R. Lee Akazaki

The applicant, an automobile parts manufacturer, sought a determination of liability insurance coverage from its insurers after settling a product liability claim for $24 million USD.

The dispute centered on when the respondent's umbrella coverage responded and the quantum of the claim.

The court held that the umbrella coverage responded once the primary policy limits were exhausted, and that the applicant was entitled to recover the balance of its loss, including forecast repair costs, totaling $13.4 million USD.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision that dismissed her action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and struck her pleadings as frivolous, scandalous, and vexatious.

The core of her claim concerned how her insurer handled her statutory accident benefits claims, alleging a conspiracy with healthcare practitioners to stage examinations and produce false reports, and breach of privacy.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's finding that the Licence Appeal Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes related to statutory accident benefits under s. 280 of the Insurance Act, regardless of how the claims are framed.

The Court also upheld the denial of leave to amend pleadings and dismissed the appeal regarding costs due to procedural non-compliance and lack of error in principle.

The plaintiffs sued the defendants for defamation over negative online reviews regarding window installation.

Faced with an anti-SLAPP motion, the plaintiffs attempted to discontinue the action.

The court held that the statutory stay under s. 137.1(5) of the Courts of Justice Act was triggered when the defendants delivered a requisition to attend Civil Practice Court, rendering the discontinuance ineffective.

Applying the Pointes framework, the court found the reviews related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiffs failed to show there were no valid defences, and the action was a SLAPP suit brought for an improper purpose.

The action was dismissed, and the plaintiffs were ordered to pay $164,186.76 in full indemnity costs and $2,500 in damages.

Following a trial where the plaintiffs were awarded $535,032.78 in damages for demolition and reconstruction costs, the plaintiffs sought partial indemnity costs of $102,663.19.

The defendant argued costs should be reduced due to the plaintiff's failure to comply with pre-trial discovery obligations and because the damages awarded were significantly less than the $2 million claimed.

The court agreed that the plaintiff's failure to produce relevant documents hindered the trial process and reduced the costs award by $10,000, ordering the defendant to pay $92,633.19.

The parties, former law partners, brought cross-motions regarding the dissolution of their partnership and the winding up of their jointly owned corporation.

The defendant sought partial summary judgment on consent for a declaration of dissolution and an accounting, which the court granted, directing a reference.

The plaintiffs sought leave to amend their statement of claim to request a winding up of the corporation and a forced sale of the defendant's shares rather than the sale of the corporation's building.

The court allowed the amendments, finding them not untenable in law, and ordered the winding up of the corporation on consent.

The appellant, a lawyer, sued the respondents (a law firm and individuals) for alleged breach of solicitor-client privilege.

The respondents successfully moved to strike the action based on issue estoppel, a decision the appellant appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the three-part test for issue estoppel was met.

The Master in an earlier, unrelated proceeding had squarely addressed and decided the privilege issue, finding it waived, and that decision was final due to the appellant's withdrawal of the appeal.

This is an appeal from the dismissal of a claim for negligence and breach of contract against insurance brokers.

The appellant, owner of a commercial property destroyed by fire, alleged the brokers failed to secure adequate reconstruction cost insurance, leading to underinsurance and a co-insurance penalty.

The trial judge found the brokers discharged their duty by advising the appellant to obtain expert appraisal for reconstruction costs and that the appellant was a sophisticated client.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the application of the duty of care or contractual obligations, and no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent client sought an order declaring that her contingency fee agreement with the applicant law firm was improperly terminated and that she was not liable for fees or disbursements.

The court found that the law firm had good cause to terminate the retainer due to a breakdown in the solicitor-client relationship.

Interpreting the Solicitors Act and its regulations, the court held that the law firm could proceed with the assessment of its disbursements immediately.

However, the assessment of legal fees was stayed as premature, because under the regulations, a solicitor cannot recover more in fees than the client recovers in damages, and the underlying tort action had not yet been resolved.

Cronnox Inc. sought declaratory relief for defence and indemnity coverage under an expired "claims-made-and-reported" professional liability policy issued by Lloyd's Underwriters.

Cronnox also claimed damages for breach of good faith.

Lloyd's Underwriters and International Programs Group (IPG) brought a cross-application for a declaration of no coverage.

The court found no legal relationship between Cronnox and Lloyd's at the time the claim was reported, as the policy had expired and the reporting period had passed.

Consequently, the doctrines of estoppel and waiver did not apply to create coverage or a new contract of insurance.

The court also found no breach of Lloyd's duties of fair dealing and good faith.

Cronnox's application was dismissed, and Lloyd's application for a declaration of no coverage was granted.

The plaintiff, owner of a commercial property destroyed by fire, sued its insurance broker and brokerage firm for negligence and breach of contract, alleging underinsurance due to inadequate advice on reconstruction costs.

The court found that the defendants met the standard of care by advising the plaintiff's principal, a sophisticated client, to obtain a professional reconstruction estimate and by providing documents with co-insurance warnings.

The court also found no causation, as the plaintiff was motivated by cost-saving and would likely not have followed advice for a professional estimate.

Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to mitigate damages by not diligently rebuilding a property of like kind and quality, thus not qualifying for replacement cost coverage.

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiff, Ochea Ikpa, claimed an equitable mortgage over property previously owned by Godknows Itamunoala, based on a promissory note with a criminal interest rate.

The defendants, Tonye Itamunoala and Fiona Duckett (daughter and ex-wife of Godknows Itamunoala), who held a registered second mortgage on the property, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim against them and to release the sale proceeds to them.

The court found that the defendants had no notice of the plaintiff's alleged equitable mortgage, thus it could not take priority over their registered interest.

Furthermore, the promissory note itself was deemed unenforceable as an equitable mortgage due to its manifestly illegal and usurious interest rate, entered into for an illegal purpose with troubling bargaining power dynamics.

The court also dismissed the plaintiff's claim of fraudulent conveyance, as there was no evidence the defendants had notice of the plaintiff's claim.

Consequently, the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the quantum of the defendants' registered mortgage.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the plaintiff's action against Tonye Itamunoala and Fiona Duckett.

The applicant insurer, Liberty Mutual, brought an application for a declaration that coverage for its insured, Cronnox Inc., was excluded under a 'prior notice' exclusion in a professional liability policy.

Cronnox, an engineering company, was sued following an electrical explosion at a hotel where it provided design services.

Prior to the inception of the Liberty policy, Cronnox received correspondence from lawyers representing the hotel's property insurer and construction manager, advising of a potential claim and inviting Cronnox to notify its liability insurer.

The court found that the application was not premature and could be decided on the record.

Applying an objective test, the court concluded that a reasonable person in the insured's position could have reasonably expected that the acts alleged in the correspondence might give rise to a claim.

Therefore, the prior notice exclusion applied, and Liberty had no duty to defend or indemnify Cronnox.

The plaintiff brought a motion to validate service of a statement of claim on the defendant Cronnox as of April 30, 2014.

Cronnox consented, but two non-parties—Cronnox's insurer (who denied coverage) and Cronnox's former lawyer—opposed the motion, arguing service occurred later, which would affect limitation periods for third-party claims and a related coverage dispute.

The court held the non-parties lacked standing as their economic interests were not directly affected by the order.

Regardless, the court found service was properly effected on April 30, 2014, and validated it accordingly.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to Lixo Investments Limited and Granite Claims Solutions LP against AACR Inc. o/a Winmar Toronto/Brampton, following a set of three summary judgment motions.

Winmar's motion for summary judgment against all defendants was dismissed, while Granite's and Intact's motions to dismiss Winmar's claim against them were granted.

The court found Winmar acted unreasonably in bringing its summary judgment motion and in responding to Granite's motion.

The request for a Bullock Order and deferral of costs was denied, as these were deemed matters for the trial judge.

All cross-claims were dismissed without costs.

The plaintiff, Winmar, a contractor, brought a motion for summary judgment against the property owner (Lixo), the insurer (Intact), and the insurance adjuster (Granite) for unpaid work following a fire and subsequent flood.

Intact and Granite also brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss Winmar's claims against them.

The court found genuine issues requiring a trial regarding Winmar's claim against Lixo, particularly concerning the scope of work, the timing of the lien, and the quantum owed, as much of the work was related to a separate flood incident for a tenant (Club V) and not clearly authorized by Lixo.

Winmar's motion against Lixo was dismissed, but the action against Lixo was not dismissed.

The court granted Intact and Granite's motions for summary judgment, dismissing Winmar's claims against them, finding no direct contractual relationship, no benefit gained by them, and no jurisdiction under the Construction Lien Act for claims against non-owners or for quantum meruit/unjust enrichment against them.

Following the dismissal of a summary judgment motion brought by certain defendants, the plaintiff sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The responding defendants did not object to the quantum requested.

The court found the plaintiff’s requested costs reasonable and ordered payment accordingly.

The decision also corrected a typographical error in the court’s earlier reasons for judgment regarding which party amended a statement of defence.

Contractors and subcontractors moved for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a negligence and property damage claim arising from a water leak during mechanical system upgrades to a commercial building.

They argued that a builder’s risk insurance obligation contained in a long‑term land lease between the building owner and its landlord created a subrogation bar protecting them as third‑party beneficiaries.

The court held that the construction contract governing the work contained an “entire agreement” clause and expressly allocated responsibility for builder’s risk insurance to the contractor.

Because the defendants were strangers to the land lease and had neither relied upon nor bargained for its provisions, the lease could not override the later construction contract or confer a defence through the privity exception.

The insurance provision in the land lease therefore did not bar the plaintiff’s action.