Eric Anthony Clear Williams

The plaintiff, Moira Caron, sued for damages following a slip and fall in her workplace kitchenette.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the defendants, as occupiers, met their positive duty of care under the Occupiers' Liability Act by maintaining a reasonable system of cleaning, inspection, and call service.

The court also found that the plaintiff failed to prove that her ongoing complaints and inability to return to work after January 2011 were caused by the slip and fall incident, attributing them instead to a pre-existing anxiety disorder.

This decision addresses pre-judgment interest and costs following a trial where the plaintiffs were awarded damages against Legalett Canada Inc. for negligent misrepresentation and breach of collateral warranty, but their claim against Joshua Teixeira was dismissed.

The court awarded the plaintiffs pre-judgment interest and partial indemnity costs from Legalett.

Concurrently, the court awarded partial indemnity costs to Teixeira from the plaintiffs.

The court declined to issue a Sanderson or Bullock order, finding it was reasonable for the plaintiffs to sue Teixeira personally and that the defendants did not improperly shift responsibility onto each other.

Following a nine-day trial where the plaintiffs successfully obtained a declaration that a property transfer was a fraudulent instrument and vested a 72.97% interest in their names, the plaintiffs sought costs.

The plaintiffs had made an offer to settle that they matched or exceeded at trial.

The court rejected the defendants' arguments to depart from the general rule regarding offers to settle, finding the defendants' conduct reprehensible and negligent.

The court awarded the plaintiffs partial indemnity costs up to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, payable jointly and severally by the defendants.

The plaintiffs, beneficial owners of a property, sought a declaration of ownership and a vesting order after the defendant bare trustee sold the property without their consent.

The trustee, who was subject to personal executions, signed a false affidavit stating he was not the execution debtor to complete the sale.

The court found the trustee was a 'fraudulent person' under the Land Titles Act and the transfer was a 'fraudulent instrument'.

The purchaser was not a bona fide purchaser without notice, as suspicious circumstances put him on inquiry.

The court declared the transfer void and ordered the title rectified to reflect the beneficial ownership interests.

The defendants brought a motion to prohibit the plaintiffs from calling Donald Raymond to give expert opinion evidence based on his 2005 appraisal report for the Quigley Hill property.

The defendants argued that Raymond failed to comply with Rule 53.03, did not qualify as a "participating or other expert" under Westerhof due to file destruction and lack of direct participation in the sale, and that his opinion was irrelevant.

The court found Raymond's appraisal relevant, that he qualified as a participant or non-party expert under Westerhof despite his file being inadvertently destroyed, and that any prejudice to the defendants was minimal and cured.

The court also noted both parties shared blame for not pursuing the "best efforts" undertaking more diligently.

The motion was dismissed.

Following a trial in which the plaintiff obtained complete success in enforcing an agreement relating to the conveyance of land, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs relying on a Rule 49 offer to settle and the defendant’s alleged reprehensible conduct before and during litigation.

The court held that the plaintiff achieved a result more favourable than its Rule 49 offer and that the defendant’s conduct, including unreasonable litigation positions and procedural steps that prolonged the proceedings, justified elevated costs consequences.

Applying Rule 49.10 and the factors under Rule 57.01, the court awarded substantial indemnity costs in a lump sum inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The plaintiff tenant sought a declaration and specific performance of an agreement to purchase leased commercial lands from the defendant landlord following a barn collapse and insurance settlement.

The court held that the landlord's long-time property manager had actual or apparent authority to bind the corporation, that an enforceable agreement existed for the sale of the severable six-acre parcel, and that any deficiency under the Statute of Frauds was overcome by part performance.

The court further found the property was sufficiently unique and damages inadequate, particularly given the plaintiff's substantial improvements and the defendant's attempt to renegotiate after receiving the insurance cheque.

Specific performance was granted, the approval authority was directed to accept the severance application without the owner's consent, and the defendant's counterclaim was dismissed.

The plaintiff's claims for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident were settled for $10 million, representing the full policy limits of the defendants' two insurers.

The primary insurer offered its $2 million policy limits early in the litigation, while the excess insurer delayed acknowledging its $8 million limits for several years.

The excess insurer brought a motion seeking an equal division of the plaintiff's $1.3 million in costs.

The court dismissed the motion and apportioned the costs 80/20 in accordance with the insurers' respective policy limits, finding this to be the most equitable result that encourages early settlement.

Following a professional negligence trial, the court considered submissions on costs and the applicable rate of pre‑judgment interest.

The court corrected an error in the original reasons, confirming that pre‑judgment interest applied only to the $22,000 award rather than the total $50,000 damages figure referenced in the earlier decision.

It held that the appropriate pre‑judgment interest rate was 5% for the entire pre‑judgment period.

Although the plaintiffs sought more than $278,000 in partial indemnity costs, the court reduced the award after considering that the plaintiffs succeeded only in part and were unsuccessful on several factual allegations.

Applying principles from appellate authority regarding the purpose and reasonableness of costs, the court awarded $150,000 inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

The appellant law firm acted for the purchaser in a commercial real estate transaction.

After closing, the purchaser discovered a 0.3 metre reserve on the property that required a significant cost recovery payment to the municipality for road access.

The purchaser successfully sued the law firm for negligence.

On appeal, the law firm challenged the negligence finding and the dismissal of its cross-claim against the vendor for contribution and indemnity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the law firm failed to properly investigate the access issues raised by the reserve, and that the vendor had no legal or equitable obligation to disclose the unregistered cost recovery agreement.

Following a summary judgment motion and cross-motion, the court determined the issue of costs under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff successfully defended the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and succeeded on a cross-motion, and sought costs accordingly.

The defendant argued that no costs should be awarded, but the court rejected that submission.

Applying the Rule 57 factors, including the amount at stake, the moderate complexity of the proceeding, and the reasonable rates and hours of counsel, the court held that costs should follow the result.

The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff $10,500 inclusive of disbursements and tax.

Following a settlement conference in a civil action, the court addressed the readiness of the matter for trial and concerns about the refusal of a non-party insurer to participate in settlement negotiations.

The court observed that the insurer’s absence from negotiations created a significant impediment to resolution and left the plaintiffs facing trial risks and costs.

The judge strongly urged the insurer to participate in negotiations and warned that cost sanctions might apply if it failed to do so.

The matter was confirmed as ready for trial with two weeks of trial time required.

The moving party sought summary judgment dissolving an alleged partnership and the corporation through which the parties conducted a development business, together with an accounting and equal distribution of assets.

The court held that the motion was procedurally defective because the relief sought exceeded the pleadings and improperly attempted to dissolve a corporation under the Partnership Act rather than the Business Corporations Act.

Significant factual disputes also remained regarding whether the business was carried on by a partnership or a corporation and how assets were owned and managed.

Given the absence of necessary evidentiary foundation and unresolved factual issues, the court found that the matter was not appropriate for summary judgment.

On the responding party’s cross‑motion, the court ordered production of the moving party’s medical records and income tax returns as they were relevant to determining whether the partnership had been abandoned and the proper date of dissolution.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing her solicitor negligence claim against the respondent.

She argued the trial judge erred in finding the respondent was not obliged to put in writing that he was not retained for tort and accident benefit claims, and in failing to decide whether his duty of care extended to reviewing limitation periods.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the appellant understood the scope of the retainer and that the respondent had in fact reviewed the limitation periods with her.

Following the dismissal of a Rule 21.01(3)(d) motion to strike a third party claim as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, the court addressed the quantum of costs payable.

The responding party sought partial indemnity costs exceeding $13,000, while the moving parties argued the hours claimed were excessive and invoked the principle of proportionality under Rules 1.04(1.1) and 57.01(1)(0.b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court considered the complexity of the privity and insurance coverage issues, the significance of the motion’s potential impact on the broader litigation, and evidence of duplication in preparation time by junior counsel.

Balancing proportionality and the importance of the issues, the court fixed partial indemnity costs at a reduced amount.

Costs of $7,000 plus disbursements and taxes were ordered payable forthwith.

Engineering consultants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss a third party claim for contribution and indemnity arising from alleged design deficiencies in a warehouse concrete slab.

The moving parties argued that the contractor’s covenant in the main construction contract to obtain wrap‑up liability insurance barred any claim against them and that they could rely on a principled exception to the doctrine of privity to benefit from that covenant.

The court held it was not plain and obvious that the alleged losses would have been covered by the contemplated insurance or that the contract intended to extend such benefits to the engineers.

The pleadings disclosed a potential claim for contribution and indemnity relating to defective design and workmanship.

The motion to dismiss the third party claim as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process was therefore dismissed.

A law firm sued a departing non-equity partner and his new firm after approximately 60 personal injury contingency files were transferred when the lawyer left the firm.

The plaintiff sought a constructive trust over future contingency fees based on unjust enrichment and breach of fiduciary duty.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the equitable claims, while the plaintiff sought partial summary judgment for work in progress and disbursements on settled files.

The court held that the unjust enrichment claim raised issues requiring a full trial because contractual documents and statutory arguments did not clearly constitute a juristic reason defeating the claim.

However, the court granted summary judgment dismissing the breach of fiduciary duty allegations, finding no evidentiary basis for the alleged breaches.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their solicitor negligence action against the respondent lawyers arising from a failed life lease project.

The appellants argued the lawyers failed to advise them of legal uncertainties regarding life leases and were in a conflict of interest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's factual finding that any failure to advise did not cause the appellants' losses, as they would have proceeded with the project regardless.

The court also upheld the trial judge's damages calculation, which deducted the increased value of the excavated property from the project costs.

The appellant appealed a judgment, arguing that correspondence between the parties constituted a binding settlement agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the initial letter was a valid offer, the subsequent correspondence indicated an intention to negotiate rather than an acceptance.

The court concluded there was no meeting of the minds sufficient to form a binding contract, as evidenced by a draft agreement containing only a one-way release.

The respondents were completely successful on an appeal, an application for judicial review, and an application to set aside an arbitrator's decision.

They sought partial indemnity costs of $22,651 plus disbursements and HST.

The applicants argued the amount was disproportionate and opposed joint and several liability.

The court fixed costs at $20,000 plus $1,000 in disbursements plus HST, payable jointly and severally by the applicants, noting the complexity of the proceedings and the arbitrator's finding that the applicants had committed the tort of deceit together.