Marco Paolo Falco

On a motion in a civil sexual-assault appeal, the moving party sought broad privacy protections including full sealing of the appeal file, an in camera hearing, anonymization, and a prospective ban on publication of the court’s future reasons.

Applying the Sherman Estate framework, the motion judge held that the parties’ allegations of sexual assault, sexual-orientation information, and parts of their medical records engaged an important public interest in protecting dignity, but that the requested restrictions were overbroad.

The court ordered a publication ban prohibiting publication of the parties’ names or identifying information, continued the initialized style of cause, and directed a limited sealing order only for specified medical records.

The request to seal the entire file, exclude the public from the appeal hearing, and pre-emptively ban publication of future reasons was refused.

No costs were awarded.

The appellant insurer appealed a decision finding it liable under an insurance policy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge did not err in proceeding on an agreed factual basis, finding no substantial breach of the insured's duty to cooperate, and interpreting the curative provision to permit notice in the next policy period absent prejudice to the insurer.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that dismissed his human rights application under s. 34(11) of the Human Rights Code due to a related civil action for wrongful dismissal.

The Divisional Court found the Tribunal's decision unreasonable because it failed to properly analyze the distinct factual underpinnings and time periods of the two proceedings.

The application for judicial review was granted, and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal for adjudication.

The appellant appealed a trial decision dismissing its breach of contract and construction lien claims and granting the respondent's counterclaim for fraud relating to a real estate development project.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by allowing an amendment to plead fraud without formal leave under the Construction Act, admitting propensity evidence, misapprehending evidence of fraud, and failing to meaningfully analyze the breach of contract claim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge implicitly granted leave for the amendment on consent, properly used past misconduct for credibility assessment rather than propensity, and made factual findings of fraud and fundamental breach that were free from palpable and overriding error.

The appellants, private practice oral surgeons, appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing their application for judicial review of a hospital board's decision to cancel their operating room access and hospital privileges.

The board made the decision without a hearing, relying on s. 44 of the Public Hospitals Act, which allows a hospital to revoke privileges when ceasing to provide a service.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the board's interpretation of s. 44 was reasonable, that the termination of the specific operating room access constituted ceasing a 'service', and that the board was not required to hold a hearing or consider the appellants' affidavits.

After repeated non-compliance with production and undertaking orders, including a peremptory and then last-chance order, pleadings were struck.

The court found no basis to interfere with the motion judge’s discretionary determination and upheld the sanctions.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding a contractual dispute over the volume of soil delivered to a construction project.

The trial judge had largely dismissed the appellant's claim for unpaid invoices, finding that the respondent was only required to pay for the actual volume of soil delivered, not the volume stated on the delivery tickets.

On appeal, the Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's findings on contractual interpretation, the adequacy of reasons, the refusal to draw an adverse inference, and the exclusion of the appellant's non-compliant expert evidence.

However, the court found a palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's calculation of damages regarding soil compaction.

The appeal was allowed in part, and damages were increased from $15,433.45 to $61,198.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal the decision of Kimmel J. dated June 18, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The moving party was successful on a motion to stay the discharge of its construction lien pending appeal and sought costs of $20,000.

The responding party argued costs should be reserved to the appeal panel or fixed at $5,000.

The Divisional Court fixed costs at $9,000 in favour of the moving party, finding its claimed costs disproportionate for a straightforward stay motion.

The payment of costs was stayed pending the determination of the appeal.

The moving party, 2B Developments, sought an order staying the trial judge's final order which dismissed its action, discharged its construction lien, and awarded damages to the respondent.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the Divisional Court found that the appeal raised serious issues to be tried, including procedural fairness and the trial judge's finding of fraud.

The court held that 2B would suffer irreparable harm if the stay were refused because the discharge of a construction lien is irrevocable, resulting in the permanent loss of a statutory right.

Finding the balance of convenience favoured 2B, the court granted the motion to stay the discharge of the lien pending appeal.

CentriLogic appealed a trial order requiring it to pay Infor Financial Inc. damages for a financing fee and trial costs.

The appeal centered on the interpretation of an engagement agreement, specifically whether Infor was entitled to the financing fee and if CentriLogic breached a confidentiality clause by sharing Infor's proprietary materials.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that CentriLogic breached the agreement and that Infor was entitled to the financing fee based on a commercially reasonable interpretation of the contract.

The court also affirmed the substantial costs award, finding no error in principle.

The plaintiff sought costs after successfully resisting an anti-SLAPP motion brought by two defendants and partially succeeding on a motion to strike pleadings.

The court, interpreting section 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act, ruled that a responding party who successfully resists an anti-SLAPP motion is generally not entitled to costs unless exceptional circumstances warrant it.

Despite the plaintiff incurring significant legal expenses and the judge's view that the motion was "on the wrong side of the boundary" of abusive use, the court found no basis to deviate from the statutory rule, compelling it to deny costs.

However, a separate settlement for $4,000 was reached with another defendant (CUHMA) for their appearance.

The defendants Kenneth LeDez and Ron Linden brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP), or alternatively, to strike certain pleadings under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The plaintiff, a hyperbaric medicine specialist, sued after LeDez accused her of unethical conduct and orchestrated her removal from a professional association, stemming from her "off-label" use of hyperbaric procedures.

The court dismissed the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that the plaintiff's defamation claim had substantial merit and the defendants lacked a valid defense, and that the public interest in allowing the suit to continue outweighed protecting the defendants' expressions, which were found to exceed privileged occasions and potentially be malicious.

The alternative motion to strike pleadings was granted in part, striking claims for unlawful interference with economic relations, conspiracy, bad faith, and breach of fiduciary duty, but allowing the corporate oppression remedy claim to stand as it was based on specific corporate acts rather than expressions.

This appeal addressed the Ontario court's jurisdiction over an action that overlapped with earlier proceedings in Nova Scotia involving the same parties.

The appellant sought to stay the Ontario action, arguing lack of jurisdiction simpliciter and that Nova Scotia was the more convenient forum.

The Court of Appeal, conducting a fresh analysis due to incomplete lower court reasons, affirmed Ontario's jurisdiction simpliciter but found Nova Scotia to be clearly the more appropriate forum.

This decision was based on the significant overlap of issues and the high risk of inconsistent findings between the two actions.

The Ontario action was stayed on an interim basis.

The applicant pharmacy sought judicial review of a decision by the Executive Officer of the Ontario Public Drugs Programs to revoke its billing privileges following an inspection that revealed over $250,000 in unsubstantiated and non-compliant claims.

The applicant argued the decision was unreasonable because the new owner was not responsible for the prior owner's misconduct.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Executive Officer reasonably concluded that the new owner was responsible for the pharmacy's compliance and that problematic billing practices continued under his management.

The court issued a costs endorsement following motions for a stay of proceedings, a certificate of pending litigation (CPL), and the appointment of an arbitrator.

The defendants had sought a stay, which was granted permanently for one defendant and temporarily for the other, while the plaintiff successfully obtained a CPL.

Finding divided success on the stay motion, the court ordered each party to bear its own costs for that motion.

However, as the plaintiff was successful on the CPL motion, the court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs fixed at $35,000 all-inclusive.

The appellants, a group of subcontractors and a bank, appealed an application judge's decision that rescission of surety bonds might be possible even if it affects innocent third parties.

The bonds were issued by Zurich Insurance Company Ltd. for a large construction project, but Zurich later discovered alleged fraudulent misrepresentations and collusion that induced it to issue the bonds.

The appellants sought a declaration that rescission was unavailable as a matter of law due to the involvement of innocent third parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that prejudice to third parties is not an absolute bar to rescission, especially in cases of fraudulent misrepresentation, and that such a determination requires a full factual record at trial.

Dr. Thirlwell, a psychiatrist, sought a stay of a Divisional Court order that upheld an interim order by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO).

The ICRC's interim order imposed terms on Thirlwell's registration, including a prohibition on issuing vaccine exemptions and a requirement to consent to OHIP inquiries, due to concerns about her providing improper medical exemption letters for cash.

The Divisional Court dismissed Thirlwell's judicial review application, finding the OHIP term reasonable for patient protection.

Thirlwell moved for a stay of the Divisional Court order pending her motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal denied the stay, finding no serious question to be tried and that the public interest in patient safety and confidence in the College's disciplinary system outweighed Thirlwell's personal interests.

The defendant brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Myers J. The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the moving party.

The defendant brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Myers J. The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the moving party.