Gunsolus J.

Costs decision following a contempt motion arising from a family law settlement concerning equalization, spousal support, and transfer of the matrimonial home.

The moving party had brought a contempt motion alleging failure to transfer title, but the matter ultimately resolved through further minutes of settlement completing the transaction.

The court held the contempt procedure was inappropriate because enforcement of the settlement should have been pursued instead.

Although the moving party obtained a small payment for cleanup costs, the responding party succeeded in having the settlement enforced and the contempt motion dismissed on consent.

The court ordered the moving party to pay partial costs, applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and proportionality considerations.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 24 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss an action for delay arising from a dispute over the purchase of a yacht allegedly suffering engine defects.

The action had remained largely stagnant for more than a decade after pleadings were closed, with limited discovery activity and no meaningful prosecution by the plaintiffs.

The court held the delay was inordinate and inexcusable and raised a presumption of prejudice that the plaintiffs failed to rebut.

The defendant also demonstrated actual prejudice, including the loss of warranty claims against the engine manufacturer, the bankruptcy of a co-defendant manufacturer, and evidentiary issues arising from faded recollection and lack of preserved expert evidence.

The court dismissed both the claim and the defendant’s counterclaim for delay and, in the alternative, exercised its inherent jurisdiction to control its process.

The defendant property owner brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing an action alleging occupiers’ liability following injuries sustained during a horse‑handling incident on a hobby farm.

The plaintiff alleged that the occupier negligently maintained fencing and gating which allegedly contributed to a horse-related accident.

The court held that the plaintiff failed to identify any act or omission by the occupier that breached the statutory duty under the Occupier’s Liability Act or the Negligence Act.

The evidence showed the fencing and gate were common and properly installed, and the alleged incident arose from the actions of the participants rather than any unsafe condition of the premises.

As no genuine issue requiring a trial was established, summary judgment dismissing the claim against the occupier was granted.

The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike portions of a statement of claim alleging numerous torts and statutory breaches against the Federal Crown.

The self-represented plaintiff alleged misfeasance in public office, conspiracy, fabrication of evidence, Charter violations, and other wrongs arising from actions of police officers and provincial officials.

The court held that the pleading failed to disclose material facts linking any federal Crown servant to the alleged conduct and improperly attempted to attribute liability to the federal government for actions of provincial actors.

The allegations were found to be vague, speculative, and comprised of bald conclusions without necessary particulars.

The court struck the impugned paragraphs and dismissed the action as against the Attorney General of Canada without leave to amend.

The Crown applied to remove defence counsel from the record on the basis of an alleged conflict of interest after the lawyer provided brief legal advice to a material Crown witness who was also the accused’s power of attorney.

The witness had contacted the lawyer seeking guidance about police questioning relating to potential obstruction charges.

The court applied the principles governing removal of counsel, including the accused’s fundamental right to counsel of choice and the requirement that counsel be free from disqualifying conflicts.

Finding that no solicitor‑client relationship existed between the lawyer and the witness and that no confidential information had been imparted, the court held that no realistic risk of conflict had been established.

The application was therefore dismissed, although the trial judge retained the ability to impose measures such as independent cross‑examination if necessary.

The plaintiff obtained judgment following a default trial arising from a brutal kidnapping, forcible confinement, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, threats, and physical assault.

The court held that the defendant was liable for the intentional tort of battery and under the Victim’s Bill of Rights, relying on the deemed admissions arising from default and the evidentiary record.

The court awarded $225,000 in general and aggravated damages, $75,000 in punitive damages, and substantial indemnity costs of $40,000 plus HST, emphasizing the extreme violence, ongoing psychological harm, and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

Pre-judgment interest on general damages was also ordered at 5% per annum commencing November 5, 2007.

A police officer commenced a civil action alleging that the police association breached its duty of fair representation in relation to disciplinary charges under the Police Services Act.

The association brought a Rule 21 motion to dismiss the claim for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the dispute arose from the employment relationship governed by a collective agreement.

The court applied the Weber framework and examined the essential character of the dispute, concluding that the allegations concerned the association’s representation duties within the collective bargaining regime.

Because the dispute required interpretation and application of the collective agreement and related statutory scheme, jurisdiction lay exclusively with a labour arbitrator.

The court therefore held it lacked jurisdiction to hear the action.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that the delay between the laying of charges for criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm and the scheduled trial date was unreasonable.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Morin and analyzed the length of delay, waiver, reasons for delay, and prejudice to the accused.

Much of the delay was attributed to inherent complexity, defence availability, and institutional factors, with a smaller portion attributable to the Crown.

The court found no clear prejudice to the accused and concluded the delay was not unreasonable in the circumstances of a complex case involving numerous witnesses and technical evidence.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit under the Criminal Code.

The appeal argued that the Crown failed to establish that the accused understood the breath demand made by the arresting officer, a prerequisite for the admission of breath test evidence.

The court held that while evidence established that a demand was made and complied with, there was no evidence that the accused understood the nature of the demand.

Without evidence satisfying the informational component required for lawful breath demands, the statutory preconditions for admitting the breath certificate were not met.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and an acquittal was entered.

The plaintiffs invested $300,000 in an offshore investment program after being advised by the defendant, who represented the investment as secure and guaranteed to yield a 17.52% return.

The defendant failed to disclose that the investment scheme was under investigation by the Ontario Securities Commission and that he was receiving undisclosed commissions for referring investors.

The court found that the defendant had held himself out as a financial advisor and stood in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiffs.

By recommending the investment, failing to disclose conflicts of interest, and concealing regulatory investigations, the defendant breached his fiduciary obligations.

The court awarded equitable compensation for the plaintiffs’ lost investment with pre‑judgment interest and held both the individual defendant and his corporation jointly and severally liable.

In a child protection proceeding, the parents brought a motion seeking full documentary disclosure from the Children’s Aid Society and the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.

Although the Society ultimately consented to the requested disclosure after the motion commenced, the court considered whether costs should be awarded against the Society.

The court held that while child protection agencies do not have immunity from costs awards, costs should only be ordered where the Society conducts itself unfairly in carrying out its statutory responsibilities.

The court found that the Society’s delayed and piecemeal disclosure required the parents to bring an unnecessary motion and risked delaying the trial in a case involving a child already in care for over a year.

Partial indemnity costs were therefore ordered against the Society.

The appellant appealed a sentence of 90 days intermittent custody imposed following convictions for driving with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit and driving while suspended.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge erred by overemphasizing deterrence and denunciation, failing to give adequate consideration to rehabilitation, and improperly rejecting a conditional sentence.

The court held that appellate intervention requires the sentence to be clearly unreasonable or demonstrably unfit and found that the sentencing judge properly considered all relevant principles and factors.

Given the appellant’s significant record for impaired driving and driving while suspended, the sentence fell within the appropriate range.

The appeal was therefore dismissed.

Following the dismissal of a motion by a proposed intervenor seeking to be added as a party to an unrelated civil action, the court addressed costs.

The court held that the proposed intervenor had no connection to the underlying action and that the motion raised no issue of public interest or bona fide legal concern.

Exercising its discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, the court determined that costs should be awarded to the defendants despite their representation by Crown counsel.

While acknowledging the unsuccessful party’s limited financial means, the court emphasized that litigants, including incarcerated individuals, remain responsible for the costs consequences of misguided or unnecessary procedural steps.

Costs of $500 inclusive of disbursements and taxes were awarded.

Costs decision following a family law motion to change regarding a child’s school placement.

The moving party sought costs after the dispute was ultimately resolved through a consent order following the involvement of a court‑directed parenting facilitator.

The court applied Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, recognizing that both parties achieved partial success but finding that the motion to change was a necessary catalyst to advance resolution of the dispute.

The court also considered the reasonableness of the parties’ conduct and the limited complexity of the matter.

Costs were awarded to the moving party in a reduced amount.