Court File and Parties

CITATION: Gould v. Ontario College of Teachers, 2026 ONSC 1095

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 438/24

DATE: 20260226

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

DIVISIONAL COURT

D.L. Corbett, Sproat and Lococo JJ.

B E T W E E N:

CHERYL CATHARINE GOULD

Appellant

• and -

ONTARIO COLLEGE OF TEACHERS

Respondent

Counsel:

Philip H. Horgan and Raphael T.R. Fernandes, for the Appellant

Christine Lonsdale, Danielle Miller and Mathew Zaia for the Respondent

Heard: October 6, 2025

REASONS FOR DECISION

D.L. CORBETT J.

[1] The Appellant appeals from the penalty decision of the Discipline Committee of the Ontario College of Teachers dated June 19, 2024, including the Committee’s preliminary decision declining a request that one of its members recuse themselves from the proceedings.

[2] In the impugned decision, the Committee found Ms Gould guilty of three counts of professional misconduct and ordered the revocation of Ms Gould’s teaching certificate.

[3] The Appellant argues that the revocation penalty cannot stand because it is unprecedented, clearly unfit, ignores the Appellant’s Charter rights to free expression, is based on a misapprehension of the evidence, and was delivered by a tribunal tainted by a reasonable apprehension of bias.

[4] I would give effect to one of Ms Gould’s arguments. The Discipline Committee did not engage in a Doré analysis[^1] either in respect to liability or penalty. Such an analysis was required in the circumstances of this case. This failure is an error of law fatal to the decision.

[5] I would not engage in a detailed review of the other grounds raised by Ms Gould, since I would remit this case back for a fresh hearing and would not want to be taken to weigh in on how the fresh hearing ought to be decided. I would, however, note my disagreement with Ms Gould’s argument about the fitness of the penalty: depending on findings that are made at the fresh hearing, based on the record and a proper Doré analysis, revocation could be an available penalty in this case. Whether it is available, and whether it should be imposed, is a matter for the Discipline Committee to decide at the fresh hearing.

Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

[6] An appeal lies to this court from the impugned decision pursuant to s. 35(1) of the Ontario College of Teachers Act, SO 1996, c. 12. An “appellate standard of review” applies to the appeal: correctness on questions of law, palpable and overriding error on questions of fact and questions of mixed fact and law (absent an “extricable error of law” which is reviewable on a correctness standard): Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65; Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33.

[7] With respect to appeals from a sanction imposed by a regulated professions tribunal, the court will interfere only if the penalty reflects an error in law, an error in principle, or if the penalty is “clearly unfit”: Cabot v. College of Nurses of Ontario, 2023 ONSC 2977(Div. Ct.), at para. 23, citing Budarick v. Brudenell, Lyndoch and Raglan (Townships) (Integrity Commissioner), 2022 ONSC 640, 25 MPLR (6th) 277 (Div. Ct.), at para. 40.

Background

[8] The Appellant was a teacher employed by the Toronto Catholic District School Board (the “Board”) as a Visual Arts and English teacher at the Midland campus of Monsignor Fraser Alternative Learning Centre in Scarborough, Ontario (the “School”).

[9] In 2020 and 2021, the Appellant had a Facebook page under the pseudonym “Harvey C. Catherine”. She made various posts on this page (the “Facebook Posts”). Others visiting the Facebook Page posted their own comments (the “Posted Comments”).

[10] On April 9, 2021, the Appellant attended a union meeting of School staff. During the course of the meeting, the Appellant expressed various views, including voicing objection to a book entitled So You Want To Talk About Race?[^2] which had been given to staff by the Board.

[11] Some of the Appellant’s colleagues took strong objection to things the Appellant said at the meeting and reported her comments to school authorities. Some colleagues knew of the Appellant’s Facebook page and reported concerns about it to school authorities as well.

[12] The Board conducted an investigation, following which it terminated the Appellant’s employment for cause.[^3] The Board reported the termination and forwarded its file to the College.

[13] On July 12, 2022, the Investigation Committee of the College directed that the complaint against the Appellant be referred to the College’s Discipline Committee.

[14] On November 8, 2022, the Registrar of the College issued a Notice of Hearing alleging that the Appellant was guilty of professional misconduct by reason of the Facebook Posts.

[15] On March 24, 2024, the Appellant and the College entered into an Agreed Statement of Facts and Guilty Plea. In this agreed statement and plea, one of the charges (pursuant to s. 1(14) of O. Reg. 437/97 (the “Regulation”)) was withdrawn: the plea of guilty was in respect to charges under ss. 1(15), (18) and (19) of the Regulation.

[16] Following the hearing on the merits of the allegations (conducted March 5-6 and April 22, 2024), the Discipline Committee found the Appellant guilty of professional misconduct under ss. 1(15), (18) and (19) of the Regulation, but not under s. 1(14).

[17] The penalty hearing was held on April 22, May 13 and June 19, 2024. At the conclusion of the hearing on June 19th, in an oral decision, the Committee directed that the Appellant’s teaching certificate be revoked, with its reasons for decision to follow in writing. The written reasons were released on March 25, 2025, and provided reasons for the Committee’s findings on both liability and penalty (the “Impugned Decision”).

Agreed Facts and the Substance of the Decisions

(a) Agreed Facts

[18] In the Agreed Statement of Facts, the parties agreed as follows (among other things).

The School

[19] The parties agreed to the following facts in respect to the School (Agreed Statement of Facts, paras. 3-9):

The School provides an alternative educational program for students between the ages of 16 and 20, as well as continuing education for students aged 21 and over. It is designed to offer an alternative for vulnerable, high needs students who have difficulty functioning in and meeting the expectations of a traditional high school environment.

During the relevant time period, 87% of the student population, at the School campus where the [Appellant] taught, were of visible minority, with the highest proportion being Black students. A large number of students were new immigrants to Canada, with many having experienced trauma because of their race, religion and/or sexual orientation.

The School also had students who identified as transgender, with two to three students being in the process of transitioning each year.

Although the School is part of the Catholic school board, it is not a requirement that students are Catholic. In fact, a significant percentage of the students were Muslim, some having attended the School directly from private Islamic school. There were students who wore hijabs.

Most of the School’s students were vulnerable, at-risk students from marginalized communities. Some were living in shelters, others were involved in gangs and/or experienced violence in their country of origin or in family settings, and many experienced mental health challenges.

Unlike students attending mainstream schools, many of them lacked parental support or involvement in their schooling as a result of their unique circumstances. This included students who were in foster care, experiencing significant poverty, had non-English-speaking parents, had parents working multiple jobs including night shifts.

For many of the School’s students, they had fallen through the cracks in the educational system, in the child welfare system, and/or in the immigration system. It was hoped that the School staff would provide an environment that would help restore their trust in the educational system, support and advocate for them. In at least one instance, the [Appellant] had been acknowledged for her support of a struggling student who was a member of a marginalized group.

Mission, Objectives and Values

[20] The parties agreed to the following facts in respect to the mission, objectives and values of the School and the Board (Agreed Statement of Facts, paras. 10-12):

A key priority for the [Board], at the relevant time, was to foster a learning environment that was equitable, inclusive and respectful of all members of the school community. Moreover, the Board’s policies explicitly recognized that discrimination, on any recognized ground, was incompatible with Catholic moral principles. In a school like [the School] … these principles were especially important given the diversity of its student population….

A copy of the School’s Catholic Equity and Inclusive Education Policy and the School’s Mission Statement were referenced and attached to the Agreed Statement of Facts.

The Appellant’s Facebook Account

[21] The parties agreed to the following facts in respect to the Facebook Posts (Agreed Statement of Facts, paras 13-18[^4]):

Throughout 2020 and 2021, the [Appellant] maintained a personal Facebook account under the name “Harvey C Catherine”. The [Appellant] did not use her married name (Cheryl C. Harvey) in any context, at work or otherwise. [Facebook Posts between February 25, 2020 and April 19, 2021 were referenced and attached to the Agreed statement of Facts as Exhibit “D”]

The [Appellant] identified herself on her Facebook account and in her posts, as a teacher working in the publicly funded Catholic system; as an English, art and media teacher; as a teacher of at-risk youth. The [Appellant] did not identify the specific school, nor the School Board, where she taught. Over the thousands of pages of posts made by the [Appellant], she only occasionally referred to her status as a teacher.

On August 27, 2020, the [Appellant] posted a new home page biography on her “Harvey C Catherine” Facebook account, which had a photograph of herself and the caption “hateful, pathetic, xenophobic, transphobic, far-right, racist that better people feel sorry for”.

The [Appellant’s] posted biography, as with many other posts on this account, was intended by her to be ironic, satirical, and self-deprecating in nature.

The [Appellant] occasionally posted photographs of herself on her Harvey C. Catherine Facebook account. For example, on March 26, 2021, the [Appellant] updated her profile page by adding a new photograph of herself.

The content of the [Appellant’s] account was visible to her Facebook “friends” (i.e. individuals to whom she had granted access), who numbered approximately 2300 at the time. However, the [Appellant] also changed her settings on occasion to allow public access to her posts, including when asked by her followers to do so….

The Facebook Posts

[22] As noted above, the Facebook Posts were referenced and attached to the Agreed Statement of Facts as Exhibit “D” and some of those posts were highlighted in the Agreed Statement of Facts (paras. 19-46).

The Guilty Plea

[23] The Appellant acknowledged as follows in the Agreed Statement of Facts (at para. 87):

The [Appellant] hereby acknowledges that the Admitted Facts constitute conduct which is professional misconduct and pleads guilty to the allegations of misconduct against her, being more particularly breaches of [Regulation ss. 1(15), 1(18) and 1(19)].

[24] Section 30(2) of the College of Teachers Act provides:

A member may be found guilty of professional misconduct by the Discipline Committee, after a hearing, if the member has been guilty, in the opinion of the Committee, of professional misconduct.

[25] The provisions under which the Appellant pleaded guilty to professional misconduct are set out in s. 1 of the Regulation:

The following acts are defined as professional misconduct for the purposes of subsection 30(2) of the Act:

15. Failing to comply with the Education Act or the regulations made under that Act, if the member is subject to that Act.

16. An act or omission that, having regard to all the circumstances, would reasonably be regarded by members as disgraceful, dishonourable or unprofessional.

17. Conduct unbecoming a member.

[26] By her guilty plea, the Appellant admitted to breaching the Education Act and/or the Regulation, conduct unbecoming a member of the College of Teachers, and [an] act[s] or omission[s] that would reasonably be regarded by members of the College as “disgraceful, dishonourable or unprofessional”. The Appellant did not admit that her conduct was – specifically – “disgraceful” or “dishonourable” or “unprofessional” and thus it was for the Discipline Committee to make findings, based on the admitted facts and the record, as to which description(s) properly characterized the Appellant’s misconduct.

The Decision of the Discipline Committee

(a) Findings of Professional Misconduct

[27] In light of the Agreed Statement of Facts and Guilty Plea, the Discipline Committee found the Appellant guilty of professional misconduct at the conclusion of the merits hearing and gave brief oral reasons. In its written reasons included in the Impugned Decision, the Discipline Committee found as follows (Decision, para. 26):

[The Appellant] acknowledged, and the Panel finds, that the Admitted Facts constitute professional misconduct under the heads of misconduct set out above. In the [Agreed Statement of Facts and Guilty Plea, the admitted facts demonstrate that the [Appellant] made numerous comments on her social media accounts that were inappropriate, unprofessional, disrespectful, and offensive and provided a forum for others to agree or post their own opinions.

[28] In respect to the finding of professional misconduct under s. 1(15) of the Regulation, the Committee found as follows (Decision, para. 27, 30-33):

The Panel finds that the [Appellant] failed to comply with subsection 264(1) of the Education Act, contrary to subsection 1(15) of the [Regulation]. Subsection 264(1)(c) states that teachers have a duty “to inculcate by precept and example respect for religion… and the highest regard for justice, … humanity, benevolence, … temperance and all other virtues” [emphasis in original]. Section 264(1) is commonly understood to mean that teachers must conduct themselves as positive role models for students. This duty extends to the [Appellant’s] conduct outside of school.

The Panel finds that the [Appellant] failed to uphold her obligations under section 264(1)(c) when she posted offensive images and comments on social media and also allowed others to make hateful comments in response. The [Appellant] failed to act as a good role model. The [Appellant’s] numerous comments and upwards of 2000 posts were discriminatory, rude, racist, and offensive. Some examples of this include her calling someone, “inbred Ahmed”; and referring to Islam as an “enemy ideology”; a “sick death cult” and a “shamefully backward religion.”

Additionally, the [Appellant’s] admitted misconduct did not comply with subsection 264(1)(d) of the Education Act, which requires teachers to assist in developing co-operation and co-ordination of effort among the members of the staff of the school. Both the Board and the School had public statements outlining their commitment to embracing diversity…. The [Appellant’s] posts and comments on social media expressed views that are opposed to these efforts and can be seen as undermining the School’s efforts to meet these objectives.

The Panel finds that there was ample evidence that the [Appellant’s] conduct had a detrimental impact on her relationships with her colleagues and on the school community…. Her colleagues who viewed the [Appellant’s] posts, saw them as anti-Islamic, racist, and transphobic. They were sickened by the scope and focus of her posts, and by the imagery and language used by the [Appellant]…. [H]er colleagues indicated they would have difficulty working with her going forward and were concerned that she presented a danger to the School’s student population, whose race, religion and/or sexual identity were targeted in the [Appellant’s] posts….

… As set out in the [Agreed Statement of Facts] and Guilty Plea, it is clear that the [Appellant’s] conduct had an adverse impact on her relationship with many of her colleagues and the school community.

[29] In respect to the finding of professional misconduct under s. 1(18) of the Regulation, the Committee found as follows (Decision, paras. 34, 35):

The terms “disgraceful, dishonourable and unprofessional” [in s. 1(18) of the Regulation] are not legislatively defined, but are understood to be disjunctive and in a decreasing level of seriousness. Disgraceful conduct is characterized as reprehensible and the most egregious. It is conduct that costs serious doubt on a member’s moral fitness and ability to uphold their duties and responsibilities as a member of the profession. Dishonourable conduct also implies an element of a moral failing but is less serious than disgraceful conduct. Conduct characterized as unprofessional does not indicate a moral failing, but rather, involves acts that display poor professional judgment. The Panel finds that the [Appellant’s] conduct meets all three terms.

The [Appellant] showed a lack of moral and professional judgment when she disseminated disrespectful and offensive comments through her social media posts…. [T]he [Appellant] clearly ignored not only the requirements imposed on teachers by statute but also the expectations regarding teachers’ use of social media that are set out by their regulatory body, the College of Teachers….

… [T]he [Appellant] facilitated the widespread promulgation of offensive content by other social media users by failing to moderate the discussions on her posts. While she may have removed some posts, she did not remove all posts…. [T]he [Appellant] also admits to having removed content that she did not want in her online space, such as anti-Semitic or misogynist content, the Panel finds this selective screening is indicative of an intentionality in the [Appellant’s] actions that puts the [Appellant’s] misconduct on the highest level of seriousness, such that the Appellant’s] conduct can be properly characterized by all three terms.

[30] In respect to the finding of professional misconduct under s. 1(18) of the Regulation, the Committee found as follows (Decision, para. 38):

The panel finds that the [Appellant] engaged in conduct unbecoming a member, contrary to… [s. 1(19) of the Regulation] … [which] includes “off duty” conduct that undermines the reputation of the teaching profession. The [Appellant’s] misconduct in expressing her personal views in a disrespectful and offensive manner on her personal social media accounts, while openly stating that she is a teacher in the Ontario system, not only affected her work colleagues, but also undermined the public’s confidence and trust in the profession as a whole.

[31] One aspect of the Discipline Committee’s liability decision required an analysis provided for in Doré v. Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12, [2023] 1 SCR 395. Ms Gould pleaded guilty to misconduct under s. 1(18) of the Regulation, that is, an act or omission that is “disgraceful, dishonourable or unprofessional” (emphasis added). The Committee found that Ms Gould committed acts and omissions that were “disgraceful, dishonourable and unprofessional” (emphasis added). This was an available finding, on the record, and was not foreclosed by the terms of the Agreed Statement of Fact and Guilty Plea, but Ms Gould cannot be taken to have agreed that her conduct constituted misconduct described by all three terms in s. 1(18). On the record, and on the basis of arguments made by Ms Gould to the Discipline Committee, she regarded her misconduct as no more serious than “unprofessional”. In making findings in respect to this contested issue of liability, the Discipline Committee was obliged to conduct a Doré analysis.

[32] The Discipline Committee’s reasons in respect to this issue are brief and insufficient in the circumstances of this case:

The Panel notes that by signing the [Agreed Statement of Facts] and Guilty Plea…, the Member has already admitted that her postings amounted to professional misconduct. However, through her counsel, during the hearing she appeared to resile from this agreement and instead advanced her alternate position[,] namely, that her posts promoted truth and freedom and that some of them were intended to be ironic and satirical. In several of her posts, the Member referred to her right to exercise her right to freedom of speech. The Panel considers the recent Divisional Court case Peterson v. College of Psychologists of Ontario, 2023 ONSC 4685[^5] (“Peterson”) where the court held that when an individual is a member of a regulated profession, he or she is required to abide by the rules of that profession which may impinge on that individual’s right to freedom of speech (at para. 1).

In the present case, the Member was a member of a regulated profession, which by statute required her to demonstrate the highest regard for moral virtues in her actions, including when posting her personal views on social media. Her right to freedom of speech on her social media was therefore limited by her professional obligations as a member of a regulated profession. The Panel notes that the Peterson case confirms this finding.

[33] With respect, Peterson cannot be read to have obviated a context-specific Doré analysis in each case in which a member of a regulated profession is disciplined for unprofessional publication of words. The court in Peterson noted the analysis undertaken by the ICRC (at Peterson, at paras. 57-67), and further noted that the ICRC, as a screening body, is not required to undertake the sort of formal and detailed reasons one would expect from an adjudicative body after a full hearing (Peterson, at para. 62). The court in Peterson did not hold, and should not be taken to have held, that regulated professionals are subject to any and all restrictions on their freedom of speech on the basis of their regulator’s views of what professionalism may require of them.

[34] Ms Gould’s argument below, and before this court, was that some of her remarks “crossed the line” and were unprofessional, but that she was entitled to express her views in appropriate and professional language, and that much of what she published fit under the penumbra of protected speech. It is no answer to this argument that Peterson holds that regulated professionals are limited in how they may express themselves publicly by standards of professionalism. Further, professional discipline tribunals may not forego their own case-specific Doré analysis because the court upheld the analysis of the ICRC in Doré. Finally, where freedom of speech is raised – even where there has been a guilty plea – a Discipline Committee is expected to provide a proper and complete Doré analysis in respect to its findings on liability and penalty where the issue is raised in defence of a contested issue.

[35] In my view, failing to conduct a Doré analysis in respect to the contested liability issues and in respect to penalty is a fatal error of law in this case. The matter must be sent back for a fresh hearing.

Other Issues

[36] I would not accept Ms Gould’s arguments that the revocation penalty was contrary to the jurisprudence or clearly unfit. Ms Gould characterizes her misconduct as “having made social media posts that were unprofessional, which might be considered disrespectful or sometimes even offensive in tone.” The Discipline Committee found that Ms Gould’s misconduct was “disgraceful, dishonourable and unprofessional” and explained, in some detail, why it found the impugned conduct far more serious than the characterization placed on it by Ms Gould. To be clear, if after a proper Doré analysis is conducted, the Discipline Committee is satisfied that Ms Gould’s misconduct was more serious than the characterization she places on it, then revocation could be an available penalty, depending on the Committee’s analysis of pertinent issues on sanctions (including its Doré analyses).

[37] I see no merit to the allegations of a reasonable apprehension of bias, for the reasons expressed by the Discipline Committee. I would, however, direct that the fresh hearing be held before a differently constituted panel, but not because of the bias allegations: the Doré analysis was a fundamental aspect to the task below and should be undertaken by a Discipline Committee panel taking a fresh look at the case.

Remedy

[38] I would set aside the impugned decision and remit the matter back to a differently constituted Discipline Committee for a fresh hearing, with costs of $20,000, inclusive, payable by the College to Ms Gould.

“D.L. Corbett J.”

I agree: “Sproat J.”

I agree: “Lococo J.”

Released: February 26, 2026

[^1]: See Doré v. Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12, [2012] 1 SCR 395.

[^2]: Oluo, Ijeoma, So You Want to Talk About Race (Seal Press, 2018).

[^3]: The Appellant states in her Factum (at para. 12) that this termination was the subject of an ongoing grievance at the time of the hearing before this court.

[^4]: The parties made consent revisions to the Agreed Statement of Facts on the record during the hearing, which are shown on the face of the copy of the Agreed Statement provided to the court. The portions quoted in this decision reflect these revisions.

[^5]: 2023 ONSC 4685, 167 OR (3d) 11, leave to appeal refused, [2024] SCCA No. 78.