Glen Orr

Following jury convictions for multiple firearms and drug trafficking offences, the court sentenced the offender for possessing three loaded prohibited handguns, overcapacity magazines, ammunition, and fentanyl, cocaine, and oxycodone.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for firearms and fentanyl trafficking offences, while also materially reducing moral culpability in light of the offender's anti-Black racism context, childhood instability, community violence exposure, and the IRCA evidence.

Applying concurrency within offence categories, consecutive treatment between firearms and drug categories, and the totality principle, the court reduced the global sentence from 14 years to 12 years.

After Summers credit for pre-trial custody and Duncan credit for harsh detention conditions, the remaining sentence was nine years and five months, together with lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA, and forfeiture orders.

The offender was found guilty of kidnapping a 14-year-old boy as leverage to extort the return of stolen cocaine.

The kidnapping was planned and premeditated, and the victim was bound and blindfolded for 36 hours.

The court considered the severe impact on the victim and his family as aggravating factors.

Mitigating factors included the offender's lack of a prior criminal record and the impact of anti-Black racism on his life trajectory, as detailed in an Impact of Race and Culture Assessment.

The court determined an appropriate sentence of 11.5 years, which was reduced to 9.5 years after applying Summers, Downes, and Duncan credits for pre-sentence custody, house arrest bail, and harsh jail conditions.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, simple possession of psilocybin, and possession of a prohibited weapon.

The Crown sought a sentence of five to six years, while the offender sought a conditional sentence.

The court considered the offender's role as the primary caregiver for his two young daughters as a mitigating factor, but noted the serious nature of trafficking 202 grams of methamphetamine from a residence where children were present.

The court rejected a conditional sentence due to the statutory bar for sentences over two years and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The offender was sentenced to four years' imprisonment for the trafficking charge, with concurrent sentences for the other offences.

Yolanda Meecham was charged with seven counts, including possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking and possession of ammunition in violation of s. 109 prohibition orders.

The trial focused on whether she had constructive or joint possession of the drugs and ammunition found in her residence, which was also used by Thiago Machado, an admitted drug dealer.

The court found Meecham's explanations for her knowledge and involvement not credible, particularly regarding a large sum of cash and incriminating intercepted phone calls.

She was found guilty on the four drug trafficking counts, as her direct involvement in arranging drug deals and her knowledge of Machado's activities were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, she was acquitted on the three ammunition counts due to insufficient evidence proving her knowledge of the ammunition beyond a reasonable doubt.

During a jury trial for illegal possession of a handgun, the defence sought to introduce text messages to impeach the credibility of a key Crown witness, Veronica Sinclair.

The defence alleged Sinclair had animus towards the accused's family due to her disapproval of a romantic relationship between her daughter and the accused's sister.

Sinclair denied this during cross-examination.

The court ruled the text messages inadmissible, finding them to be collateral evidence and noting the defence's failure to confront the witness with the messages during cross-examination, as well as a lack of due diligence in their late presentation.

The defendants, Frank Lee and Jason Cooney, brought a Charter application to exclude two kilograms of crystal methamphetamine found in their car, arguing violations of their s. 9 (unreasonable arrest) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel) Charter rights.

The court found that the police had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, thus no s. 9 violation.

However, it found s. 10(b) violations for both defendants due to delays in advising and facilitating access to counsel.

Applying the s. 24(2) Grant test, the court determined that the seriousness of the police misconduct (carelessness, not systemic) and the impact on the accused's Charter interests (no evidence flowed from the breach) were outweighed by society's strong interest in adjudicating the case on its merits, given the reliable and significant evidence.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with possession of a loaded handgun, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence and stay proceedings, alleging breaches of ss. 7, 8, 9, 10(b), and 12.

The court found the arrest and subsequent search of the vehicle were lawful based on a reliable 911 call.

While the court found a minor breach of the implementational aspect of s. 10(b) due to a 17-minute delay in contacting duty counsel, it declined to exclude the firearm or the applicant's spontaneous utterances under s. 24(2), concluding the breach was technical and did not warrant exclusion.

The defendant was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with dangerous driving.

The Crown withdrew the "over 80" charge during trial.

The defendant admitted to being the driver at the scene but later claimed his friend, the vehicle owner, was actually driving.

The court found the defendant guilty of both impaired driving and dangerous driving based on eyewitness testimony, the defendant's own admission to police, and the implausibility of the defence evidence.

The court rejected the defence narrative that the defendant was lying in the back seat and that the vehicle owner was the actual driver.

Three offenders were convicted of manslaughter following a botched home invasion robbery targeting a drug dealer.

The offenders planned to use extreme violence, bringing weapons and gasoline, but mistakenly encountered the target's brother, who was stabbed to death by one of the offenders.

The court found the offence to be an aggravated manslaughter due to the high degree of planning, the home invasion context, and the extreme violence intended.

The court sentenced the stabber to 13 years and the other two offenders to 11 years, less credit for pre-trial custody.

Requests for enhanced credit due to lockdown conditions were denied for lack of evidence of detrimental impact.

The defendants applied for a re-hearing of their dismissed s. 8 Charter application regarding a police search of a residential property where marijuana plants were found.

They argued that the Supreme Court of Canada's recent decisions in Jones and Marakah changed the law on standing, allowing them to rely on the Crown's allegations of possession to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The court dismissed the application, holding that Jones and Marakah applied to informational privacy claims and did not overrule the Edwards test for territorial privacy claims.

The court found that even if the Crown's allegations were assumed true, they only alleged possession of the plants, not possession of the property, which was insufficient to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched.

Joe Ramono, charged with criminal negligence causing death and forged documents, applied to have evidence from searches of his business, Pro Street Auto, ruled inadmissible.

He alleged violations of his Charter right against unreasonable search or seizure, arguing that police failed to make full disclosure in the Information to Obtain (ITO) for the search warrants and that the searches exceeded the warrants' scope.

The court found no evidence of police deception or subversive conduct and determined that the ITO provided reasonable grounds for the warrants.

The court also found that the searches did not exceed the scope of the warrants and that the participation of an MTO officer was lawful.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with criminal negligence causing death, moved to sever his trial from a co-accused.

The applicant argued that the accused were not jointly charged, did not act in concert, had different conduct, and that severance was necessary for him to call the co-accused as a witness to elicit exculpatory evidence regarding the co-accused's drinking and driving history.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the offences arose from the same series of events, the nexus between the accused was sufficient for a joint trial, and the applicant failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the co-accused would testify or that such testimony would be favourable.

The court also noted the "cut-throat defence" element, which weighs against severance.

Following jury convictions for producing methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of precursor chemicals, and arson by negligence, the court sentenced the offender for operating a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory in a rented residential house over approximately 18 months.

The court emphasized denunciation and both general and specific deterrence, relying on the pernicious nature of methamphetamine, the quantity involved, the prolonged production operation, the use of a third party's property, and the substantial danger posed to a residential neighbourhood.

After concurrent count-specific sentences and credits for bail restrictions and pre-sentence custody, the court imposed a global sentence of seven years' imprisonment.

The court also granted a weapons prohibition, a DNA order, forfeiture of seized property, and restitution to the landlord for repair costs and lost rent.

The accused sought review of a detention order arising from serious firearm and drug charges linked to storage lockers allegedly under his control.

The court considered whether the earlier bail review judge erred in assessing the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds under s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code, and whether allegations of police misconduct and fresh evidence amounted to a material change in circumstances.

The court held that any shortcomings in the earlier release analysis did not undermine the continued justification for detention on the secondary and tertiary grounds, given the seriousness of the charges, evidence connecting the accused to the lockers and firearms, and public safety concerns.

The alleged fresh evidence was found not credible, while subsequent DNA evidence strengthened the prosecution’s case.

The application was dismissed.

On a criminal trial arising from a house fire that exposed a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory, the Crown sought to adduce several utterances made by the accused to attending police officers.

The court held the utterances were voluntary under the confessions rule, rejecting arguments based on lack of caution, incomplete note-taking, oppression, and lack of operating mind.

Applying the detention analysis, the court found no breach of the informational component of s. 10(b) before the utterances were made, but found a later breach of the implementational component because police delayed access to counsel for several hours after arrest.

Applying s. 24(2), the court held the subsequent breach did not justify exclusion because the utterances predated the breach and their admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was charged with possession of MDMA, ketamine, and methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking and with producing those substances under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

Police discovered a large-scale clandestine drug laboratory inside a residence containing approximately 150 kilograms of finished drugs and extensive manufacturing equipment in plain view.

The accused was found inside the residence and his personal documents were located there.

The court held that the pervasive presence of drugs, odour, and equipment established the accused’s knowledge of the operation and that his presence and conduct supported an inference of control sufficient for constructive possession for the purpose of trafficking.

However, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused participated in the production process.

The applicant sought exclusion of evidence discovered after police entered a residence without a warrant and arrested him in connection with drug production and trafficking offences.

The issue was whether the applicant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the dwelling sufficient to challenge the search under s. 8 of the Charter.

Applying the factors from Edwards and related authorities, the court examined the applicant’s connection to the premises.

The evidence established only that the applicant was present in the house and had left a bag of personal effects there.

The court concluded there was no evidence of ownership, control, historical use, or a subjective expectation of privacy, and therefore the applicant lacked standing to challenge the search.

A judicial interim release hearing for two accused charged with robbery while armed with a firearm, forcible confinement, possession of prohibited weapons, and possession of property obtained by crime, as well as possession of opium poppy including heroin.

The Crown opposed release on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found that both accused had reversed onus due to prior weapons convictions and current bail conditions.

Despite proposed sureties and electronic monitoring, the court determined the release plans were insufficient given the serious nature of the charges, the apparent strength of the Crown's case based on recent possession doctrine, and the extensive criminal histories of both accused.

Both accused were detained.

The accused was charged with arson contrary to s. 433(a) of the Criminal Code after a fire was discovered in a wall cavity of a dwelling occupied by her romantic partner.

The Crown alleged the accused intentionally ignited combustible material in the wall as a diversion after she was unable to provide funds for a joint real estate transaction, thereby risking the occupant’s life.

Expert evidence from the Office of the Fire Marshal concluded the fire originated in a pre‑existing hole in the basement stairwell wall and was caused by the intentional application of an open flame to combustible material.

The court rejected defence theories that the fire was staged or set by the complainant and found the accused’s testimony not credible, applying the credibility framework in R. v. W. (D.).

The court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally caused damage by fire to an occupied dwelling.