Michael Stocks

The appellants sought summary judgment to determine whether an insurance policy obtained by the mortgagees covered the mortgagors' interest in the property and whether the insurer could exercise subrogation rights.

The mortgagors had failed to obtain property insurance after their existing policy was cancelled.

The mortgagees obtained a policy in their own names covering only their mortgagee interest.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that the policy was for the sole benefit of the mortgagees and that the mortgagees were entitled to pursue subrogation rights.

The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Standard Charge Term 16 of the mortgage imposed the obligation to insure on the mortgagors and that any insurance obtained by the mortgagees was permissive and for their benefit alone.

The plaintiff mortgagors failed to maintain property insurance as required by their mortgage.

The defendant mortgagees obtained their own insurance policy to protect their interest, with the plaintiffs reimbursing the premiums.

After a fire destroyed the property, the insurer paid the mortgagees the policy limits and claimed a subrogated right to enforce the mortgage against the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that the insurer had no subrogated rights and an order discharging the mortgage to the extent of the insurance payout.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the insurance policy was obtained solely for the benefit of the mortgagees and explicitly provided for subrogation rights against the mortgagors.

A five-year-old child was injured in a single-vehicle accident while a passenger in her father's uninsured vehicle.

The child sought coverage under the uninsured motorist provisions of her mother's automobile insurance policy.

The insurer denied coverage, arguing the father's vehicle was excluded from the definition of 'uninsured automobile' because the father was the spouse of the named insured.

The motion judge found that 'the insured' in the exclusionary clause referred only to the person making the claim, meaning the child was entitled to coverage.

The Court of Appeal upheld this interpretation, finding it consistent with the purpose of the Insurance Act to internalize driving costs and the principle that ambiguities in insurance coverage should be resolved in favour of the insured.

The parties brought a motion under Rule 22.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for determination of a question of law by special case concerning uninsured automobile coverage.

The issue was whether a vehicle owned and driven by a spouse of the named insured, but uninsured at the time of the accident, qualified as an “uninsured automobile” under the standard Ontario automobile policy (O.P.F. 1) and s. 265 of the Insurance Act.

The court considered competing interpretations of the term “the insured” in the statutory exclusion and the definition of “insured” in s. 224 of the Insurance Act.

Applying principles of broad interpretation of coverage and narrow construction of exclusions, and relying on appellate jurisprudence, the court held that the term refers to the claimant rather than the named insured.

Accordingly, the vehicle was an uninsured automobile and coverage under the policy was available.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking removal of defence counsel on the basis that counsel’s spouse had previously conducted a counselling session with the plaintiff.

After learning of the litigation, the spouse transferred the file and destroyed correspondence from the plaintiff.

The court held there was no solicitor‑client relationship between the plaintiff and defence counsel and no evidence that confidential information had been improperly disclosed.

The evidence demonstrated that the spouse acted professionally and there was no breach of professional conduct rules.

Given the strong right of parties to retain counsel of their choice, the motion to remove counsel was dismissed.