J. Bryan Shaughnessy

The accused, a transport truck driver, was charged with four counts of dangerous driving causing death and nine counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after colliding with multiple vehicles in a construction zone on Highway 401.

The Crown proved the actus reus, showing the accused failed to slow down despite clear signage and stopped traffic.

The defence argued the accused experienced a 'micro-sleep' due to undiagnosed sleep apnea and chronic renal disease, negating the mens rea.

The court rejected the expert evidence of a micro-sleep, finding the accused's prolonged inattention and failure to brake constituted a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The plaintiffs loaned $25,000 to the individual defendant's corporation based on a long-standing friendship.

When the loan was not repaid, the plaintiffs sued the corporation and the individual defendant.

The defendants failed to attend the trial.

The court found that the individual defendant had personally guaranteed the loan to protect his own interest in the corporation, taking the guarantee out of the Statute of Frauds.

Judgment was granted against both defendants for the principal amount plus interest and costs.

The Township of Uxbridge brought an application seeking a declaration that the respondents were in civil contempt of two restraining orders issued under the Building Code Act and the Planning Act.

The orders prohibited the respondents from using their rural property as a contractor's yard and required them to clean up debris and commercial vehicles.

The court reviewed photographic evidence and testimony from a municipal enforcement officer, finding that the property remained littered with waste, commercial trucks, and machinery.

The court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondents intentionally failed to comply with the clear and unequivocal orders, finding them in contempt and scheduling a penalty hearing.

Following the plaintiff's acceptance of the defendant's offer to settle a motor vehicle accident claim for $30,000 plus partial indemnity costs and disbursements, the court was tasked with assessing the costs.

The plaintiff sought $72,278 in fees and $121,045 in disbursements, while the defendant argued for a total of $55,000 based on proportionality.

The court reduced the fees to $30,000 to reflect proportionality but allowed the full $121,045 for disbursements, noting they were reasonably incurred before the defendant produced a contradictory engineering report and made the settlement offer.

The plaintiff, who suffered a severe traumatic brain injury in a motor vehicle accident, sought court approval for two settlements: a $1 million tort settlement reached in 2007 and a $3 million statutory accident benefits settlement.

The court approved both settlements, noting the tort settlement should have had a capacity assessment at the time.

However, the court found the 30% contingency fee agreement signed on the eve of the accident benefits settlement was not fair and reasonable under the Solicitors Act.

The agreement was declared void, and the court reduced the legal fees to 17% of the recovery.

The plaintiff, Natalie Moretto, a 15-year-old at the time, was bitten on the face by the defendant's dog.

The court found the defendant strictly liable under the Dog Owner’s Liability Act.

The defendant failed to prove contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

The court awarded general damages for physical injury and some psychological sequelae, and future care costs for laser treatments and sunscreen.

However, the claim for loss of competitive advantage was dismissed due to insufficient evidence and the inadmissibility of expert opinion.

This motion concerned the priority of insurance policies following a motor vehicle accident.

The primary issue was whether a State Farm Personal Liability Umbrella Policy (PLUP) was a primary owner's policy or an excess policy, and its response sequence relative to a State Farm Automobile Policy and an Economical Insurance Automobile Policy.

The court determined that the State Farm PLUP was a true excess policy, not a motor vehicle liability policy under the Insurance Act, and would respond only after the primary coverages of both the State Farm Automobile Policy and the Economical Insurance Automobile Policy were exhausted.

The Economical Insurance Automobile Policy was found to be a primary, first-loss policy, responding alongside the State Farm Automobile Policy.

The plaintiffs sought court approval for a $12.5 million settlement arising from a catastrophic brain injury sustained by a 16-year-old during a high school rugby match.

The court reviewed the proposed structured settlement, private investment plan, and legal fees.

Finding the 30% contingency fee unreasonable given the size of the settlement and the exclusion of the OHIP subrogated claim, the court reduced the legal fee to 20% and directed the savings to the plaintiff's future care fund.

The settlement was approved with these modifications.

The court addressed two applications: a motion for court approval of an accident benefits settlement for a minor, Stephan Markus, and a guardianship application by his mother, Natalie Nicholas.

The court approved the accident benefits settlement amount of $650,000 but reduced the legal contingency fee from 25% to 15% and disallowed a disbursement for clerk's time.

The court rejected the proposed management plan for the settlement funds and Natalie Nicholas's application to be appointed guardian of property, citing concerns about the plan's realism and internal inconsistencies in affidavits.

All settlement funds were ordered to be placed into a structured settlement and paid into court until an authorized guardian of property is appointed, with a new management plan required.

The appellant, a former Member of Parliament, appealed his convictions and sentence for exceeding election expense limits, exceeding personal contribution limits, and filing a false electoral campaign return under the Canada Elections Act.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence, seeking a longer term of imprisonment.

The appeal court dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge correctly interpreted the definition of election expenses, properly assessed credibility, and correctly applied party liability provisions.

The court also dismissed both sentence appeals, upholding the global sentence of one month in jail, a four-month conditional sentence, and 18 months' probation as proportionate and fit, though it set aside a $10,000 restitution order on consent.

During a jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the defendants brought a threshold motion under s. 267.5(15) of the Insurance Act seeking a determination that the plaintiff had not sustained a permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function.

The court reviewed the statutory test and the regulatory criteria under the Ontario Regulations, including the requirements of substantial interference, importance of function, and permanence.

Based on extensive medical evidence diagnosing chronic pain syndrome, orthopedic injuries, and psychiatric conditions including major depressive disorder and somatic symptom disorder, the court found the impairments substantially interfered with employment and daily living.

The court accepted the evidence of multiple treating and expert physicians and rejected the defence medical expert’s opinion as unreliable.

The court concluded the plaintiff met the statutory threshold and was not barred from recovering damages for non‑pecuniary losses.

The moving defendant sought summary judgment dismissing a motor vehicle negligence action against her arising from a collision caused by her estranged spouse driving her vehicle while impaired.

The issue was whether the vehicle was in the driver’s possession with the owner’s implied consent under s. 192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act, or alternatively whether the owner was negligent in safeguarding her car keys.

The court held the owner rebutted the statutory presumption of consent, finding she had taken reasonable steps to prevent access to the vehicle and did not grant express or implied permission.

The alleged inconsistencies in her testimony were immaterial and did not undermine credibility on the central issues.

The court also rejected the insurer’s negligence argument, finding the owner acted as a reasonable and prudent person in controlling the keys.

The Crown defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a personal injury action on the basis that the plaintiff failed to provide notice within ten days as required by s. 7(3) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

The plaintiff was injured when a swing set on Crown-owned property collapsed.

Although written notice was sent outside the statutory ten‑day period, correspondence indicated that the Crown’s property manager attempted to inspect the swing the day after the incident.

The court drew an adverse inference from the Crown’s failure to provide affidavit evidence explaining what information it received or what investigation it undertook.

The court held that the Crown effectively received notice and had an opportunity to investigate shortly after the incident, satisfying the legislative purpose of the notice provision.

The accused was charged with arson contrary to s. 433(a) of the Criminal Code after a fire was discovered in a wall cavity of a dwelling occupied by her romantic partner.

The Crown alleged the accused intentionally ignited combustible material in the wall as a diversion after she was unable to provide funds for a joint real estate transaction, thereby risking the occupant’s life.

Expert evidence from the Office of the Fire Marshal concluded the fire originated in a pre‑existing hole in the basement stairwell wall and was caused by the intentional application of an open flame to combustible material.

The court rejected defence theories that the fire was staged or set by the complainant and found the accused’s testimony not credible, applying the credibility framework in R. v. W. (D.).

The court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally caused damage by fire to an occupied dwelling.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for assault arising from a domestic altercation.

He argued that the trial judge failed to properly apply the analytical framework in R. v. W.(D.), failed to address key credibility issues, and provided reasons that prevented meaningful appellate review.

The appellate court found that the trial judge’s reasons mischaracterized parts of the evidentiary record and failed to resolve significant inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence, including prior statements and testimony affecting credibility.

Given the central importance of credibility and unresolved live issues, the reasons were insufficient to disclose the basis for the verdict.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The responding spouse brought a motion seeking an order declaring the opposing party a vexatious litigant pursuant to s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court reviewed the extensive litigation history arising from the parties’ matrimonial dispute, including repeated motions, appeals, and collateral proceedings in multiple courts attempting to relitigate issues already determined.

The court found that the litigant persistently commenced proceedings without reasonable grounds, failed to pay outstanding cost orders, and continued to advance allegations of conspiracy and misconduct against judges, lawyers, and third parties.

Applying the principles governing vexatious proceedings, the court concluded that the conduct constituted harassment and oppression through abusive litigation.

An order was made prohibiting the litigant from instituting or continuing proceedings in any Ontario court without leave of the Regional Senior Judge.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action alleging that a surgeon breached the standard of care by recommending and performing revisional bariatric surgery following the failure of an earlier gastric partitioning procedure.

Liability was the sole issue at trial, as causation and damages were agreed upon subject to that determination.

The court considered extensive expert evidence concerning whether the patient was an appropriate candidate for revisionary bariatric surgery, including the relevance of the 1991 NIH bariatric surgery guidelines and the assessment of obesity‑related co‑morbidities.

The court held that candidacy for revisionary bariatric surgery involves the exercise of clinical judgment and that strict adherence to the NIH guidelines is not determinative, particularly where a prior bariatric procedure has mechanically failed.

The surgeon reasonably relied on the patient’s history, weight regain, gastroscopy findings confirming failure of the prior surgery, and a dietician’s assessment in determining candidacy.

The court concluded that the surgeon met the applicable standard of care.

Siblings sought an order under s. 3(1) of the Partition Act for the sale of a jointly owned parcel of land inherited through a family arrangement.

The defendant claimed beneficial ownership of the property through a resulting trust, asserting he had funded the purchase and mortgage payments and that the parents held title in trust for him.

The court rejected the resulting trust claim, finding documentary and testimonial evidence established the property was intended to be held in trust for all six siblings in equal shares.

Expert appraisal evidence demonstrated that a dwelling constructed by the defendant added no value to the property’s highest and best use as future residential development land.

The court ordered sale of the property with proceeds divided equally among the six siblings and dismissed the defendant’s counterclaim.