Mikel C. Pearce

The applicant unit owner sought an oppression remedy against the respondent condominium corporation due to excessive noise and vibrations emanating from an adjacent garbage room.

The applicant endured the noise for over a decade while the corporation responded in a delayed and piecemeal fashion, eventually halting approved remediation work when the application was commenced.

The court found that while the applicant did not provide expert evidence to prove the corporation's proposed remediation plan was inadequate, the corporation's inexcusable delay and retaliatory stoppage of work unfairly disregarded the applicant's interests.

The court awarded $30,000 in damages for oppression and ordered the corporation to complete the approved remediation work.

The appellants sought summary judgment to determine whether an insurance policy obtained by the mortgagees covered the mortgagors' interest in the property and whether the insurer could exercise subrogation rights.

The mortgagors had failed to obtain property insurance after their existing policy was cancelled.

The mortgagees obtained a policy in their own names covering only their mortgagee interest.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that the policy was for the sole benefit of the mortgagees and that the mortgagees were entitled to pursue subrogation rights.

The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Standard Charge Term 16 of the mortgage imposed the obligation to insure on the mortgagors and that any insurance obtained by the mortgagees was permissive and for their benefit alone.

The defendant brought a motion for the production of a confidential settlement agreement between the plaintiff and a third party.

The plaintiff and the third party opposed the motion, asserting settlement privilege.

The defendant argued that the monetary amount of the settlement must be disclosed to prevent the plaintiff from being overcompensated.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that settlement privilege applies and that it is premature to determine whether the overcompensation exception applies until liability is determined at trial.

The plaintiff mortgagors failed to maintain property insurance as required by their mortgage.

The defendant mortgagees obtained their own insurance policy to protect their interest, with the plaintiffs reimbursing the premiums.

After a fire destroyed the property, the insurer paid the mortgagees the policy limits and claimed a subrogated right to enforce the mortgage against the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that the insurer had no subrogated rights and an order discharging the mortgage to the extent of the insurance payout.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the insurance policy was obtained solely for the benefit of the mortgagees and explicitly provided for subrogation rights against the mortgagors.

The plaintiff commenced an action seeking damages for slander.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the statement of claim under the Protection of Public Participation Act, 2015 (anti-SLAPP legislation).

The parties could not agree on a timetable leading up to the motion, particularly because the defendant failed to attend her scheduled examination for discovery due to medical reasons.

The court fixed a timetable for the delivery of materials, completion of discoveries, cross-examinations, and factums leading up to the scheduled motion date.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to add the officiating referees and their associations as defendants to an action arising from a spectator injury at a high school football game.

The motion was brought more than two years after the incident, raising a limitation period issue.

The plaintiffs argued they only discovered the potential liability of the referees during the examinations for discovery of the existing defendants.

The court granted the motion, finding there was a live issue of fact regarding discoverability and no non-compensable prejudice to the proposed defendants.

The appellant appealed a costs judgment awarding the respondent $298,681.16 in partial indemnity costs following a 16-day trial where the respondent was awarded $218,331.15 in damages.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by awarding an amount virtually the same as substantial indemnity costs and failing to consider proportionality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge carefully explained his reasons, considered the complexities of the case, and had the proportionality principle in mind, demonstrating no error in principle.

The appellant sued its insurance brokers (the respondents) for leaving it underinsured and for negligence in failing to assist with settling its insurance claim.

The respondents claimed indemnification from the third-party insurer.

The motion judge stayed both the main action and the third-party claim because the appellant had signed a release in favour of the insurer.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal lifted the stay for the underinsured claim, finding that the third-party claim for indemnification was incompatible with the main action and could not succeed.

However, the stay remained for the negligence claim regarding the settlement.

The third party insurer sought leave to appeal a motion judge's comments regarding alternative relief under Rules 20 and 21.

The motion judge had granted the insurer's primary request to stay the main action and third party claim, but commented in obiter that he would have dismissed the alternative relief had he not granted the stay.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the motion judge's hypothetical comments did not constitute an appealable interlocutory order.