Marco Paolo Falco

After repeated non-compliance with production and undertaking orders, including a peremptory and then last-chance order, pleadings were struck.

The court found no basis to interfere with the motion judge’s discretionary determination and upheld the sanctions.

CentriLogic appealed a trial order requiring it to pay Infor Financial Inc. damages for a financing fee and trial costs.

The appeal centered on the interpretation of an engagement agreement, specifically whether Infor was entitled to the financing fee and if CentriLogic breached a confidentiality clause by sharing Infor's proprietary materials.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that CentriLogic breached the agreement and that Infor was entitled to the financing fee based on a commercially reasonable interpretation of the contract.

The court also affirmed the substantial costs award, finding no error in principle.

The plaintiff sought costs after successfully resisting an anti-SLAPP motion brought by two defendants and partially succeeding on a motion to strike pleadings.

The court, interpreting section 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act, ruled that a responding party who successfully resists an anti-SLAPP motion is generally not entitled to costs unless exceptional circumstances warrant it.

Despite the plaintiff incurring significant legal expenses and the judge's view that the motion was "on the wrong side of the boundary" of abusive use, the court found no basis to deviate from the statutory rule, compelling it to deny costs.

However, a separate settlement for $4,000 was reached with another defendant (CUHMA) for their appearance.

The defendants Kenneth LeDez and Ron Linden brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP), or alternatively, to strike certain pleadings under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The plaintiff, a hyperbaric medicine specialist, sued after LeDez accused her of unethical conduct and orchestrated her removal from a professional association, stemming from her "off-label" use of hyperbaric procedures.

The court dismissed the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that the plaintiff's defamation claim had substantial merit and the defendants lacked a valid defense, and that the public interest in allowing the suit to continue outweighed protecting the defendants' expressions, which were found to exceed privileged occasions and potentially be malicious.

The alternative motion to strike pleadings was granted in part, striking claims for unlawful interference with economic relations, conspiracy, bad faith, and breach of fiduciary duty, but allowing the corporate oppression remedy claim to stand as it was based on specific corporate acts rather than expressions.

This appeal addressed the Ontario court's jurisdiction over an action that overlapped with earlier proceedings in Nova Scotia involving the same parties.

The appellant sought to stay the Ontario action, arguing lack of jurisdiction simpliciter and that Nova Scotia was the more convenient forum.

The Court of Appeal, conducting a fresh analysis due to incomplete lower court reasons, affirmed Ontario's jurisdiction simpliciter but found Nova Scotia to be clearly the more appropriate forum.

This decision was based on the significant overlap of issues and the high risk of inconsistent findings between the two actions.

The Ontario action was stayed on an interim basis.

The appellants, a group of subcontractors and a bank, appealed an application judge's decision that rescission of surety bonds might be possible even if it affects innocent third parties.

The bonds were issued by Zurich Insurance Company Ltd. for a large construction project, but Zurich later discovered alleged fraudulent misrepresentations and collusion that induced it to issue the bonds.

The appellants sought a declaration that rescission was unavailable as a matter of law due to the involvement of innocent third parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that prejudice to third parties is not an absolute bar to rescission, especially in cases of fraudulent misrepresentation, and that such a determination requires a full factual record at trial.

Dr. Thirlwell, a psychiatrist, sought a stay of a Divisional Court order that upheld an interim order by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO).

The ICRC's interim order imposed terms on Thirlwell's registration, including a prohibition on issuing vaccine exemptions and a requirement to consent to OHIP inquiries, due to concerns about her providing improper medical exemption letters for cash.

The Divisional Court dismissed Thirlwell's judicial review application, finding the OHIP term reasonable for patient protection.

Thirlwell moved for a stay of the Divisional Court order pending her motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal denied the stay, finding no serious question to be tried and that the public interest in patient safety and confidence in the College's disciplinary system outweighed Thirlwell's personal interests.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal from the Divisional Court, which had found the Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal's decision unreasonable.

The case concerned the interpretation of the Pay Equity Act, specifically whether the statutory proxy method, used to establish pay equity in female-dominated workplaces, must also be used to maintain it.

The Tribunal had ruled that the proxy method was not required for maintenance, leading to an internal comparison method.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that the Tribunal's interpretation was unreasonable, as it ignored the Act's purpose, scheme, and wording, which necessitate an ongoing comparison to male (or deemed male) comparators to redress systemic gender discrimination.

The matter was remitted to the Tribunal to specify procedures for maintaining pay equity using the proxy method.

The Participating Nursing Homes (PNH) appealed a Divisional Court decision that upheld a Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal order.

The Tribunal had directed the PNH and unions to negotiate a gender-neutral comparison system (GNCS) for maintaining pay equity, specifically to address changes in job duties and ensure ongoing compliance with the Pay Equity Act.

The PNH argued that the Act did not require them to tie their maintenance obligation to the proxy employer's historical valuation of male jobs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the Tribunal's authority to ensure compliance with the Act and the necessity of ongoing comparison, including through the proxy method, to maintain pay equity.

The appellants, defendants in a mortgage guarantee action, commenced third party claims against their former lawyer for contribution and indemnity, alleging he failed to obtain releases of their personal guarantees as instructed.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claims as statute-barred under section 18 of the Limitations Act, 2002, finding an absolute two-year limitation period.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that section 18 does not establish an absolute limitation period but rather works with sections 4 and 5 of the Limitations Act to create a presumed start date subject to discoverability principles.

The court also found the motion judge erred in principle by not fully appreciating the complexity of the discoverability issue when deciding to proceed by summary judgment.

Appeal from a Superior Court judgment dismissing an appeal of an arbitrator's preliminary award.

The franchisor appealed the arbitrator's determination that the limitation period for arbitration had not expired.

The dispute arose from a franchisee's notice of rescission of a franchise agreement based on alleged non-disclosure by the franchisor.

The central issue was whether a mediation requirement in the franchise agreement constituted a precondition to arbitration that suspended the running of the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The arbitrator severed the requirement that mediation occur in Delaware, finding it contrary to the Arthur Wishart Act, and determined that the limitation period commenced only after mediation was deemed completed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the arbitrator's decision, applying a reasonableness standard of review.

This is a costs judgment following a successful appeal by the respondent.

The respondent sought partial indemnity costs of $28,029.42, while the applicants argued for no costs or a limit of $12,000.

The court awarded the respondent the full amount requested, considering factors under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The decision emphasized the respondent's success, the significant importance and complexity of the legal issues, and the reasonableness of counsel's hourly rates and time expended.