William J. Sammon

The plaintiff, Drew Casterton, sued the defendant, Gordon MacIsaac, for injuries sustained during a recreational hockey game collision.

The court found MacIsaac liable for intentionally or recklessly causing a blindside hit to Casterton's face, which was deemed outside the bounds of fair play.

The defence of contributory negligence, based on Casterton's choice of a half-visor and alleged cannabis impairment, was rejected.

Casterton was awarded general damages, past income loss, and future income loss, totaling $702,551, but punitive damages were not granted.

Following a three-week trial where the plaintiff's action for negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and defamation was dismissed, the successful defendants sought costs of over $523,000.

The defendants relied on an offer to settle for $100,000.

The court found that the defendants' fees were disproportionate and that the federal government had failed to meet its document production obligations, which unnecessarily lengthened the trial.

Balancing the defendants' success and offer to settle against their improper conduct regarding document disclosure, the court fixed costs at $100,000 all-inclusive.

The plaintiff sued for damages totalling approximately two million dollars, alleging negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and defamation against the Attorney General of Canada and a contract manager, Paul Piché.

The claims arose from the plaintiff's participation in a 2007 Request for Standing Offer (RFSO) where his bid was largely prepared by a competitor, leading to a bid-rigging investigation and charges (later stayed).

The plaintiff argued that negligent answers to RFSO questions induced his actions and that Piché's statements to the Competition Bureau were defamatory.

The court dismissed all claims, finding no duty of care owed by the defendants to provide legal advice on the Competition Act, no negligent misrepresentation or breach of standard of care, and no malice in the defamation claim.

The court also determined that the plaintiff's reliance was unreasonable and that his alleged damages were unproven and too remote, largely attributable to his own contributory negligence.

The plaintiff in a motor vehicle accident case served a Notice of Discontinuance against two defendants.

Despite this, the defendants insisted on proceeding with a previously scheduled summary judgment motion to dismiss the action, seemingly to leverage higher costs.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to approve the Notice of Discontinuance nunc pro tunc.

The court granted the plaintiff's cross-motion, finding the defendants' summary judgment motion to be vexatious, unnecessary, and an abuse of process.

The summary judgment motion was permanently stayed, and the defendants were ordered to pay the plaintiff's costs of $15,305.

The plaintiff sued the estate of a deceased priest and the Archdiocese for historical sexual assault.

The plaintiff's claim against the estate was dismissed due to the two-year limitation period in the Trustee Act.

The estate then brought a motion to dismiss the Archdiocese's crossclaim for contribution and indemnity, arguing it was also barred by the Trustee Act.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that section 18 of the Limitations Act, 2002 governs claims for contribution and indemnity and prevails over the Trustee Act limitation period, allowing the crossclaim to proceed.

In a certified class proceeding concerning allegedly unsafe solarium models, the plaintiff brought a motion to settle the certification order and notice to class members, obtain security for publication costs, and address unpaid cost awards.

The defendant cross-moved to amend the class definition, remove the representative plaintiff, decertify the action, and require fuller disclosure of counsel’s fee arrangement.

The court held that the class definition previously approved by the Divisional Court remained appropriate and rejected the defendant’s attempt to narrow it to current users of the solariums.

The representative plaintiff remained a valid class member despite no longer residing in the home where the solarium had been installed.

The court dismissed the defendant’s motions, ordered the defendant to pay $7,000 into counsel’s trust account for notice publication costs, and approved the certification order and class notice with a minor amendment concerning disclosure of the retainer agreement.

The plaintiffs moved to set aside a registrar’s dismissal order after the action was dismissed for failure to meet a timetable deadline under Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the missed deadline resulted from an inadvertent diarizing error and that the motion was brought promptly with no prejudice to the defendant, warranting revival of the action.

A related motion sought production of an accident reconstruction report prepared for the plaintiff’s insurer.

The court held the report was not protected by litigation privilege and that Rule 31.06(3) imposed a high threshold for withholding expert opinions.

The plaintiffs were ordered to produce the report, while the defendants were permitted to pursue underlying source materials from the expert or insurer if relevant.

Following a successful application declaring a contingency fee agreement void and ordering repayment of funds, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The successful party sought partial indemnity costs exceeding $22,000.

The court held that costs awards must reflect a fair and reasonable contribution rather than an exact reimbursement of actual legal fees and considered the expectations of the unsuccessful party under r. 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Finding the claimed hourly rate, allocation of discovery time, and counsel fee for a half‑day motion excessive, the court reduced the award and fixed costs at $10,000 plus HST.

The applicant sought a declaration that a contingency fee agreement with her former lawyer was unenforceable because it permitted the lawyer to charge a percentage on costs recovered through settlement.

The agreement calculated the lawyer’s contingency fee on the entire settlement amount, including costs and disbursements, without obtaining prior judicial approval as required by s. 28.1(8) of the Solicitors Act.

The court held that including costs in a contingency fee agreement without judicial approval constitutes a fundamental breach of the statutory scheme.

Because the agreement contravened s. 28.1(8) and was not approved as required by s. 28.1(9), it was unenforceable.

The lawyer was ordered to repay the portion of the fee calculated on costs, while the broader question of fee reasonableness was left to the trial judge in the related tort action.

Following a trial in a personal injury action, the court addressed the issue of costs after written submissions.

The successful plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs alleging litigation misconduct by the defendants, including failure to produce an important engineering drawing and challenging the plaintiff’s credibility.

The defendants argued costs should be reduced due to delay and duplication arising from the plaintiff changing counsel multiple times and periods of self‑representation.

The court held that neither party’s conduct justified substantial indemnity costs and emphasized the principle that cost awards must be fair and reasonable rather than matching actual legal fees.

Partial indemnity costs of $200,000 inclusive of taxes and disbursements were awarded to the plaintiff, apportioned in accordance with the liability findings.

The plaintiff brought a negligence action against a municipality and road construction contractors after tripping on a height differential at a crosswalk during an ongoing road reconstruction project.

The court found that the unfinished roadway created a tripping hazard amounting to a condition of non-repair under s. 44 of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The defendants failed to install temporary ramping or provide adequate warning of the vertical gap between the roadway and depressed curb.

The court rejected allegations of contributory negligence and held that all defendants were occupiers responsible for site safety under the Occupiers’ Liability Act.

Liability was apportioned 50% to the paving contractor and 25% each to the municipality and general contractor, and damages were awarded for general damages, income loss, future care, and expenses.

In a certified class proceeding, the defendant sought leave to appeal an interlocutory decision that ordered notice to class members through newspaper publication and added a common issue concerning whether an appropriate remedy existed if liability were established.

The court applied Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure governing leave to appeal interlocutory orders.

It held that no conflicting authority existed and there was no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge’s decision regarding publication of notice.

The court further held that the motion judge acted within his discretion in permitting consideration of an expert report appended to an affidavit and in adding a common issue relating to potential remedies.

As neither branch of the test for leave to appeal was satisfied, leave to appeal was refused.

Following the adjournment of a civil trial after the defendants sought leave to file a late expert report on the eve of trial, the plaintiff sought recovery of costs thrown away.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including success, proportionality, reasonable expectations of the losing party, and the principle of indemnity.

The court held that the defendants' conduct in serving the expert report immediately before trial justified an award of costs on a complete indemnity basis for wasted preparation.

However, the court applied a 50% reduction to certain trial preparation time to reflect work that would remain useful for the future trial and adjusted other disputed items.

Costs thrown away were fixed at $27,951 plus HST and disbursements.

The representative plaintiff in a class proceeding sought costs following a motion to add additional common issues and to determine the method of giving notice to potential class members.

The plaintiff requested costs on a complete indemnity basis, alleging delay and obfuscation by the defendant regarding the number of class members.

The court found that success on the motion was divided but that the plaintiff was substantially successful, particularly on the primary issue relating to the appropriate remedy and the method of providing notice to class members.

Although the defendant’s conduct contributed to the need for newspaper publication notice, the court held it was not sufficiently blameworthy to justify substantial or complete indemnity costs.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendants, Ontario, Quebec, and Canada, sought leave to appeal a motion judge's decision that dismissed their motions for summary judgment and allowed the plaintiffs to amend their statement of claim.

The underlying action involved a fatal collision following a high-speed chase by Akwesasne Police Service officers, with the plaintiffs alleging vicarious and direct liability against the government defendants.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding that the motion judge's decision conflicted with established appellate authorities on the tests for summary judgment, amending pleadings, and establishing a private law duty of care, and that there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the decision.

Civil action arising from a fatal motor vehicle collision following a police pursuit conducted by officers of a First Nations police service operating under a quadripartite policing agreement among federal and provincial governments and a First Nation.

Provincial governments moved for summary judgment arguing they could not be vicariously liable for the conduct of the police officers because they exercised no operational control.

The court held that the complex governance structure, degree of governmental oversight, and the unique jurisdictional circumstances raised factual issues regarding control, partnership, and potential vicarious liability that required a full evidentiary record at trial.

The plaintiffs also sought to amend their statement of claim to allege negligence for failure to implement recommendations from a prior policing audit; most amendments were permitted.

Summary judgment was refused and leave to amend was largely granted.

Civil action arising from a fatal motor vehicle collision following a police pursuit conducted by officers of a First Nations police service operating under a quadripartite policing agreement among federal and provincial governments and a First Nation.

Provincial governments moved for summary judgment arguing they could not be vicariously liable for the conduct of the police officers because they exercised no operational control.

The court held that the complex governance structure, degree of governmental oversight, and the unique jurisdictional circumstances raised factual issues regarding control, partnership, and potential vicarious liability that required a full evidentiary record at trial.

The plaintiffs also sought to amend their statement of claim to allege negligence for failure to implement recommendations from a prior policing audit; most amendments were permitted.

Summary judgment was refused and leave to amend was largely granted.

Following a jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident involving an impaired driver, the plaintiff sought to sign judgment without applying the statutory deductible under s. 267.5 and s. 267.7 of the Insurance Act.

The plaintiff argued the tavern defendant had waived reliance on the deductible by objecting to proposed jury questions that would have apportioned liability solely between the driver and the tavern.

The court rejected the waiver argument, finding the jury’s answers effectively determined the tavern’s negligence at one percent and the driver’s responsibility at the balance.

Applying the principles in Sullivan Estate v. Bond, the court held that an unprotected defendant is liable only for its proportionate share of the statutory deductible.

Judgment was therefore to be signed with the tavern responsible only for one percent of the $30,000 deductible.

Supplementary reasons addressing an outstanding refusal arising from an examination for discovery in a civil action involving a leased vehicle.

The disputed question asked how profit was calculated by the dealership on a leased vehicle.

The court held that while the exact profit earned by the dealership was not directly relevant, the method of calculating profit was relevant to issues concerning ownership, control of the vehicle, and the financial relationships among the dealer, financing company, and manufacturer.

Given the surrounding evidence about the assignment of the lease and payments made, the answer was necessary to understand prior discovery evidence and documents produced.

The witness was therefore required to answer the question regarding how profit is calculated.

Following a jury verdict in a complex personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident involving a licensed establishment, the successful plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs exceeding $300,000.

The defendant argued that its offers to settle should affect the costs award and that the statutory deductible under s. 267.5(9) of the Insurance Act should be deducted from the damages when assessing whether settlement offers were exceeded.

The court held that the statutory deductible must not be subtracted when determining entitlement to costs, following appellate authority.

Although the defendant’s settlement offers did not comply with Rule 49.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, they remained relevant under Rule 49.13 as discretionary factors.

Considering proportionality, the complexity of the trial, the amount recovered compared to the amount claimed, and counsel conduct during trial, the court fixed costs at $150,000 plus HST and disbursements.