Jeremy Mutton

This sentencing decision addresses the possession of a loaded restricted firearm and related offences by Chadwick Francis, who was stopped at a RIDE spot-check.

The trial focused on a racial profiling claim which was dismissed.

The judge considered the social context of systemic racism and Mr. Francis’ personal history, including his victimization by gun violence, as mitigating factors.

The decision carefully balances denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and public protection, ultimately imposing a conditional sentence order (CSO) of two years less one day with strict conditions, including GPS monitoring and probation, rather than incarceration.

The case highlights the complexity of sentencing in firearm possession cases involving racialized offenders and the evolving role of social context evidence.

This criminal trial concerned Puneet Grewal, charged with dangerous driving causing death after he reversed his dump truck on a landfill site, running over and killing Kyrsten Sujanszky.

The Crown alleged that Grewal's driving constituted a marked departure from the standard of a reasonable and prudent truck driver, specifically by reversing without regard to Ms. Sujanszky's whereabouts despite an obligation to keep her in sight.

The court examined the circumstances of the site, the inherent dangers of reversing a dump truck, and the actions of both the accused and the deceased.

Ultimately, the court found that while Grewel's actions might have been careless, there was reasonable doubt as to whether they constituted a 'marked departure' from the standard of care, particularly given the uncertainties about how Ms. Sujanszky came to be in the truck's path and the site's own safety practice deficiencies.

Grewal was found not guilty.

Cengiz Ay applied for a stay of proceedings, alleging a violation of his s.11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 33 months and two weeks (1019 days).

The court applied the R. v. Jordan framework, deducting periods of defence-caused delay (waivers, counsel removal, requests for time to retain new counsel) and discrete events (COVID-19 impact on scheduling, Crown witness illness).

After deductions, the net delay was calculated to be 17 months, which is below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court found that the applicant did not take meaningful and sustained steps to expedite the proceedings, nor did the case take markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

The application for a stay of proceedings was denied.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation (excess blood alcohol) after being stopped by police on private property as part of a RIDE program.

The officer believed the stop was authorized by the Highway Traffic Act.

The court found that while a common law power existed for sobriety checks on private property, the officer's reliance on a mistaken understanding of the Highway Traffic Act rendered the detention unlawful, violating the defendant's Charter rights (sections 9 and 8).

Applying the Grant test, the court determined the breaches were technical and not serious, the impact on the defendant's rights was modest, and the reliable breath evidence was crucial to the Crown's case and society's interest in deterring drunk driving.

Consequently, the evidence was admitted, and the defendant was convicted.

The Crown applied under s 117.05(4) of the Criminal Code for forfeiture of a seized firearm and a three-year prohibition order against the respondent, who failed to appear despite notice.

The court proceeded ex parte.

Based on evidence of the respondent's suicidal ideations and apprehension under the Mental Health Act, the court found it undesirable for the respondent to possess the firearm for his and his ex-girlfriend's safety.

The firearm was ordered forfeit.

While the Crown sought a three-year prohibition, the court granted a two-year prohibition, finding it sufficient given the circumstances and time passed.

This decision concerns the sentencing of the defendant for manslaughter, to which he pleaded guilty.

The offence involved the fatal assault of his intimate partner, who was vulnerable due to drug and alcohol consumption.

The assault was brutal and prolonged, resulting in blunt force trauma and internal injuries.

Aggravating factors included the domestic context, victim vulnerability, the vicious nature of the assault, the defendant's failure to summon immediate medical aid, and prior abuse.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, sincere remorse, youthful first offender status, harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, rehabilitative efforts, and strong family support.

The court balanced these factors, imposing a sentence of eight years in jail, less pre-sentence custody credit.

This decision addresses a voir dire in a criminal trial concerning the admissibility of self-incriminating statements and breath test results in an impaired driving case.

The defence argued Charter violations (ss. 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b)) and that the accused lacked an operating mind.

The court found initial breaches of the accused's s.10(a) and (b) Charter rights during investigative detention due to police failure to promptly inform him of the reasons for detention and right to counsel.

However, it ruled that subsequent spontaneous statements made after the detention ended, and further statements and breath samples obtained at the police station, were admissible.

The court applied the R. v. Grant framework, concluding that the spontaneous statements were not causally connected to the initial breach and that the accused possessed an operating mind despite intoxication, as evidenced by his coherent responses and understanding of cautions.

This case concerns an application by Luigi Caruso to refer the Chief Firearms Officer's (CFO) decision to revoke his Possession and Acquisition Licence (PAL) to a provincial court judge, pursuant to section 74(1)(a) of the Firearms Act.

The CFO revoked the PAL based on evidence from a police investigation (Project Ovenus) that suggested Mr. Caruso's involvement in drug and firearm trafficking, improper firearm storage, and gunsmithing, despite his criminal charges being stayed due to unreasonable delay.

The court affirmed that a stay of proceedings is not equivalent to an acquittal for all purposes, especially in the context of public safety assessments under the Firearms Act.

The judge found the CFO's decision to be reasonable, as the evidence, including Mr. Caruso's incriminating statements and the discovery of contraband in his residence's basement, supported the conclusion that he posed a public safety risk.

The application was dismissed.

Chadwick Francis was stopped at a RIDE spot-check where police detected a strong odour of cannabis.

After producing an opened cannabis packet, a subsequent search of his vehicle revealed a loaded handgun.

Francis challenged the lawfulness of the search and his detention, alleging racial profiling and violations of his Charter rights (sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b)).

The court found that the cannabis was not lawfully packaged for transport under the Cannabis Control Act, justifying the search.

It also determined that there was no racial profiling and that the delay in providing counsel rights was reasonable.

Francis was found guilty of four firearms-related offences.

The applicant, Elijah Jacques-Taylor, sought a stay of serious firearms charges under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the information being sworn (November 18, 2021) to the anticipated trial date (October 2-4, 2023) was 22 months and 2 weeks.

The court deducted one month for defence counsel's unavailability and three months for the ongoing impact of the COVID-19 backlog, resulting in a net delay of 18 months and 2 weeks.

This period exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice established in R. v. Jordan.

As the Crown conceded there were no exceptional circumstances to justify the delay, the court concluded that a stay of proceedings was the necessary remedy.

The defendant was charged with failing to provide a suitable breath sample for an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand after being found asleep in his vehicle.

The Crown and defence disputed the reasonable suspicion for the ASD demand and the mens rea standard for the offence.

The court found that the officer's ASD demand was within the 'forthwith window'.

However, the central issue was whether the Crown proved the failure to provide a suitable sample beyond a reasonable doubt.

Due to insufficient and inaccurate details provided by the administering officer regarding the multiple failed tests, the court found a reasonable doubt remained and dismissed the charge.