Kelly Anne Hart

Following a jury trial for damages arising from a motor vehicle collision, the plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs.

The court awarded the plaintiff $275,000 in fees, $100,000 in disbursements, and $30,000 for costs incurred in pursuing a SABS settlement that significantly benefited the defendants.

The court denied the plaintiff's claim for litigation loan interest due to insufficient evidence.

The defendants' request for costs under Rule 49.10(2) was dismissed because the plaintiff's judgment exceeded the defendants' offer.

In this personal injury trial, the plaintiffs sought to have the jury quantify damages for past attendant care and housekeeping.

The court denied this request, ruling that such claims were barred due to the male plaintiff's prior settlement of his Family Law Act claim for services provided to his wife, which would result in impermissible double recovery.

Additionally, the court found there was insufficient evidentiary foundation to put these specific questions to the jury, as the plaintiffs failed to provide adequate evidence regarding the hours of services rendered by third parties or the value of non-monetary compensation, and the proposed methodology of valuing damages based on need rather than services actually received was incorrect in law.

This appeal concerned a priority dispute between two automobile insurers regarding statutory accident benefits (SABS) for two catastrophically injured pedestrians.

The claimants, who had no automobile insurance of their own, were struck by a vehicle insured by the applicant, Economical Insurance Group.

They resided with their daughter and son-in-law, who were insured by the respondent, Desjardins Insurance.

The central issue was whether the claimants were "principally dependent" on their children, which would make Desjardins liable for SABS.

The arbitrator found that the claimants were not principally dependent, as they could meet 81% of their financial needs through savings, government payments, and income from providing child care services to their children.

Consequently, the arbitrator held Economical liable.

The applicant appealed, arguing errors in treating child care payments as income and in applying the dependency rule.

The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the arbitrator's finding that the claimants were not principally dependent, as it was a reasonable conclusion supported by the evidence.

The National Gallery brought an application seeking a declaration that its contractor, Lafleur, and Lafleur's insurer, Intact, owed a duty to defend it in two underlying actions arising from a fatal trip and fall by a Lafleur employee on the Gallery's premises.

The court reviewed the commercial general liability policy and the service contract's indemnity provisions.

It found that the underlying claims alleged negligence relating to the design and control of the premises by the Gallery as occupier, independent of any activities by Lafleur.

Furthermore, the policy's exclusions for workers' compensation and employer's liability applied.

The application was dismissed, as neither respondent owed a duty to defend.

The National Gallery of Canada retained Lafleur de la Capitale Inc. for landscaping and maintenance services and required Lafleur to add it as a named insured under its comprehensive general liability policy with Intact Insurance Company.

The Gallery was added as an additional insured only insofar as its legal liability arose vicariously out of Lafleur's operations.

When a Lafleur employee died while performing maintenance work at the Gallery's premises, two actions were commenced against the Gallery by the employee's spouse and family members.

The Gallery applied for a declaration that Intact had a duty to defend.

The application judge granted the application in brief reasons that failed to address exclusion clauses or the nature of the allegations in the statements of claim.

The Court of Appeal found the application judge's reasons inadequate and did not permit meaningful appellate review, allowing the appeal and remitting the application for a new hearing.

The applicants brought a motion to add Cindy Ravary as a defendant and to amend their Statement of Claim.

The court granted the motion, allowing the addition of Ms. Ravary and the proposed amendments, with the exception of the allegation of conspiracy.

The court found that Ms. Ravary had not demonstrated prejudice and that the proposed causes of action were prima facie meritorious.

The applicant filed an application alleging discrimination with respect to membership in a vocational association because of place of origin.

The applicant requested an adjournment by email two days before the scheduled summary hearing, citing personal reasons.

The Tribunal advised the applicant that detailed reasons were required for an adjournment and that the hearing would proceed as scheduled.

The applicant failed to respond or attend the hearing.

The Tribunal dismissed the application as abandoned.

The plaintiff sued for damages arising from altercations with security guards.

Shortly before the jury trial commenced, the defendants conducted surveillance on the plaintiff and disclosed the video and report to the plaintiff's counsel.

During the trial, the defendants sought to use the surveillance as substantive evidence or for impeachment.

The plaintiff argued the evidence should be excluded due to late disclosure.

The court held that the defendants required leave to introduce the evidence under Rule 48.04, as the matter had been set down for trial.

The court declined to exclude the evidence outright, finding it relevant and material, but granted the plaintiff a 1.5-day adjournment to review the footage and prepare.

The plaintiff slipped and fell outside a Tim Horton's restaurant.

She initially sued only the franchisee.

More than two years after the accident, she commenced a second action against the landlord and the snow removal contractor.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the action was statute-barred.

The court applied the new summary judgment framework from Hryniak v. Mauldin and found that the plaintiff knew or ought to have known of the potential liability of the landlord and snow removal contractor shortly after the accident.

The court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the expiry of the limitation period and dismissed the action.

Following the granting of summary judgment dismissing an action as statute‑barred, the court addressed outstanding issues regarding the quantum and procedure for awarding costs.

The plaintiffs sought to challenge the previously indicated costs amounts and requested further disclosure of supporting documentation.

The court held it retained jurisdiction to revisit the costs award because no formal order had yet been issued and the judicial officer was not functus.

The court fixed the costs of the summary judgment motion, including enhanced costs due to a reasonable offer to settle, but determined that the costs of the dismissed action required a separate assessment process due to overlapping proceedings.

Costs of the action were therefore ordered on a partial indemnity basis with quantum to be determined by agreement or assessment.

The defendant brought a motion seeking to discharge a certificate of pending litigation registered against disputed lands, to require the plaintiff to pay $300,000 into court in exchange for the certificate, and to compel answers and undertakings arising from examinations for discovery.

Due to time constraints, the motion proceeded only on the refusals and undertakings issues.

The court reviewed the disputed discovery questions and ordered several further and better answers, production of the plaintiff’s current insurance policy, and additional itemized responses regarding claimed expenditures and work performed on the property.

Some requests were found premature, while others required re‑attendance at discovery.

The balance of the relief sought was adjourned to a later date, with costs reserved.

Following a trial in a personal injury action, the court addressed the issue of costs after written submissions.

The successful plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs alleging litigation misconduct by the defendants, including failure to produce an important engineering drawing and challenging the plaintiff’s credibility.

The defendants argued costs should be reduced due to delay and duplication arising from the plaintiff changing counsel multiple times and periods of self‑representation.

The court held that neither party’s conduct justified substantial indemnity costs and emphasized the principle that cost awards must be fair and reasonable rather than matching actual legal fees.

Partial indemnity costs of $200,000 inclusive of taxes and disbursements were awarded to the plaintiff, apportioned in accordance with the liability findings.

The plaintiff brought a negligence action against a municipality and road construction contractors after tripping on a height differential at a crosswalk during an ongoing road reconstruction project.

The court found that the unfinished roadway created a tripping hazard amounting to a condition of non-repair under s. 44 of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The defendants failed to install temporary ramping or provide adequate warning of the vertical gap between the roadway and depressed curb.

The court rejected allegations of contributory negligence and held that all defendants were occupiers responsible for site safety under the Occupiers’ Liability Act.

Liability was apportioned 50% to the paving contractor and 25% each to the municipality and general contractor, and damages were awarded for general damages, income loss, future care, and expenses.

Following the dismissal of a Rule 21.01(3)(d) motion to strike a third party claim as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, the court addressed the quantum of costs payable.

The responding party sought partial indemnity costs exceeding $13,000, while the moving parties argued the hours claimed were excessive and invoked the principle of proportionality under Rules 1.04(1.1) and 57.01(1)(0.b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court considered the complexity of the privity and insurance coverage issues, the significance of the motion’s potential impact on the broader litigation, and evidence of duplication in preparation time by junior counsel.

Balancing proportionality and the importance of the issues, the court fixed partial indemnity costs at a reduced amount.

Costs of $7,000 plus disbursements and taxes were ordered payable forthwith.

Engineering consultants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss a third party claim for contribution and indemnity arising from alleged design deficiencies in a warehouse concrete slab.

The moving parties argued that the contractor’s covenant in the main construction contract to obtain wrap‑up liability insurance barred any claim against them and that they could rely on a principled exception to the doctrine of privity to benefit from that covenant.

The court held it was not plain and obvious that the alleged losses would have been covered by the contemplated insurance or that the contract intended to extend such benefits to the engineers.

The pleadings disclosed a potential claim for contribution and indemnity relating to defective design and workmanship.

The motion to dismiss the third party claim as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process was therefore dismissed.

The applicant sought declarations that a snow removal contractor and its insurer were required to defend and indemnify it in an underlying slip-and-fall action.

The applicant had contracted with the contractor to perform snow clearing and ice control services and required the contractor to obtain liability insurance naming the applicant as an additional insured and to indemnify it for claims arising from the contractor’s operations.

After a pedestrian allegedly slipped and fell on ice in a parking lot, the contractor and insurer refused to assume the applicant’s defence.

The court held that the true nature of the underlying claim was negligence arising from snow and ice removal, which fell within the contractor’s contractual responsibilities and the insurer’s coverage.

The insurer therefore had a duty to defend the entire action and both the contractor and insurer were required to indemnify the applicant for liability attributable to the contractor.