Lauren Natalie Bloom

The defendants in a personal injury action brought a motion to bifurcate the issues of liability and damages for a jury trial, relying on the recently amended Rule 6.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that it would cause undue delay and increase costs.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while bifurcation can promote timely justice, the defendants' request was made too late in the litigation process, close to the scheduled trial date.

The court determined that granting the motion would cause significant prejudice to the plaintiffs by effectively adjourning the damages hearing for an estimated two years, outweighing any potential cost savings or efficiencies.

This decision addresses the quantum of costs payable to the plaintiffs following the settlement of a motor vehicle accident action.

The court considered the principles of fair and reasonable costs under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing proportionality and the defendants' failure to engage in mandatory mediation under the Insurance Act.

Despite the plaintiffs abandoning claims for substantial or augmented costs, the court found the partial indemnity costs sought by the plaintiffs to be fair, reasonable, and proportionate, considering the complexity and length of the litigation, and the defendants' conduct in prolonging the process.

The defendants, a licensed service provider and its owner, brought a motion to strike the plaintiff employee's statement of claim.

The plaintiff alleged she was assaulted by a minor resident at the defendants' group home and claimed damages for negligence, breach of contract, and breach of the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The defendants argued they owed no duty of care to the plaintiff because their paramount statutory duty was to the child.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it was not plain and obvious that the employer owed no common law duty of care to provide a safe workplace for its employee, and that such a duty would not necessarily conflict with its statutory duty to the child.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motions to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim.

The plaintiff, a foster parent, alleged the defendants failed to disclose material information about a foster child who subsequently assaulted her.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision that it was not plain and obvious the claims would fail.

The appellants appealed an order refusing to set aside an administrative dismissal of their personal injury action.

The action was dismissed in 2007 due to the inaction of their former counsel, and a motion to set aside the dismissal was not brought until 2013.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the conclusion that the appellants failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice caused by the significant delay, and that actual prejudice to the respondent's ability to defend the action had been established.

A five-year-old child was injured in a single-vehicle accident while a passenger in her father's uninsured vehicle.

The child sought coverage under the uninsured motorist provisions of her mother's automobile insurance policy.

The insurer denied coverage, arguing the father's vehicle was excluded from the definition of 'uninsured automobile' because the father was the spouse of the named insured.

The motion judge found that 'the insured' in the exclusionary clause referred only to the person making the claim, meaning the child was entitled to coverage.

The Court of Appeal upheld this interpretation, finding it consistent with the purpose of the Insurance Act to internalize driving costs and the principle that ambiguities in insurance coverage should be resolved in favour of the insured.

The parties brought a motion under Rule 22.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for determination of a question of law by special case concerning uninsured automobile coverage.

The issue was whether a vehicle owned and driven by a spouse of the named insured, but uninsured at the time of the accident, qualified as an “uninsured automobile” under the standard Ontario automobile policy (O.P.F. 1) and s. 265 of the Insurance Act.

The court considered competing interpretations of the term “the insured” in the statutory exclusion and the definition of “insured” in s. 224 of the Insurance Act.

Applying principles of broad interpretation of coverage and narrow construction of exclusions, and relying on appellate jurisprudence, the court held that the term refers to the claimant rather than the named insured.

Accordingly, the vehicle was an uninsured automobile and coverage under the policy was available.