Gene Cary Colman

The applicant father sought parenting and decision-making orders for his two adult children, primarily to facilitate access to government benefits and Canadian citizenship for the children.

The respondent mother was self-represented and did not file an Answer.

The court, proceeding as an uncontested trial, dismissed the application, finding no jurisdiction under the Children's Law Reform Act to make parenting or decision-making orders for adult children who are not under a disability and are able to withdraw from parental control.

The court also noted the applicant's failure to file a factum.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal from an order dated January 28, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $3,500 to the respondent.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of Jarvis J. dated January 28, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $3,500 to the respondent.

The applicant husband brought motions to find the respondent wife in contempt for failing to provide timely disclosure, and for various other relief including the sale or winding up of their jointly owned companies and former matrimonial home, an advance on legal fees, and an extension of the limitation period to seek equalization.

The court dismissed the contempt motion, finding the wife's delay was not wilful or deliberate.

The court declined to order the sale of the companies or the home given the existence of separation agreements that dealt with those assets, but granted preservation orders restraining the wife from encroaching on corporate funds or the home's equity.

The request for an advance on legal fees was dismissed, and the limitation period extension was adjourned to trial.

Rajeev Bhogal brought a motion for interim sole custody and child support for their eleven-year-old daughter, S, following the sale of the matrimonial home.

Prithy Jennifer Bhogal opposed, arguing the motion was premature given ongoing Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) involvement and due to contested affidavit evidence.

The court dismissed Rajeev's motion, finding it premature without OCL input and due to contested affidavit evidence.

Instead, the court ordered an interim shared parenting schedule as proposed by Prithy, pending OCL conclusions and a settlement conference.

The mother unilaterally moved with the parties' two children from Toronto to Barrie without the father's consent or a court order.

The father brought a motion seeking the return of the children, joint custody, a 50/50 residential schedule, and unsupervised access.

The court declined to order the return of the children, finding that due to the passage of time, they had become well settled in Barrie and a return would be disruptive.

However, the court condemned the mother's self-help actions and ordered joint custody, with a 50/50 residential schedule to commence once the father relocates to Barrie.

The court also partially lifted the supervision requirement for the father's access and ordered the mother to pay $500 in costs due to her unreasonable conduct.

A child protection case involving a four-month-old infant who suffered severe traumatic head injuries including subdural hemorrhaging, retinal hemorrhages, and brain damage.

The child was hospitalized after the father called an ambulance on October 2, 2015.

The Children's Aid Society sought a finding that both children were in need of protection under the Child and Family Services Act.

The parents disputed the cause of injury, with the father's expert suggesting a chronic medical condition (subdural hygroma) with spontaneous rebleeding, while the Society's expert concluded the injuries resulted from traumatic head trauma inflicted or inadequately protected against by the parents.

The court accepted the Society's expert evidence and found both children in need of protection.

The Children's Aid Society of the County of Dufferin sought leave to withdraw a protection application concerning a child.

The respondent, a pediatric nurse with 17 years of experience as a foster parent, consented to the withdrawal but sought costs on a full indemnification basis.

The court found that while the Society did not act in bad faith, the decision to apprehend the child was an ill-considered use of the Society's powers that could not be justified.

The court awarded costs to the respondent for the apprehension hearing and the period leading up to the temporary care hearing, but declined to award costs for work undertaken after the Society's settlement offer on May 22, 2013, which was focused on adding the Toronto Children's Aid Society as a party rather than resolving the protection concerns.

The father appealed an order finding that the Ontario court had jurisdiction to hear the mother's application for child support.

The parents previously lived in France, where a French court made a custody, access, and child support order that contemplated the mother's relocation to Canada.

The mother subsequently moved to Ontario with the children and applied to change the child support and custody provisions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that because the children are ordinarily resident in Ontario and have an independent legal right to support under the Family Law Act, the child support claim should be determined on its merits in Ontario.

The moving party sought costs following a successful motion for leave to appeal a decision of a motions judge to the Divisional Court.

Although the moving party was presumptively entitled to costs under Rule 24(1) of the Family Law Rules, the court considered that the ultimate value of the leave motion depended on the outcome of the forthcoming appeal.

The court noted that if the appeal were successful, costs of both the leave motion and the appeal would logically follow.

However, if the appeal were unsuccessful, the leave motion might ultimately prove unnecessary.

The court exercised its discretion to defer determination of costs until the appeal is decided.

The applicant father brought a motion for interim joint custody and equal parenting time of the parties' two-and-a-half-year-old daughter.

The respondent mother opposed the motion, seeking sole custody.

The court found that the high level of conflict between the parties, exacerbated by the paternal grandmother's interference and denigration of the mother, made joint custody or parallel parenting inappropriate.

The court granted sole custody to the mother, finding it in the child's best interests, and ordered a specified access schedule for the father.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a motion decision dismissing his request to strike portions of an application dealing with child support.

The application was brought after a French court had issued a final child support order concerning children now residing in Ontario.

The motion judge had concluded Ontario had jurisdiction to address child support and that Ontario was the most appropriate forum.

On the leave motion, the court considered conflicting authorities regarding whether Ontario courts may entertain an originating application for child support where a valid foreign order already exists.

Finding an apparent conflict between prior decisions concerning jurisdiction under s. 33 of the Family Law Act, the court held that the legal issue was unsettled and granted leave to appeal.

The respondent father, a resident of France, brought a motion to strike the applicant mother's claim for child support in Ontario, arguing that an existing French court order already addressed the issue.

The court applied the Muscutt factors and found a real and substantial connection to Ontario, as the children habitually reside there.

Distinguishing previous case law, the court held that because custody and access were also being legitimately litigated in Ontario, it was appropriate to assume jurisdiction over child support to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.

The motion to strike was dismissed.

In a child protection proceeding, the parents brought a motion seeking full documentary disclosure from the Children’s Aid Society and the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.

Although the Society ultimately consented to the requested disclosure after the motion commenced, the court considered whether costs should be awarded against the Society.

The court held that while child protection agencies do not have immunity from costs awards, costs should only be ordered where the Society conducts itself unfairly in carrying out its statutory responsibilities.

The court found that the Society’s delayed and piecemeal disclosure required the parents to bring an unnecessary motion and risked delaying the trial in a case involving a child already in care for over a year.

Partial indemnity costs were therefore ordered against the Society.

The appellant mother appealed a final order awarding the respondent father retroactive and ongoing child support.

She raised procedural fairness issues, including an alleged reasonable apprehension of bias because the father's spouse previously worked at the trial judge's former law firm.

The Divisional Court dismissed the procedural fairness grounds, finding no evidence to support the bias claim and no error in refusing an adjournment or an amendment to add the spouse as a party.

On consent, the court allowed the appeal in part to reduce the retroactive child support award to three years prior to the application and to correct calculation errors under the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The father brought a motion for interim joint custody and the mother brought a cross-motion to strike paragraphs from the father's affidavit that referred to an off-the-record settlement meeting.

The father argued that the best interests of the child trumped settlement privilege and that the mother negotiated in bad faith.

The court found no evidence of bad faith by the mother and emphasized the importance of protecting settlement privilege to encourage parties to resolve disputes without fear of prejudice.

The mother's cross-motion was granted, and the offending paragraphs were struck.

The parents appealed an order making their two children permanent wards of the Crown without access.

The trial judge had granted summary judgment against the mother based on a prior agreement to be bound by a parental assessment, effectively delegating the disposition decision and depriving her of a hearing on the merits.

The Court of Appeal found this process fundamentally flawed, as the burden was on the Children's Aid Society to show no triable issue regarding the best interests of the children.

The Court also admitted fresh evidence regarding the mother's mental health progress and the parents' support network.

The appeal was allowed and a new hearing ordered.

The appellant wife appealed an order regarding a default divorce judgment.

The Court of Appeal found the motions judge erred in concluding the appellant could seek originating corollary relief despite a final divorce judgment addressing those issues.

The Court applied the three-part test for setting aside the noting of pleadings closed, finding the motion was timely, the appellant had a persistent intention to defend, and there was merit to her claims.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the noting of pleadings closed and specific paragraphs of the default divorce judgment.

The wife appealed a trial judgment regarding the equalization of net family property and spousal support.

At trial, the judge intervened after the close of evidence to request additional actuarial calculations based on the husband's reduced life expectancy, which significantly altered the pension valuations in his favour.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge overstepped her role and usurped the function of counsel, causing procedural unfairness.

The Court varied the equalization payment based on the original trial evidence.

The Court upheld the trial judge's use of the pro rata method for valuing the husband's pension, but set aside the lump sum spousal support award as it was based solely on an income differential without evidence of need.