Adrianna Monique Pilkington

The appellant town appealed a decision dismissing its application for a declaration that its large-scale commercial aggregate extraction operation on property located in the respondent township was a permitted use under the township's zoning by-law or alternatively constituted a legal non-conforming use under the Planning Act.

The application judge found that the extraction operation was not permitted under the zoning by-law and did not qualify as a legal non-conforming use because the historical use of the property was as a municipal park with only incidental and ancillary extraction for municipal purposes.

The court found that the expansion from incidental extraction to large-scale commercial extraction constituted a change in the type of use rather than a mere intensification.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The Town of Caledon and Waterstone Properties Corporation (and Wyndcliffe Developments Inc.) brought cross-applications concerning the beneficial ownership of a 2.8-acre parkette.

Waterstone claimed beneficial ownership based on a 1972 subdivision agreement with a re-conveyance clause, arguing its inclusion in a subsequent 1973 agreement was a mistake.

The Town asserted ownership based on the unconditional transfer provision in the 1973 agreement, and alternatively, through adverse possession or dedication and acceptance.

The court found the 1973 agreement superseded the 1972 agreement, that the inclusion of the parkette in the 1973 agreement was not a mistake, and that the Town was the beneficial owner.

The court also found that the Town would have succeeded on adverse possession and dedication and acceptance.

Waterstone's application was dismissed, and the Town's application was granted.

A spouse without legal title sought an interlocutory injunction restraining mortgagees from exercising power of sale over Muskoka properties alleged to constitute a matrimonial home.

The mortgagees relied on a statutory declaration by the titled spouse asserting that another property had been designated as the matrimonial home under s. 21(3)(d) of the Family Law Act.

The court found strong evidence capable of belief that the lender had actual or constructive notice that the property was used as a family cottage and therefore a matrimonial home.

The presumption in s. 21(3)(d) could not protect a lender who knew facts inconsistent with the declaration.

Applying the three-part injunctive test, the court found a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm to the spouse, and a balance of convenience favouring preservation of the property pending trial.