned paragraph was a bald statement without supporting facts, overly broad, and amounted to a fishing expedition that would prejudice and delay the fair trial of the action.

The motion was granted and the paragraph was struck without leave to amend.