Paula Victoria Locke

This criminal trial concerned Puneet Grewal, charged with dangerous driving causing death after he reversed his dump truck on a landfill site, running over and killing Kyrsten Sujanszky.

The Crown alleged that Grewal's driving constituted a marked departure from the standard of a reasonable and prudent truck driver, specifically by reversing without regard to Ms. Sujanszky's whereabouts despite an obligation to keep her in sight.

The court examined the circumstances of the site, the inherent dangers of reversing a dump truck, and the actions of both the accused and the deceased.

Ultimately, the court found that while Grewel's actions might have been careless, there was reasonable doubt as to whether they constituted a 'marked departure' from the standard of care, particularly given the uncertainties about how Ms. Sujanszky came to be in the truck's path and the site's own safety practice deficiencies.

Grewal was found not guilty.

The defendant, Upkaran Sandhu, pleaded guilty to some counts and was acquitted on others, including the main charge of possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The court found Mr. Sandhu's testimony credible, accepting his explanation that he was a heroin addict who supported his habit with a substantial inheritance.

Despite the presence of drugs and paraphernalia, the court concluded that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the possession was for trafficking, as the evidence was consistent with personal use by an addict with financial means.

The accused, B.D., charged with sexual assault and sexual interference, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to alleged unreasonable delay.

The total anticipated delay from information to trial end was 793 days (approximately 26 months).

The court applied the Jordan framework, deducting periods of defence delay and delay due to exceptional circumstances (COVID-19 related administrative delay).

The court found 267 days of defence delay and 14 days of exceptional circumstances delay, resulting in a net delay of 512 days (approximately 17 months), which is below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The application was dismissed as the defence failed to establish that the delay was markedly longer than it reasonably should have been or that they took sustained efforts to expedite proceedings.

The defendant, Vinusan Arudselvam, was charged with failing or refusing to comply with a breath demand under s. 320.15(1) of the Criminal Code following a motor vehicle accident.

The defence argued that due to chest pain from the accident, he had a reasonable excuse for not providing a suitable sample and challenged the mens rea requirement for the offence.

The court ruled that the breath demand was lawful and that the mens rea for the offence is knowledge that a demand has been made, not specific intent to refuse.

However, the court found the defendant's testimony credible regarding his chest pain and accepted that his injury constituted a reasonable medical excuse, making compliance extremely difficult or painful.

The police investigation was deemed rushed and poorly conducted, particularly regarding the officer's failure to ascertain the defendant's language difficulties or medical distress.

Consequently, the charge was dismissed.

Mr. Yi Shuai Yang applied for a stay of proceedings under s.11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay of almost 27 months for an "80 plus" charge.

The court applied the Jordan framework, calculating a net delay of 793 days (26 months).

It found the COVID-19 public health crisis to be a discrete exceptional circumstance, deducting 295 days of delay attributable to it.

This reduced the remaining delay to 498 days (16.5 months), which is below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases.

Although the applicant took meaningful steps to expedite, the court found the case did not take "markedly longer" than it reasonably should have given the circumstances.

The application for a stay of proceedings was denied, and the trial dates were confirmed.

The accused was charged with possession of child pornography contrary to section 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

Following a search warrant execution, police seized computers and external hard drives containing video files.

The Crown proceeded on four accessible movies depicting young Asian girls in swimsuits and various clothing.

The central issue was whether three of the movies met the statutory definition of child pornography under section 163.1(1)(a)(ii), which requires that the dominant characteristic be the depiction of a sexual organ or anal region of a person under 18 years for a sexual purpose.

The trial judge found the accused guilty on one movie (as conceded by defence) but acquitted on the three contested movies, finding that while they could possibly meet the definition, the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the dominant characteristic was the depiction of sexual organs or anal regions.

The defendant brought a motion to exclude evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant executed on his home and personal computer, arguing that there were no reasonable grounds for the warrant's issuance and that the search violated his Charter rights under section 8.

The defendant raised three grounds: typographical errors in the Information to Obtain, staleness of information due to a two-month delay, and insufficient corroboration of the evidence.

The court found that the errors were inadvertent and correctable, that the delay was not fatal given the nature of digital evidence and forensic retrieval capabilities, and that sufficient corroboration existed.

The motion was dismissed and the warrant was upheld as valid.

The defendant was charged with refusing to provide a sample of breath into an approved screening device (ASD) following a traffic stop in Pickering.

The Crown alleged the defendant made multiple attempts to blow into the ASD but failed to provide a satisfactory sample.

The defendant claimed he was only given three attempts without warning.

The court found the defendant's testimony neither credible nor reliable, accepted the corroborated testimony of the two police officers, and determined that the ASD demand was made forthwith as required by law.

The defendant was found guilty as charged.

David Persaud appealed his conviction for impaired driving.

The trial judge had conducted a blended trial and Charter application, granting a s. 10(b) application but dismissing a s. 8 application, and then convicting Persaud.

The appeal court found that the trial judge conflated s. 8 Charter issues with the trial proper, provided insufficient reasons for conviction, and improperly used evidence admissible only for the Charter application to convict on the substantive charge.

The court dismissed grounds related to unreasonable verdict and a new ground raised on appeal.

Ultimately, the conviction could not stand due to significant flaws in the trial judge's reasoning, leading to an order for a new trial on the impaired driving charge.

The applicant was charged with operating a motor vehicle over 80 contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on the basis that the right to be tried within a reasonable time was violated.

The court applied the new framework established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, which sets a presumptive ceiling of 18 months for trials in provincial court.

The net delay was 14 months and 3 days, falling below the ceiling.

The court found that the applicant failed to demonstrate meaningful steps to expedite proceedings and that the case did not markedly exceed reasonable time requirements.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with Operation Impaired and Blow Over 80 following a traffic stop for erratic driving.

The accused challenged the lawfulness of the investigation, alleging violations of his Charter rights under sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found that the roadside screening demand was made forthwith and that the accused was adequately informed of the reasons for his detention.

However, the court found that the strip search was unnecessary and violated the accused's Charter rights under sections 7 and 8.

Applying the Grant analysis, the court excluded the breath test results due to the seriousness of the Charter violations.

The Blow Over 80 charge was dismissed.

The accused was convicted of Operation Impaired based on evidence of erratic driving, impairment indicators, and impaired judgment.

The offender pleaded guilty to production of methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of chemicals knowing they would be used to manufacture methamphetamine.

The offender was found in possession of approximately 1 kilogram of pure methamphetamine and precursors capable of producing at least 6 kilograms of methamphetamine, with an estimated street value of $700,000 to $1,050,000.

The court imposed a global sentence of 6 years and 6 months less credit for 5 weeks of pre-trial custody, resulting in 6 years and 4 months to be served, along with a 10-year weapons prohibition and DNA order.

The defendant was charged with failing or refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample for analysis by an approved screening device.

Following a traffic stop for erratic driving, the officer detected a faint odour of alcohol and the defendant admitted to consuming beer.

The defendant was given five attempts to provide a proper breath sample into an Alcotest 7410 GLC approved screening device, but on each occasion provided only a brief puff of air before stopping, resulting in E0 error codes.

The court found that the defendant had a valid demand made against him, failed to provide a suitable breath sample on five occasions, and intended to refuse to provide such a sample.

The defendant was convicted and sentenced to a $1,200 fine with 60 days to pay, plus a one-year driving prohibition with eligibility for the Interlock program.

The accused was charged with eight counts of fraud and forgery related to the fraudulent sale of Records of Employment (R.O.E.s).

The Crown alleged the accused played a significant role in a scheme whereby fraudulent R.O.E.s were sold for approximately $3,000 each, which were then submitted to Service Canada to obtain Employment Insurance benefits to which the purchasers were not entitled.

The trial involved testimony from witnesses involved in the scheme, accountants, and investigators.

The court found the accused guilty of two counts related to the sale of a fraudulent R.O.E. to Kunaseelan Kandasamy and acquitted him on the remaining counts due to evidentiary issues, including the inadmissibility of hearsay statements and insufficient corroboration.

A judicial interim release hearing for two accused charged with robbery while armed with a firearm, forcible confinement, possession of prohibited weapons, and possession of property obtained by crime, as well as possession of opium poppy including heroin.

The Crown opposed release on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found that both accused had reversed onus due to prior weapons convictions and current bail conditions.

Despite proposed sureties and electronic monitoring, the court determined the release plans were insufficient given the serious nature of the charges, the apparent strength of the Crown's case based on recent possession doctrine, and the extensive criminal histories of both accused.

Both accused were detained.