Christopher F. Reil

The parties appeared to settle the terms of an order following earlier motions regarding an insurance coverage dispute for water damage.

The court agreed with the defendant brokers to add wording dismissing the action against them concerning an inapplicable 'under construction' exclusion.

The court also stayed the disclosure of certain documents pending the insurer's motion for leave to appeal.

Following a costs endorsement, the plaintiffs requested a reconsideration, arguing the court omitted to deal with elements of their discovery requests.

The court declined to reconsider, noting that the costs of the plaintiffs' motions for further discovery were already assessed and regrouped under the production issues in the earlier decision.

The plaintiffs in a personal injury action sought a redaction order to conceal the amount of a settlement and advance payments, as well as expert reports on damages, from the public record.

The motion was dismissed.

The court found that the plaintiffs failed to establish a serious risk to important public interests such as settlement privilege, confidentiality clauses in settlement agreements, or the privacy of litigants, as required by the Sierra Club test.

The extensive media attention was not considered a measure of public interest.

The court issued a costs endorsement for multiple motions heard on January 9, 2020, in an insurance dispute.

The plaintiffs were awarded partial indemnity costs against AXA and McLeod for successful production motions, and against AXA for a successful motion regarding the "building under construction" exclusion.

The defendants Irvin Hoffman and Cohen & Lord Insurance Brokers Limited also received partial indemnity costs from AXA for their successful motion on the "building under construction" exclusion.

The plaintiffs were awarded substantial indemnity costs against McLeod and the brokers for their unsuccessful summary judgment motions, as the moving defendants acted unreasonably by failing to adduce sufficient evidence on discoverability.

The court fixed specific amounts for each cost award.

The appellant appealed from a partial summary judgment that limited the respondents' liability to $2 million pursuant to a liability cap in a personal services contract.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in interpreting the contract by relying on subsequent conduct of the parties and in extending the liability cap to respondents who were not parties to the original contract.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation, finding no error in principle and affirming that the contract was extended to apply to the construction phase and that the liability cap was intended to benefit all respondents.

The plaintiff was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident.

The defendant insurer, State Farm, brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the vehicle owner, Ms. Barrett, had given consent for the driver to possess the vehicle, making her liable under the Highway Traffic Act.

Ms. Barrett contended she did not give consent to drive, only to retrieve items from the car.

The court found a genuine issue for trial regarding whether giving keys to retrieve items constitutes "possession with consent" under the Highway Traffic Act, considering the driver's state and the owner's knowledge.

State Farm's motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and Ms. Barrett's request for summary judgment was also denied.

Two appeals from a trial judgment concerning liability for environmental remediation of real property contaminated by dry cleaning solvents.

The trial judge found Fraser Hillary's Limited liable in nuisance and under section 99 of the Environmental Protection Act, awarding over $1.8 million in damages for remediation.

The action against David Hillary was dismissed.

Fraser appealed on grounds that the trial judge erred in finding it liable in nuisance and under the EPA.

The plaintiff appealed on grounds that the trial judge erred in failing to find negligence, failing to find the individual defendant liable in nuisance or negligence, and in assessing damages.

The appellate court dismissed both appeals, upholding the trial judgment.

The applicant sought non-earner benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer brought a motion to dismiss the arbitration because the applicant failed to participate or advance his claim.

The arbitrator previously found the applicant lacked the capacity to proceed on his own and adjourned the matter multiple times to allow him to retain counsel or arrange for assistance.

The Public Guardian and Trustee declined to intervene.

As the applicant took no steps to participate or retain representation despite ample time, the application for arbitration was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking leave to compel production of information from an insurance broker and to examine a representative for discovery, in anticipation of a summary judgment motion concerning insurance coverage.

The motion was brought after the trial record had been delivered, necessitating leave of the court under Rule 48.

The court reviewed the conflicting judicial interpretations of the test for granting such leave, ultimately reaffirming the "substantial or unexpected change in circumstances" test, where a refusal would be "manifestly unjust" and rejecting the broader "interests of justice" test as a separate ground.

Given the plaintiffs' long-standing knowledge of the insurance coverage issues, the significant delay in bringing the motion, and the absence of insurance coverage issues in the third party's pleadings, the court found no substantial or unexpected change in circumstances.

Consequently, leave was denied, and the plaintiffs' motion was dismissed.

The applicant applied for statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

During the dispute resolution process, concerns arose regarding his mental capacity to represent himself, as he exhibited signs of cognitive and memory issues and failed to attend scheduled pre-hearings.

The Arbitrator held a preliminary issue hearing and determined that the applicant lacked the mental capacity to proceed on his own.

The hearing was adjourned to allow the applicant time to find a suitable representative or guardian.

The appellants appealed a decision finding that the respondent insurance company did not have a duty to defend them in a defamation action arising from an internet video.

The application judge had concluded that the substance of the claim did not implicate the appellants as employees acting in the course of their employment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge failed to consider cross-claims and third-party claims, which established a mere possibility that the appellants were acting in the course of their employment.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued her long-term disability insurer after being denied benefits.

She was receiving income replacement benefits from her accident benefits insurer.

The accident benefits insurer successfully moved to be added as a defendant to help the plaintiff secure long-term disability benefits, which would reduce its own payment obligations.

The long-term disability insurer appealed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the accident benefits insurer was not a necessary party under Rule 5.03 and had no direct cause of action against the long-term disability insurer.

Following a serious motor vehicle accident involving a leased tractor trailer, the insured plaintiffs sought a determination that their insurer's umbrella policy did not respond and summary judgment against their insurance broker and broker employee for failing to secure excess coverage.

The court held that the leased vehicle was excluded from the non-owned automobile coverage by the long-term lease exclusion and that the umbrella coverage did not apply because the lessor's primary policy was not listed in the schedule of underlying insurance.

The court excluded the broker's expert report as unnecessary for policy interpretation, applied the summary judgment framework, and found no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The broker defendants were found to have breached their duty of care by failing to identify and address the coverage gap, and contributory negligence was rejected.

Summary judgment was granted against the broker defendants.

The applicants sought a declaration that their insurer had a duty to defend them in a defamation action arising from a video posted online.

They argued that, as employees of the named insured organization, the claim potentially fell within the commercial liability policy covering personal injury and advertising injury.

The court held that the duty to defend must be determined primarily from the Statement of Claim and that extrinsic evidence may only be considered in limited circumstances to clarify the substance of the pleadings.

The pleadings alleged only that the applicants posted a defamatory video and contained no facts suggesting the conduct occurred in the course of employment with the insured organization.

As there was no “mere possibility” that the claim fell within policy coverage, the insurer had no duty to defend.

The plaintiffs moved to set aside a registrar’s dismissal order after the action was dismissed for failure to meet a timetable deadline under Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the missed deadline resulted from an inadvertent diarizing error and that the motion was brought promptly with no prejudice to the defendant, warranting revival of the action.

A related motion sought production of an accident reconstruction report prepared for the plaintiff’s insurer.

The court held the report was not protected by litigation privilege and that Rule 31.06(3) imposed a high threshold for withholding expert opinions.

The plaintiffs were ordered to produce the report, while the defendants were permitted to pursue underlying source materials from the expert or insurer if relevant.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and applied for a determination of catastrophic impairment based on a mental or behavioural disorder.

The insurer's assessors concluded she had only a moderate impairment, while her own assessors found a marked impairment in the area of adaptation.

The arbitrator found that the applicant's inability to work was too narrow a basis for finding a marked impairment in adaptation.

Considering her overall ability to cope with pain and manage daily activities, the arbitrator concluded the applicant had only a moderate impairment in all four areas of function and therefore did not meet the definition of catastrophic impairment.

The appellants appealed a Master's order granting summary judgment dismissing their action against the respondents.

The action arose from the allegedly defective installation of a hot water heater in their new home, which they claimed caused carbon monoxide exposure and adverse health effects.

On appeal, the appellants argued the Master erred by denying an adjournment, exceeding his jurisdiction, reversing the burden of proof, and applying the wrong legal test for causation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Master correctly applied the law, properly held the moving parties to their burden of proof, and correctly concluded that the appellants failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue for trial regarding causation.