Mark William Barrett

The appellant insurer appealed a decision finding it liable under an insurance policy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge did not err in proceeding on an agreed factual basis, finding no substantial breach of the insured's duty to cooperate, and interpreting the curative provision to permit notice in the next policy period absent prejudice to the insurer.

The applicant, a land surveying company, sought indemnification from the respondent insurance company under a professional liability insurance policy for a settlement payment of $3,200,000.00 relating to the Halton Claim.

The respondent had already paid $5,000,000.00 under the policy for an unrelated Port Lands Claim.

The court determined that the Halton Claim fell within the policy's coverage, that it was covered under the first policy period based on when the applicant first received notice of the claim, and that the applicant did not breach its duty to cooperate with the insurer.

The court ordered full indemnification of the settlement amount plus costs.

Great American Insurance Company appealed a judgment finding it had a duty to defend the City of Thunder Bay against claims related to property damage from sodium hydroxide in the water supply.

Great American argued a lead exclusion in its policy precluded coverage.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that a section of the lead exclusion was ambiguous, thus triggering the duty to defend based on the "mere possibility" of coverage, as per *Progressive Homes Ltd. v. Lombard General Insurance Co. of Canada*.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company sought a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Dave Watson in three negligence actions arising from a boating accident.

Watson, the insured, conceded no duty to indemnify but argued Wawanesa had a duty to defend and had waived its right to refuse defence.

The court found that Wawanesa had a duty to defend based on the "pleadings rule" and the doctrine of waiver, but no duty to indemnify.

Wawanesa was ordered to resume providing a defence.

This decision addresses two consolidated applications seeking a declaration that Great American Insurance Company (GAIC) has a duty to defend the City of Thunder Bay in multiple actions concerning "pinhole leaks" in water pipes.

GAIC denied coverage, relying on a lead exclusion clause.

The court found the lead exclusion ambiguous and, applying the "mere possibility" test, determined that GAIC failed to prove the exclusion clearly and unambiguously applied to the claims, which primarily alleged negligence related to the introduction of sodium hydroxide, not lead.

The court declared GAIC obliged to defend the City.

The plaintiff initiated an action against "Can-Sure Underwriting" a managing general agent, for an insurance coverage dispute, mistakenly believing it to be the insurer.

The plaintiff brought a motion to correct this misnomer by adding the actual subscribing insurers as defendants.

Concurrently, the defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was time-barred by a one-year contractual limitation period and that it was not the proper defendant.

The court dismissed the defendant's summary judgment motion, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding promissory estoppel, as the defendant's agent had previously advised the plaintiff of a two-year limitation period, leading to reliance.

The court granted the plaintiff's misnomer motion, concluding that the intended defendants (subscribing insurers) had actual knowledge of the claim from its inception and suffered no prejudice from the delay in formal naming, especially given the contradictory information provided by the defendant.

The plaintiff, owner of a longstanding craft beer competition, brought a motion for an interim injunction to prevent the defendants from holding a competing national craft beer competition.

The plaintiff alleged that a former employee, now working for the defendant association, misused confidential financial and business information obtained during his employment and during subsequent failed negotiations to purchase the plaintiff's competition.

The court applied the RJR MacDonald test and found a serious issue to be tried, presumed irreparable harm due to the nature of the confidential business information, and determined the balance of convenience favoured the plaintiff.

A time-limited injunction was granted until September 1, 2022.

The applicant pool manufacturer sought a declaration that the respondent dealer was required to defend it against third party claims pursuant to a hold harmless and indemnity provision in their dealership agreement.

The third party claims sought contribution and indemnity from the applicant for its own alleged negligence in overseeing a pool installation.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the indemnity provision only applied to claims arising out of the respondent's negligence, and did not require the respondent to defend the applicant against allegations of the applicant's own negligence under the Negligence Act.

The moving defendants sought summary judgment dismissing negligence and occupiers’ liability claims arising from an alleged assault between two individuals in a church basement.

The plaintiff alleged church representatives knew of prior threats relating to a private mortgage dispute and failed to warn or protect her, giving rise to vicarious liability and breach of the Occupiers’ Liability Act.

The court held that credibility disputes concerning alleged prior threats and communications with church representatives required viva voce evidence and could not be resolved on a summary judgment record.

However, the plaintiff adduced no evidence linking the national church corporation to the events or establishing vicarious liability against it.

Summary judgment was therefore granted dismissing the claim against that corporation but refused as against the local church.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against his insurance company and broker following a house fire.

The trial judge found that the appellant had a financial motive to set the fires, misrepresented his insurance history to the broker, and had the best opportunity to commit the arson.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's assessment of credibility, motive, opportunity, or the overwhelming evidence of arson.