Kayla Gordon

The applicant, the wife of Carl Joseph Bennett, sought a declaration that Powers of Attorney signed by Carl in September 2023 were invalid due to lack of capacity and undue influence, or alternatively, that the respondent son had breached his fiduciary duties as attorney.

The court found that Carl lacked capacity to execute the POAs and that the respondent had breached multiple fiduciary duties under the Substitute Decisions Act.

The court terminated the POAs and appointed the applicant as Carl's Guardian of Property and Person.

The respondent was ordered to pay costs and provide full accounting of Carl's finances.

The appellant engaged in digital protests against the respondent's anti-abortion vigils by posting videos on social media.

The respondent obtained an interim and then an interlocutory injunction restraining the appellant's online activity, despite the appellant having ceased the activity months prior and having filed an anti-SLAPP motion.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the appeal was not stayed by the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court allowed the appeal and quashed the injunctions, finding the motion judge erred by failing to apply the strict test for quia timet injunctions restraining expressive activity and by failing to consider the pending anti-SLAPP motion.

This appeal concerned parental responsibility and decision-making for twin children, where one child was alienated from the mother and the other from the father.

The appellant mother sought to overturn a lower court order that maintained the de facto living arrangements (daughter with mother, son with father) and to reinstate previous shared parenting orders or gain sole parental responsibility for the son.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's decision that the existing arrangements were in the children's best interests, given the history of failed therapeutic interventions and the lack of a concrete plan for reunification therapy.

The court also confirmed that a material change in circumstances was not required for the motion judge's order, as per a prior consent order.

The plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs of $51,185.65 after successfully defending against the defendant's anti-SLAPP motion.

The court considered section 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act, which presumes no costs for a responding party unless the motion was frivolous or unmeritorious.

Given the divided success on the underlying motion, the court found the anti-SLAPP motion was not frivolous and declined to depart from the statutory presumption.

The plaintiff's request for costs was dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss an action brought by the plaintiff, an anti-abortion organization.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant led an online campaign of harassment and defamation against it via TikTok videos, encouraging false sign-ups for prayer vigils and shopping cart abandonment.

The court found that while the expression related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff's claims for defamation, internet harassment, and civil conspiracy had substantial merit.

The court concluded that the harm suffered by the plaintiff outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendant's expression, which was aimed at disrupting the plaintiff's activities rather than engaging in public debate.

The motion to dismiss was denied.

The moving party brought a motion to set aside the Registrar's dismissal of her appeal for failure to perfect on time.

The delay was primarily caused by the moving party's initial appeal counsel, who failed to address fee waivers and properly serve documents.

The Court of Appeal applied the Paulsson factors and found that it was in the interests of justice to set aside the dismissal, as the moving party should not suffer the consequences of her lawyer's oversight, the appeal materials were essentially ready, and there was no prejudice to the children's best interests.

The motion was granted and the appeal was permitted to proceed.

The applicant brought a motion for interim spousal support following the breakdown of a 20-year marriage.

The parties enjoyed a high standard of living during the marriage, with the respondent earning a significantly higher income than the applicant.

The court found that the applicant was entitled to interim support to maintain a standard of living commensurate with that enjoyed prior to separation.

The respondent was ordered to pay $12,500 per month in interim spousal support, retroactive to January 1, 2019.